

PLATO'S

Demon

Or, the

STATE-PHYSICIAN

Unmaskt;

Being a Discourse in Answer to
a Book call'd Plato Redivivus.

By Thomas Goddard, Esq;

Si enim id spectamus, quam referta voce Lucius Pril:
cus incensum sum & ante dominum posuerit, neque
ceteris, neque sapientibus, ne servilis quidem cunctatus in
eum iussit. Tacit. Ann. lib. 3.

L O N D O N,

Printed by H. Hills Jun. for Walter Kettilby,
at the Bishop's Head in Saint Paul's
Church-yard, 1684.

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Si enim id spectamus, quam referta voce Lucius Priscus
cuius mentem Iam O curis dominum possidet, neque
ceteris, neque sapientibus, ne servilis quidem cunctatione in
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a Book call'd *Plato Redivivus*.

By *Thomas Goddard, Esq;*

Si unum Id spectamus, quam nefaria voce Lutorius Priscus mentem suam & aures hominum polluerit, neque carcer, neque laquei, ne serviles quidem cruciatus in eum suffecerint. Tacit. Ann. lib. 3.

L O N D O N,

Printed by *H. Hills Jun.* for *Walter Kettilby,*
at the *Bishop's Head* in *Saint Paul's*
Church-yard, 1684.

PLATO

Deum

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G. 55

STATISTICIAN

Rare

Unmask

Being a Discourse in Answer to
a Book call'd Vato Rediviva.

By Thomas Colclough

It is a well known fact, that a person who is not
a Christian, cannot be a good citizen, nor a
good subject, nor a good man. This is a
truth, which is as old as time, and as
new as the world.

L O W D O N

Printed by H. Hills, for Walter Knapton,
at the Bishop's Head in Saint Dunstons
Church-yard, 1684.

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To His

ROYAL HIGHNESS,
JAMES
Duke of YORK, &c.

Royal Sir,

THe sense which all sober
Men, and good Subjects,
ever will retain of that
Safety and Protection, which the
Nation owes to your Princely
Wisdom, and true born Courage,
A 2 obligeth

The Epistle Dedicatory.

obligeth us to look upon your Royal Person (next to His most Sacred Majesty) as Our Sword, Our Shield, and Our securest Hopes.

You are Our Head in Council, and Our Arm in Battel: and as we all ought to fight under your Royal Banner against the force and injuries of a Foreign Foe; so is it Our Duty to oppose no less, the Seditious Conspiracies, and Traiterous Associations, of Our little, malicious scribbling Enemies at home.

Amongst many of that deceiving, or deceived Crew, none seems more impudently extravagant than the Author

The Epistle Dedicatory

thor of a Libel call'd *Plura Redi-*
vivus. The Book it self, with the
encouragement which I had to
answer it, I received about *May*
last at *Paris*, from that most Loy-
al and most Worthy Minister, my
Lord *Preston*. What I have been
able to do in this little time, I
most humbly offer at your
Highness's Feet, being fully as-
sured, that your Royal High-
ness will never refuse your
Princely Protection to what Per-
son so ever shall sincerely endea-
vour to defend (according to his
strength) Our Regal Government
with its just Rights, and Preroga-
tives. May Heaven continue

The Epistle Dedicatory.

your Royal Person a Blessing to
these Kingdoms, to the utmost
extent of Providence and Mercy:
And may these Nations endea-
vour to deserve so great a Bless-
ing, by an unfeigned Respect,
Duty, and Gratitude without
limit.

Your Royal Highness's

*Most Obedient, Most Faithful,
and Most Humble Servant.*

T. G.

TO

TO THE
READER.

T*He iniquity and licentiousness of the times are such, that those wicked Principles which the most perverse of men in former days would hardly trust to their private thoughts, In these men impudently dare to publish.*

Amongst many Seditious Libels, which of late have come abroad, none is more insolently bold than

To the Reader.

that which bears the Name of Plato Redivivus. The Author seems so hardened and confirmed in his Villanous Errors, that he makes no scruple to offer Treason and Sedition, for Reason and Loyalty: He would make us believe that he is supporting Our Government, whilst he endeavours utterly to destroy it: Propounds ruine and slavery in a quiet and peaceable way:

Page 219. And disapproves a Civil

War only because he doubts the success: He beseeches the King therefore that he would be graciously pleased to lay down his Imperial Crown: Tells

Page 220.

him it will make himself Glorious, and his People happy: Adviseth him to

Page 249.

quit his lawful Power, that he may be great: Divest himself

To the Reader.

himself of his Prerogatives and Liberties that he may be free; and become a ward to a Popular Junctio, that he may live at ease. And that this their Pupil King may not doubt the kind intentions of his Indulgent Governours, they promise to take immediately the Administration of the Regal Authority into their own hands, and make him as idle, as he would prove an insignificant Prince: Ease him of the trouble of making Peace and War abroad, and Officers and Ministers at home; Take away from him the disposal of the Militia, by Sea and Land, as also of his own Revenue, as affairs too mean and below the consideration of such an absolute Monarch: Disengage him

Page 258.

Page 237.

Page 239.

To the Reader.

him from the Obligation of bestowing Honours, and Titles, upon Persons deserving well; That Barons, Earls, and Dukes shall be

Page 252. henceforward created

by the Authority and Favour of Gentlemen, Esquires, and Knights. And last of all, that the Dignity of this their Glorious King might lose nothing of its lustre, from the Communication of laborious business, and the concerns of Government, it is proposed, that the King shall have

Page 249. no more Authority to

Call, Adjourn, Prorogue, or Dissolve Parliaments: That their Annual Session shall be perpetuated to all Eternity.

And least an Honest, Sober and Loyal Parliament, should (in process of time) undo what a Knavish, Hot-brain'd

To the Reader.

*brain'd and Traiterous Assembly
had imposed upon us,* Page 249.

Elections are to be regulated according to their own
fancies, and *Honesty and Loyalty*
are to be perpetual marks of Inca-
pacity. And in a word, when they
are once elected, It is concluded,
that they shall be Judge and Par-
ty in their own Cause,
and govern themselves Page 254.

*World without end, according to
their own Independent and most
Soveraign Right of Power.*

Now least these, and many other
Propositions, (howsoever illegal and
extravagant) should not be em-
braced as chearfully as they are
loyally and honestly intended, Our
Author assures us, That he hath
proposed nothing in
his Discourse which Page 258.

in-

To the Reader.

intrencheth upon the Kings
Hereditary Right.

These, Worthy Reader, are the
just Principles and sound Founda-
tion upon which Our Author pre-
tends to build his new-found Go-
vernment. And that the Effect may
answer so good and so great a Pro-
ject; He assures us, that such a
blessed Reformation will not fail
to work Miracles. The King shall be
more absolute when he hath no

Page 249.

Power at all, than ever
he was, or could be
before: The Lords more honou-
rable when they receive their Ho-
nours from the People,

Page 256. 7.

than when they were
given by the King. The Peo-
ple shall enjoy their Liberties and
Properties more Secure, now they
are become their own Slaves, than
when

To the Reader.

when they were the Kings Subjects: No Fires in London but of their own making, no Want in the Country, no Wars abroad, nor Troubles at home but of their own raising: Presbyterians and Papists like Peace and Righteousness shall kiss each other: The Lyon shall lie down with the Lamb, and there shall be no more enmity between the Serpent and the Seed of the Woman.

Page 186.

Nay, such is the force of our wonder-working politick Apostle, that provided his Tyrannical, Popular Usurpation may take place against a Lawful, Natural, & the most Easie Monarchy upon Earth, all Interests will be reconciled, all Persons, of whatsoever different Principles or Professions they be, whether Jew or Greek, a Samaritan, or of the dwellers of
Me.

To the Reader.

Mesopotamia ; They shall all understand his charming and irresistible reasoning in their own Languages, that is, according to each man's design, and the desires of his own heart.

Now although the extravagances & fallacies of our vain Magisterial Author, are obvious enough to all sober, considering men, yet since Error is more communicative than Truth, and some men (especially such as may be already prejudiced are more apt to embrace Shadows, than retain Substances, I have endeavoured to distinguish Both, unmask our Republican Dæmon, & shew no less his horrid Claws, than his Cloven-feet.

I should now make some excuse that this Answer comes so late into the World, but I have a sufficient Witness, that I had never
seen

To the Reader.

seen the Book call'd Plato Redivivus, before I received it at Paris, about May last, from My Lord Preston, His Majesties Envoy Extraordinary in the French Court: To his Lordship, I owe the first motion, and encouragement of answering it, you the advantage (if any be) and satisfaction of the Answer.

*Next I must inform you, that I meddle little with the Law-part, which is now and then to be met withal in Our Author; not only because it hath been sufficiently answer'd already, but besides, if there be any breach of the Law or Government by any Person whatsoever, the Courts of Justice are open, which are the proper places for Law matters; and when Plato shall think fit to shew himself and legally accuse, both himself, and such other of the
Kings*

To the Reader

Kings Subjects, who may have been deceived by him, will receive a more full & ample satisfaction, than I durst pretend to give them.

The historical and rational part I endeavour to answer as plainly, as my judgment and little time would permit, which I have done also by way of Dialogue, that I might in all things comply with Our Authors method, as far as is reasonable. Many impertinencies I have passed by to avoid tediousness. Those faults in this Discourse which shall not be found maticious, I hope the Reader will excuse; small mistakes may be easily rectified. And as to the whole, if the Reader shall please to examine it as impartially, as it is writ sincerely, I persuade my self, that he will find nothing misbecoming an Honest Man and a Loyal Subject.
Farewell. PLATO's

PLATO's Dæmon:

OR;

The State-Physician unmaskt;

BEING

A Discourse in Answer to a Book
call'd *Plato Redivivus*.

The Argument.

An English Gentleman lately return'd
from France, and Italy, where he had
spent several years, is invited by a very
considerable Merchant, and his near
Kinsman, to his Country House, where
discourfing of many things with great
liberty, the Merchant accidentally opens
a Book, call'd *Plato Redivivus*, which

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the Traveller had brought down with him into the Country; This becomes a new Subject of Discourse, and both deliver their opinions concerning it with great freedom, as follows.

First Discourse.

Merchant.

Good morrow, *Cousin*, What, up and ready too so early? How do you like our *Old English Country Air*?

Traveller. Very well Sir, and indeed the pleasantness of this situation, with those many delights which appear round about it, are sufficient to raise any Man from his Bed, especially one who hath been so long a stranger to the happinesses of a Country retirement, and who loves them so much as I do.

Mer. I rather feared that notwithstanding our best endeavours here, your time would pass tediously away, for having seen all *France and Italy* (which they call the Garden of *Europe*) I apprehended that the best part of *England*, would have appeared no better to you, then an uncultivated Desert. *Trav.*

Trav. No, nor yet shall *Lumbardy*, nor *Capua* which is the Garden of *Italy*, be ever preferr'd by me before our own blest, happy soil.

Mer. I am glad to find you so good an *Englishman*, the rather because we may now hope to keep you henceforward in a place which, it seems, you like so well.

Trav. Believe me, *Tutto il mondo è paese*. All Countries are in this alike, that they have their conveniences, and inconveniences, their particular delights, and their particular wants. And when we shall have made a just estimate of all the Kingdoms in *Europe*, I know none, which for pleasure and profit, ought to be preferr'd justly before our own.

Mer. Sir, I was always satisfied with my own Countrey, and the little encouragement you give me to exchange it for any other confirms me now so much in my Opinion, that I am resolv'd never to cross the Seas, except some greater Business, than I can foresee, should necessitate me.

Trav. I have now spent somewhat more than Eight years, (as you know *Cousin*) out of *England*. The first time

I went abroad, I only learnt my Exercises, and made those *Tours* of *France* and *Italy*, which generally other Gentlemen use to do. I could then have told you who was the best Dancing Master of *Paris*, where liv'd the most fashionable Taylor, the airiest Perriwig-maker, and such like. In *Italy*, where the best Wines, and what Curiosities were particular to every City.

But having almost lost the *bon goût*, as they say, or relish for those youthful pleasures, since I went last abroad, I have made other remarks, and grown more sullen possibly than I ought to be; can tell you now of the pride and libertinage of the *French Noblesse*, the impertinence, *coquetry* and debauchery of the Gentry, the misery of the Commonalty, the extream poverty of most, and slavery of all. In *Italy* the restraint of their Wives and Women, the jealousy of Husbands and their general vindicative humour: At *Venice* the insupportable insolence of their *Nobili Venediani*, and triumphant Vice. At *Genova* the scandalous Mechanick Traffick and notorious Avarice of their Grandees, in-
somuch

ſomuch that they ſtarve even a Jew in
 his own Trade: Their frequent aſſaſſi-
 nations, pride and ill manners. The
 dull Bigotry of *Florence*, and hard im-
 poſitions upon Subjects. The formaliti-
 ties of *Rome*, the loſt Vertue and Cou-
 rage, and natural Cowardize and *Pol-
 tronery* of the degenerated *Romans*; the
 inſolence of the Commonalty *del regna*,
 as they call it, or Kingdom of *Naples*,
 the Robberies of their *Banditti*, the great
 Titles, and ſmall Eſtates of the Nobili-
 ty; the hereditary *riſſes* or quarrels of
 the *Piedmonteſe*, and thoſe of *Monſerrat*,
 and (from their ill adminiſtration of
 Juſtice) their eternal *Proceſſes*. And to
 conclude, add to this, the arbitrary Go-
 vernment exerciſ'd generally all over
Italy, and the heavy impoſitions
 upon their Subjects, greater than they
 ought to bear.

Now, Couſin, with all I have ſaid,
 compare the extream happineſs of the
Engliſh Nation. The Riches of the Com-
 monalty, inſomuch that ſome have
 thought it to be the greateſt part of our
 diſeaſe; The vaſt trade and prosperous
 condition of our Merchants; The Hoſpi-
 tality,

tality, Wealth and Modesty of our Gentry ; The high quality and true worth of our Nobility, their uncorrupted Loyalty to their Prince, and unaffected kindness for the People.

But above all let us reflect seriously upon the most happy security and liberty of our Persons and Estates, which all strangers are forc't both to admire and envy : Our freedom and exemption from all manner of Taxes and Impositions, but such as we our selves shall consent to.

And not to be too tedious upon a subject which is so large, let us truly consider, and at the same time bless God Almighty for our just Laws, and impartial execution of them, for the admirable & equal Constitution of our Government ; where the Prince hath so great a power, and the People such ample privileges, that as our form of Government is Monarchy, and that as perfect and free as the Sun ever saw, so it is eternally secur'd from the corruption of Tyranny.

Over all this, our present Age enjoys a Prince so moderate and so just, that
his

his mercy and goodness, have been his greatest faults, and his Government over us hath been so modest, that his greatest Enemies are forc't to confess, That his present Majesty never did any Act of arbitrary Power, nor took from any particular Person the benefit of the Law; *Plato Red. p. 118, 119.*

These considerations have oblig'd all Persons of all Nations whom I have hapned to meet abroad, or who have heard or read any thing concerning us, to congratulate with me the incomparable Constitution and easiness of the Government under which we live, and applying the happiness of *Virgil's* Husbandman to our own People, have often repeated:

*O fortunatos nimium, bona se sua norint,
Anglicolas.*

Now, *Cousin*, if you have an inclination to leave all those general blessings, besides your particular ones of a noble House, a healthful & pleasant situation, delightful Garden, plenty of water & fresh springs, and many other great conveniences be-

longing to them, then *Cousin*, go abroad, and there learn to be wiser.

Mer. No, good *Cousin*, I intend to remain a fool and stay at home, & to speak plainly, if I had as good an Opinion of the present Constitution of our own Government, as I have an ill one of those which you have mention'd, all those foreign pleasures, which the most Frenches'd Traveller would make us believe were to be found amongst them, should not persuade me to leave Old *England*, not so much as for one single Month.

Trav. How, dear *Cousin*? Is it possible that there should be any thing in the Constitution of our own Government which can displease a man of your sense, and solid Judgment, and one whom hitherto I have ever thought very well affected to it?

Mer. Truly Sir, few men love their King and Countrey better than my self. I have never forwarded any irregular address to his Majesty, nor given my Vote for any notorious Phanatick, nor am I look'd upon as such amongst them. But I must confess, when I reflect upon the differences and animosities between the
King

King and the House of Commons, the discontents of a great number of People, the Danger of Popery, and many other such considerations, which I have not at present in my mind, I cannot but think there is a fault somewhere, and where to lay it more modestly, and more reasonably than upon the Constitution of the Government itself, is what I cannot find out.

But we shall not want opportunity to discourse as much as you please of these matters, ere we return to *London*: And in the mean time, I think it a good hour to break your fast. What Drink do you choose for your Mornings draught?

Trav. Good faith *Cousin*, a mouthful or two of good Air is to me the most acceptable Breakfast in the World.

Mer. Pray use no ceremonies. You know and believe, I hope, that our friendship, as well as near relation gives, you the same freedom in my House, as you have in your own. If therefore you will eat or drink any thing, speak what you like best, and the Butler shall bring it you immediately. But if you be resolv'd to stay till Dinner, I will in the mean time carry you to a very pleasant walk, and

and shew you a little Arbour at the end, agreeable enough.

Trav. Most willingly. I'll only put on my Cravat and Perriwig and wait upon you.

Mer. And I, until you are ready, will (with your leave) examine what curious Books you have brought down from beyond Sea.

Trav. Very few besides such as I carried over; for I find *London* the best Library, and *England* the best University for learned men in *Europe*.

Mer. I am glad you think it so. Let's see, what have we here? *Hugonis Grotii de Jure Belli ac Pacis*? This we have translated into *English* since you left us.

Trav. I heard so in *Italy*, but never saw the Book, I should have thought it a very difficult undertaking by reason of many expressions so particular to the Civil Law and *Latin*, that they are hard to be rendered into our Language.

Mer. It is very well done, and of good use, I can shew it you when ever you please. For in my vacant hours I love a little reading, especially when I meet with

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an Author, who is universally allow'd to be of a solid Judgment & great Learning.

Trav. You could not have met with one in my opinion who more truly possesses those two qualifications than *Grotius* did. *Joseph Scaliger* tells us, that he was *prudens Politicus, optimus Graecus, Juris-consultus, modestus, praestantissimus in Epigrammatibus*, and certainly he deserv'd all or more than he hath said of him.

Mer. What have you got next? The holy Bible in *English*? Nay then, *Cousin*, we may hope, that besides your *English* inclinations, you have brought over with you also your *English* Religion. For I think the *Papists* seldom make use of the Bible.

Trav. Sir, I assure you, I profess the same Religion which I ever did, and hope I ever shall. I mean the true *Orthodox Protestant Religion of the Church of England*, as it is by Law establish'd, and in my Heart do believe it, not only a safe Religion, but the most sound and the most pure in its Doctrine as well as in its discipline, that is profess'd this day in any part of the whole World.

Mer.

Mer. I shall ever agree with you in the Doctrine, and not much differ from you in the Discipline. But let us proceed. What fine gilt Book is this? *Plato Redivivus*. 'Tis a strong piece, *Cousin*.

Trav. As strong as Mustard, *Cousin*; Children are afraid of it, because it bites them by the Nose, as they fancy. But those of riper years, easily discover the fallacy, for when examin'd, it leaves no impression behind it.

Mer. Have you read it Sir?

Trav. Please to open it, and you will find whether I have or no.

Mer. I perceive indeed that your red Lead Pen hath examin'd it very strictly; every leaf looks almost as dismal as a Martyr.

Trav. Not a Martyr, I beseech you; but if you will say a Sacrifice, I will admit of the Comparison.

Mer. Why *Cousin*? What distinction do you make between these two?

Trav. Martyr, Sir, is generally taken in a good sense, and in a good cause, but a Sacrifice may be said to be offer'd either to God or to the Devil.

Mer. Which is as much as to say,
That

That you believe the Author hath undertaken an ill cause.

Trav. Yes, Sir, and under any good Government besides our own, especially in that Republick, which he so much admires, both himself and his works would have been made publick Sacrifices to Justice, and to the quiet of the establish'd Government, long before now.

Mer. But is it not hard, that a Man of great Learning, should not have liberty to give his Judgment in a case of so great consequence, as the Peace and Security of our Government, under which our lives and fortunes, and our all, are to be preserv'd or shipwrack'd; especially when his design is so apparently good and commendable?

Trav. First, *Cousin*, as to our present Author, to deal plainly with you, I cannot possibly remark, either his great Learning, or his good design. But supposing he had both (which I shall hardly grant you) yet I must maintain, that any private person, who unauthoriz'd by our lawful Government, shall publish either by words or writings, any arguments or discourse, against the Constitution of
the

the Government by Law establish'd, is a pestilent, pragmatistical Deceiver, a seditious *Calumniator*, and *Perturbator* of our Peace: His words and writings become scandalous *Lies*, and both deserve the extreamest punishments, which the rigour of the Law or Reason in that case provides.

Mer. Hold, hold, dear *Cousin*, be not so angry.

Trav. Sir, I ask your pardon; for whilst you entertain me with so much kindness, it were indeed unreasonable that I should offend you in the Person of any Man, for whom you may bear the least respect.

Mer. No, no, Sir, you mistake me; for in the first place I have no acquaintance with the author, supposing it, whom common fame speaks him: Besides, want of freedom in discourse, abates so much of the profit, as well as the pleasure of it, that I must conjure you to use all the liberty henceforward imaginable, and so with your good leave I intend to do my self. But I confess I wonder'd a little to see you so warm and vigorous in the Defence of a Government,

ment, under which we must needs agree, that even to our own knowledg, and possibly amongst our own friends, there have happen'd cases very severe (not to say more) which sure must be faults, either in the Governours, or the Government.

Trav. Perhaps in neither, for though as you say, we may have remembred many particular cases, which to us have seem'd hard, yet it may be, if we had fully examin'd the circumstances of each case, we should have found, either some mismanagement in the Person, or some very unlucky contingency, which neglects or misfortunes we presently throw upon the Government, that we may the easier discharge our selves.

Indeed such particular cases, how hard soever they may seem to those concerned, yet ought they not to overbias or prejudice a Mans Reason or Justice, much less make him undermine, and endeavour to shake the very Constitution of our present Government; which having subsisted so long, been constituted, approved, confirmed, by so many wise, just, and valiant Princes; and.

and consented to, established, and courageously asserted by such a long Series of our grave, and learned Ancestors, remains the same at this day in the substantial part, which it ever hath been in the best of times, and under the administration of much greater *Politicians* than our *quack Statesman*, (who ever he was) seems to have been.

Mer. I know not what our former Constitution hath been. It is sufficient to mind you, that *now* the uncertainty of grants, and Court favours hath been such, that many men have never enjoyed, what with great pains and expence they thought they had obtained; and I still think that a fault.

Trav. I guess possibly what you mean, and I confess *Machiavel* above all things advises his Prince to avoid the imputation of easiness, or unsteadiness. He would not have him be, *Varius*, or *Levis*, as he calls it. But on the contrary, to be so firm and constant in all that he says, or resolves, as not to leave in any Man, so much as the hopes of moving or deceiving him. *Ita sententiam suam quam semel pronuntiavit, ratam*

ac firmam haberi velit, ad ab ea nunquam deduci, aut dimoveri posse proterro reneant, ac talem de se opinionem sustineri ac retineri studeat, ac illorum nemo veniat, ut illum aut decipi aut flecti posse cogitet. This certainly is good advice, and possibly very proper in our circumstances; and this exact care of a Prince in keeping his word, and not passing one grant over the head of another, might be more practicable in the little Government, under which *Machiavel* wrote, than in ours, which hath such numerous Offices depending upon his Majesties grace and favour. But still if this *Fermete*, be wanting, and hard cases do sometimes happen, yet nothing can be more ridiculous and unjust, than presently to accuse the Government: For such things have happen'd under the best forms of Government that ever have been, or ever will be, whether Monarchical or Democratical, and will ever happen, whilst we are govern'd by men, who are all more or less naturally subject to inevitable frailties. We must therefore distinguish between the Supream Governours, and the subordinate ones, and

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both

both from the Constitution of the Government. The first, as I said, are subject to weaknesses and infirmities, and when they are too frequent, I mean in the subordinate Officers, they may be easily remov'd or chang'd, without destroying or altering the Government.

For as a man would be justly thought mad, or highly imprudent, who finding that by the negligence of Servants, a Door-post, or Window, a Joyst, Beam or Rafter of his House had been decay'd, should immediately pull down the whole building, with a design to repair only those little breaches; so that Politician is certainly most unfit for a Prince's Cabinet, or House of Parliament, who finding, it may be, some mismanagement in State-affairs, should presently resolve to pull down the Fabrick it self, I mean Monarchy, and in its place build up a phantastical Commonwealth, then transform that into an Optimacy, then an Oligarchy, till having pass'd through all the misfortunes, which innovation and change have generally produc'd, we fall necessarily into confusion and Anarchy,

and

and in that most miserable state, become either Slaves to some mechanical Tyrant, sprung up from the Lees of the people, and rais'd by the foul breath of vulgar applause, or made eternally a pittiful Province loaden with afflictions, and groaning under the heavy Taxes of a foreign Conquerour.

By this time, *Confin*, I hope you understand the difference between Governours and Governments; the solid Foundation, or the whole House it self, from its Ornaments, or some necessary or convenient parts of it, and the dangers which attend the change of the one, more than of the other. I shall endeavour to shew you next, if you command me, what unjust pretences our old neglected Politician has found out, to endeavour an alteration in either, and what false arguments he produces to favour his pretence!

Met. Nothing can oblige me more; And that we may not lose the advantage of this fine morning, since you are now ready, let us be walking. I'll lead you through my Garden, which brings us into the walk I spake of, and in the

Arbour, if you please, we may discourse farther of these matters.

Trav. Most willingly. And to help the unfaithfulness of my memory; I'll take my constant companion *Grotius* in my Pocket.

Mer. And I, that I may be able now and then to make some opposition, or at least ask some pertinent Questions, will take with me our friend *Plato Redivivus*.

Trav. Best of all: You will find, whatever is well or ill said by him already scor'd to your hand.

Mer. Come then, let us walk. You see, *Confn*, that my Garden is but small, but the Soil is very proper for Fruit, and lies well enough to the South Sun, which is a great advantage to us.

Trav. Yes: And I see you have plasht your Vines upon *Treilles*; which sure ripens the Fruit better than when they touch the Walls. Then your Gravel walks are particular to our Country, and finer than any thing I have seen of that kind, either in *France* or *Italy*.

Mer.

Mer. You may take notice also that I want not Water, for I have an excellent Spring, which lies close by the Arbour to which we are going, that serves all the offices of my House. Here Sir, is the walk I told you of.

Trav. It is indeed very pleasant and I suppose we see at the end of it the Arbour you mean.

Mer. The same. There we shall have a very fine prospect over a great part of our Country. But what will please me much better, I hope to have there the advantage of your Discourse, upon a subject, which will be no less delightful than profitable, to a man who has had neither time nor learning enough to examine those high points, which do not much belong to a man of my profession.

Trav. Sir, I am very well satisfied concerning your judgment and your learning also: For I remember you were reputed the best Scholar in *Paul's School*, when I was at *Westminster*. And if the death of your Father had not happen'd in the nick of time, you were design'd for *Oxford*, when I went

to *Cambridg*. However having lately had occasion to read somewhat more of these matters, than it may be you have done, I shall be very willing to give you my opinion, as far as my reading goes, provided you will excuse my ignorance and presumption, in seeming to inform you of what possibly you are better instructed than my self.

Mer. Pray, dear *Cousin*, let's lose no time in complements, we are now in the *Arbour*, and here are seats convenient enough.

Trav. Sir, I am ready to obey your commands. And that we may proceed in some method, at least as good as your Author there has taken; and because I suppose it is thought by some, that he has treated as fully and clearly upon that subject, as is necessary to satisfy a reasonable man, let us examine him from the beginning to the end.

Mer. That I fear will be too tedious for you.

Trav. No Sir, you have only to read those places, which are marked with the red lead Pen; And if you please to add any arguments of your own (which

(which I am confident will have more weight, than many which he has produc'd) I will endeavour to give you the most plain and satisfactory Answers I can.

Mer. Agreed; And in the first place I find, you have wounded even *Plato* himself in the very Title of the Book.

Trav. No Sir, it is only his Ghost or *Demon, Plato Redivivus*; For to tell you the truth, I never was a friend to such troublesome spirits. But in earnest, do you not think it a little arrogance in our Polypragmatick (notwithstanding the gentle excuse of the Publisher) to assume the Title even of *Plato* himself. I am confident, could *Plato* look into the world again, he would be much asham'd to see how ill a figure his Ghost makes among all sober men, and it would prove a second death more cruel than the first, to see himself so ill *Travestied*.

Mar. But *Cousin*, he that maintains *Plato's* opinions, may surely without offence call himself *Plato's* Friend and Disciple, and *Honoris gratia*, as our Author says, take upon himself the

name of him, whom he admires and follows; that is common enough at this day among our selves.

Thro. 'Tis true, but in that case he ought rather to have stiled himself *Plato Britannicus*. That would have made distinction enough between the Master and the Scholar, I agreed better with the instances which you have brought on his behalf, and have been more modest than *Redivivus*.

However you must consider that *Plato* and others living then under Common-wealths, wrote in favour of that Form of Government, under which their lives and fortunes were protected. And besides, many of them, being but the late corruptions of Monarchy or Aristocracy, wanted the learned Philosopher's defence. But to alter, may totally destroy the ancient establish'd Government, under which we enjoy all the blessings and liberties, which our Ancestors ever did, or we can reasonably desire, would have been so much contrary to the Wisdom and Judgment of *Plato*, that he would no more have wrote in our days, for a

Democracy in *London*, than for Monarchy at *Athens*.

Add to this the vast difference between the State of *Greece* in those days, and that of Great *Britain* in these: The first was divided into several different Governments, all ambitious of one another's greatness, and were oftentimes forc'd to make great alterations in their Politics, according to the misfortunes, or success of their Neighbours, who besides were all upon the same Continent, and had no other bounds or separation between them, than a hedge or brook, or at most a little River.

But *England* having subsisted gloriously and happily, more than 1700 years, as authentick History can witness, under a Monarchical Government, and divided from the world by a Ditch which nature has made, not easily passable, - *Toto divisos orbe Britannos*, fears no interruption whatsoever, in our Tranquillity or Government, but such as may proceed from seditious men, whom false mischievous and calumniating persons (such as our Author

ther is) may, if tolerated, decoy into some Rebellion as unnatural, as to themselves destructive.

To conclude, I appeal to all wise men, whether the Government of *Athens* in those days, be more applicable and necessary for us and ours in these, than to affirm, that the Government of *France* could not possibly subsist, except they introduce the Discipline of *Geneva*, or Polity of the little Commonwealth of *Luca* or *Genova*.

Mer. I am much pleased with this way of reasoning, and am well satisfied, that times, and places, and circumstances, may alter our reason exceedingly, and that no one *Polity*, or Form of Governments or laws whatsoever, are universally proper for all places.

Plato, I think, introduc'd in his Commonwealth, a commonalty or common use of Wives or Women, as well as of all other Goods and Chattels. *Lycurgus* forbade the use of Gold and Silver, divided all the Lands equally amongst all, and permitted the noble

exercise

exercise of stealing. Sure could these two learned men preach the same Doctrine in our days at London, as they did then in Sparta and Athens, they would be look'd upon rather as mad-men, than great Law-givers and Philosophers.

Trav. Aureum, or raptu vivere, was indeed commendable among the Egyptians, and generally all the Grecians, as well as Spartans. But it was not, *ad sumptum libidini præbendum*, as Gellius observes, but only *pro exercitio disciplinæque reipublicæ facitatum*. To accustom their youth to vigilance and agility, that thereby they might be initiated in some measure in military affairs, and learn the practical part of laying, as well as avoiding the snares and ambushes of their enemies.

This practice in Peace prepar'd them for War abroad, and the impossibility of gaining any thing at home, together with the small reward of Industry, so inclin'd them to it, that they fancied, they could be no where more miserable, than in their own Houses, nor ever lead a more unfortunate than a peace-

peaceable life, *Ils estoient si malheureux en leurs maisons* (says my Author) *qu'ils ne demandoient que la guerre pour en sortir, & trouver dans la fatigue des armes du soulagement a leurs maux.*

And I am confident, whosoever shall consider impartially the Laws and Constitutions of those older Democratical Governments, I mean of *Rome*, as well as *Sparta* and *Athens*, will find, that they were adapted, and contriv'd rather for the enlargement and conquest of other Countries, than the peace and security of their own, and in effect they were all three in continual Wars; sometimes Conquerors; sometimes reduc'd to the utmost extremities of Conquest, untill at last, having past through all the miseries which Change and Wars produce, they were united all, and consolidated under a Monarchy, from which only true solid Form of Government, they at first proceeded.

Now how improper such Laws and Constitutions would prove for us, who are in no measure in their circumstances, and to whom all foreign acquisitions, have

have been justly thought rather chargeable, and prejudicial, than advantageous, I leave to you and all sober men to determin.

As for *Plato*, it is true, that he permitted the promiscuous use of Women, as may be seen in his 4 *Repub.* for which amongst other things *Aristotle* reprehends him in his 2 *Polit.* c. 5.

But that might proceed from the little respect which he had for that Sex, and great love for the other, which made him so great a Pæderastist, or to speak plainer, a Sodomite that he wish'd himself as many eyes, as there were Stars in the Heavens, the better to admire his dear *Alexis*, his *Phedrus*, or his *Agathon*; witness (amongst other tender expressions) that celebrated Distich to his beloved *Agathon*.

Τὴν ψυχὴν Ἀγάθωνα φιλοῦν ἐπὶ χείρεσιν ἔχον

Ἦλθε γὰρ ἡ τλήμων αἵ διαβητομένη.

I cannot pass by a memorable passage to this purpose of *Philo*, a great favourer of *Plato*, who tells us in his Book *De vita Contemplatrice*, that *Plato's*
Con-

Coniuvia's were all spent in the affairs of love, not of Men towards Women, or Women towards Men, which the Law of nature doth very well approve, but of Men towards one another, or youths no way differing but in their Ages, τὸν Πλατωνικὸν ἅπαν ἡλικίαν ἐξισοῦν ἔργον, &c.

Now whether our Climate be warm enough to entertain such Philosophical and Amorous notions, will be an experiment amongst his Politicks, worthy the name of *Plato Redivivus*.

But to return to his Government, and that you may not be carried away with the fame only, or great reputation of any man, whether ancient or modern; give me leave to mind you, that *Plato*, as great a Philosopher as he was, had nevertheless an Antagonist, as eminent in all manner of learning as himself; I mean the admirable *Xenophon*, who, whilst *Plato* instituted his Commonwealth, defended worthily the most excellent Government of Monarchy, as may be seen at large in his *Cyropaedia*. And so jealous were these two famous men of their name and honour, that as *Plato* in all his writings never named *Xenophon*,

phan, tho' contemporaries, so *Xenophon* also never made any mention of *Plato*.

Men. This, *Causin*, is thus far very plain and satisfactory, that is to say, that the ancient Customs, Laws, and Governments of *Greece*, or any other part of the World, though contriv'd and modell'd by men extremely learn'd, and most proper for those times and Countries, where they were in force, are not for that single reason practicable in our days, and in our Kingdom, any farther than our case and circumstances agree with theirs.

And that the Authority of *Plato*, *Lycurgus*, or *Solon*, or any other, are to be admitted no farther than their laws are proper or convenient for us.

Trav. Right, for though *Galen*, *Hypocrates* or *Æsculapius* himself, should have deliver'd as an Oracle that Phlebotomy is good in Feavers, yet if a modern Physician shall from thence affirm that we may as safely bleed an ancient Phlegmatick person, languishing under a malignant Fever, as a vigorous, young, Sanguine man, who is sick of a burning Fever, I think
in

in reason, we ought not to admit of his inference.

Besides, you must again remark, that as Democracy, so Monarchy had equally its learned Champions, as *Homer*, *Callimachus*, *Aristotle*, *Seneca* and others.

Mer. I apprehend you, and from thence you would insinuate, that the Republics of *Holland*, *Venice*, or *Geneva*, may as well follow the Maxims of *Xenophon*, and imitate the Governments of *Persia*, and generally all the Eastern Monarchies upon the bare credit of that Great Man, and example of those Flourishing Empires as *England*, *France*, or *Spain*, the discipline of *Plato*, upon his sole Authority, and Fortune of his little *Grecian* Common-wealth. Your inference is most reasonable, and your design most just, which is to disengage our judgments from the dependence upon any Mans great Reputation, I have only one question or two to ask you, before we leave *Greece*, the rather because I would be well informed, concerning a Country whose prosperity under their good Laws, and Democrati-
cal

cal form of Government, our Author has produced as great arguments, and rules for our imitation.

Trav. By all means Sir, for as nothing can oblige me more, than to use all possible freedom in asking whatsoever you doubt, or seems difficult to you, so you can never make this Discourse without that liberty, either pleasurable or profitable.

Mer. Pray then Sir, give me leave to mind you, that you were just now saying, that some of those Grecian Republicks, were but the corruptions of Monarchy, or Aristocracy: and that notwithstanding their excellent Laws, they were not only engaged in many most desperate Wars, but that their very Laws themselves, seem'd to induce them: If your memory can serve to make this out, or bring any few examples, I shall be extremely satisfied, especially since the true knowledge of the ancient state of Greece, will be a great help to me in your following discourse.

Trav. I shall endeavour to give you as plain and as short an answer, as the

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case, and my memory will permit. And to your first Question, I must tell you, that all Greece was originally Govern'd under most absolute Monarchie. And that they descended for many ages successively from Father to Son, as generally amongst us at this day.

I will pitch chiefly upon *Athen* and *Sparta*, which I suppose will be sufficient at present: I need not begin so high as the very original of Greece itself, and tell you they were peopled by Fathers of Families. I mean *Jap*, *Javon*, or *Javan* the Son, of *Japhet*. Whence *durum Japeti genus*, and thence their name *Ioni* and *Iavani*, as is observ'd by *Suidas*.

Of these you may read farther in *Josephus* and other Authors. I shall only mind you, that before *Deucalion's* Flood, *Cecrops*, was said to have brought Learning, and with it Idolatry out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, and was King in that Country, which we call *Athens* or *Athens*. *Ante Deucalypsis tempora Regem habuere Cecropem*. *Cecrops* succeeded *Cecrops*, to whose Daughter *Athis* that Country owes its name. After him

him *Amphiction*, who dedicated the Town to *Minerva*, and from her name call'd it *Athena*. In his days happen'd the Flood of *Deucalion*: After that *per ordinem successionis*, the Kingdom descended to *Erichonius* or *Erichthonius*, then passing through many others, unto *Theseus*, and from him to *Demophoon*, who was an associate in the Trojan War. There you have a long Catalogue of the *Grecian* Kings, without the least mention either of an Aristocracy or a Democracy amongst them. And from thence the Kingdom fell by succession to *Codrus*, the Son of *Melanthus*, who was the last King of *Athens*. *Eusebius* in his Chronology gives us the names of Sixteen Kings of *Athens* to *Codrus* inclusively, which space of time makes up near Five hundred years. And in his time it was, that a War broke out between the *Athenians* and the *Dorians*. Which last when they consulted the Oracle of *Apollo*, which should have the better, it was answer'd, that they should certainly overcome their enemies, except the King of the *Athenians* were slain:

Upon this, strict charge was given to their Army, that none should presume to hurt the *Arbenian* King; but *Codrus* being inform'd, as well of the Answer of the Oracle, as the order which the *Dorians* had given, unknown to any, clad himself in a miserable habit, and getting in that condition into the Enemies Camp, rais'd on purpose an impertinent quarrel, and was there according to his intent, slain by his enemies. This being soon discover'd, the *Dorians* of themselves retreated home, and the War ended: *Quis eum non miretur, cum Paterculus, qui iis artibus mortem quaesierit, quibus ab ignavis vita quæri solet?*

Much such an action did *Leonidas* King of *Sparta* for the safety of his Country in the *Perfian* War, at the streights of *Thermopilaë*. Who being admonish'd by the Oracle, that either himself must fall, or *Sparta*, dy'd desperately fighting in the midst of the *Perfian* Army.

I believe, *Cousin*, you will hardly remark two more generous actions of publick spirited men in any Commonwealth,

wealth, than those of these two Monarchs. But to return to Athens, Alcibiades Son to Codrus, was first Archon of Athens, in whose Family that Kingdom continued, having chang'd nothing but the name of *Tyran*, into *Archon*, until the death of *Alcmaeon*.

After him *Charops* was first created Archon for Ten years only, which constitution lasted Seventy years. The last of those was *Erixias*—*Tum annis commissa est magistratibus Respublica*. Then Monarchy lay bleeding, and their Archon became but an annual Magistrate.

The first of these was *Creon*, to whom Nine other Princes were chosen, *ex nobilibus urbis*. And under this Form it was, which we may truly call an Aristocracy, That *Solon* was appointed to make them laws, which it seems were contrived so equal, between the Senate and the People, that he was well esteem'd, and thank'd on both sides: This was the first considerable change in the Athenian Government, for what was before a Monarchy, and Govern'd absolutely according to the will of the

Monarch, became now an Optimacy, or if you will, according to *Isocrates*, a mix'd Democracy, *δημοκρατία* and had now, by the diligence of *Solon*, certain publick written Laws, which (as I said) seem'd so reasonable, that both the Prince and the People obliged themselves to observe them.

Mer. Pray Cousin, by your leave, had the *Athenians* no Law before *Solon*? And did their Kings rule after their own Wills, which we may call, Fancies or Inclinations?

Trav. First, Sir, the *Athenians* had, as I said, no certain publick Laws, by which they might constantly know their Duty, and which might regulate the Princes Commands, as well as their Obedience, except a few which *Draco* made for them about sixty Years before *Solon*; which being now mostly antiquated, signify'd little. *Solon* therefore is truly said to have found Laws proper for the Government and Times, which were both much out of order and distracted. *Administratio Reipublicæ annis magistratibus commissa, sed Civi.*

*Quod nulli unquam leges erant, quia illi
 Bini Regibus praedictis habebatur. Por-
 gitur itaque Solon, vir iustitia insignis,
 qui velis utramque Civitatem legibus con-
 duceret, id agnomis. Vndeque, magis de ob-
 and for their Kings, I must tell you,
 that anciently, not only in Greece, in
 which there were several Kingdoms,
 but generally all the World over, the
 People were govern'd, purely and sim-
 ply, according to the good Will and
 Pleasure of their Prince. This you will
 easily believe was very inconvenient for
 the People. For since there are more
 bad than good amongst all sorts of
 Men and Professions, it happened by
 consequence, that there were generally
 in the World more evil than just and
 virtuous Princes.*

The last therefore were ador'd as
 Gods. The first, from the very ill use
 of their right of Power, were deserved-
 ly call'd Tyrants, and sometimes re-
 mov'd by violence, when their Yoke
 grew insupportable.

I do not wonder at it; for hu-
 mane Nature hath its Bounds, beyond
 which it cannot suffer, and both Re-
 spect

spect and Obedience too, will break, when bent with too much Rigor and beyond their *Tremp*.

Trav. This hath happen'd, and may do so again, especially amongst People whose Understanding having been never open'd by the more glorious Rays and Light of the Gospel, follow, at best, the Dictates of Nature only; amongst which, that of Self-Defectation is none of the least. But you will observe, that these Accidents are still no Arguments against a Monarchical Form of Government, no more than the happy Reign of a good King, and the entire Obedience of most dutiful Subjects, are certain Reasons for it, these being Contingences, and may vary often; in Prince, or People, or in both together.

Mer. What solid Foundation then do you establish for perpetuating a Government, and judging of its Goodness?

Trav. The same which God and Moses did, I mean, good Laws, of which we have as many, as prudently pens'd, and as proper for us, as any People upon Earth; not only in the point of *Mett*

and

and *Tulius*, but the more necessary parts of *Obedience* and *Command*, the *Right of Power* and *Honour* in the *Governour*, and *Right of Privilege* and *Protection* in the *Governed*; that the one may be secured against *Oppression*, and the other from *Violation*. And in this it was, that *Salon*, (living probably in his *Travels*, perused *Part*, if not all the *Laws of Moses*, and nicking the *Circumstances* of the troublesome *Affairs* in *Athens*) succeeded so well, that, as hath been said, he had the *Fortune* to make such *Laws*, and contrive such a *Form of Government*, as for a time pleased both *Parties*. How did *Athens* prosper under these new *Laws*, and this *Innovation* in the *Government*? *Trav*. As for the *Laws*, they continued in Force for many *Years*: but for the *Form of Government*, it succeeded as generally all *Innovations* do, especially such as are popular: for, his mingled *Democracy* became, even in his own *Days*, a perfect *Monarchy*, under the *Reign of Pisistratus*, to whom, even *Salon* himself was a constant *Privy Councillor*.

Mer.

and Mexico surprised me extremely, that
 so wise a Man as Colins should fall so
 grossly in to a material Point as the Estab-
 lishment of his new Government was
 all *Ray*. Sir, you will cease to wonder;
 when I shall tell you how the Case and
 his Circumstances stood. Mexico was di-
 vided into three principal Factions, ac-
 cording to the three different Situa-
 tions of the Country. The *Abolitionists*
 were all for a Popular Government;
 those of the plain or low Country affect-
 ed an Aristocracy; the *Coastmen* and
 those who liv'd near the Sea-side, de-
 sird rather a mixed Government; but
 all the People and poorer sort were so
 generally indebted to the *Kings*, that
 they paid annually no less than the
 sixth part of all they had, to their Cre-
 ditors; whence they were call'd *Heli-
 moris*; and many were so desperately
 engag'd that they were forc'd to sell
 their Children.
 In these Distractions and Afflictions,
 the more sober part did believe, That
 nothing could so truly heal their Griev-
 vances as returning again under the
 Government of a Monarchy whose
 power

Power being despotical, might, according as himself should think most just, end all their Differences, by easing the Poor, without exasperating the Rich.

In this Conjunction, *Solon* (being a rich Merchant, and a wise Man, and living splendidly enough) grew so popular, that the common People invited him to, take the Government wholly upon himself. Two of the Parties were very zealous in it, and the third seem'd well enough satisfy'd that the Management of all should be in the Hands of so prudent a Man, as he was thought to be.

But *Solon* very unadvisedly refusing what was offer'd him, suffer'd himself to be chosen after *Philembrotus* their *Archon*; and then, to gratifie the People, who had been so respective to him, he abolisheth their Debts, and gave them a greater share in the Government than in good reason and Policy they ought to have had. All their Law-givers and Politicians, after *Draeco*, (as *Josephus* cont. App. observes) *aut Civitatem laudantes, aut Reges, thos* is,

is affected, according to their Circumstances or Inclinations, a *Popular* or a *Monarchical* Government.

Mer. But this sure should rather have strengthened their popular Government, than introduced another so contrary to it.

Terr. No Sir, that's a Mistake; for when Men are unduely raised to the Helm who are born to obey, or as *Agrippa* observes, *Qui hereditariam obedientiam suscepunt*, their new Power; like Strong Liquors, intoxicates them, their Heads grow giddy, and they become more insolent and unsupportable, even to their Fellows, for whose sakes they receiv'd their Honours, than the most absolute Monarchs generally have been. This makes them easily shake off the servile Yoke, and return to the Obedience of their natural Prince, or else some aspiring Man amongst them usurps all. So the popular Sedition of the *Gracchi*, and some others of the *Tribunes*, confirm'd the Authority of the *Consuls*, and introduc'd at last (even by the Consent of the People) a Monarchical Government.

Mer.

Mer. This Observation is most just, and common enough amongst us, nothing being more ridiculously proud and insolent, than a Clown in Office. But what became afterwards of Athens?

Trav. *Pisistratus* having govern'd very well, about thirty five Years, left the Kingdom to his Son *Diocles*, who being murder'd by one of his Subjects, the other Son, *Hippias*, was banish'd by the Rebellious Multitude, and the Government fell again into the Hands of the People. Then it became an Aristocracy, and was governed wholly by the Senate, *Permittente populo imperium ad Senatum transferatur*. Then a Tyranny under thirty Governours, each of which was more cruel than any of their former Kings had been. Then they reduc'd the thirty to ten Tyrants, then the Government came to the People again; and, in a Word, passing through all the Changes and Forms which they could invent, they had nothing certain and establish'd but continual Wars, which lasted untill they became Slaves to the *Macedonian* Conquerour, and at last remain'd Subjects to the *Roman* and

Gre-

Grecian, as at present to the *Tarkish* Emperours.

Mer. And was this the Condition of the celebrated *Athenian* Governments? are their Wars and Changes the admirable Blessings which we are encouraged to seek after?

Trav. Sir, I relate only matter of Fact, as you will find at large in *Thucydides*, *Justin*, *Plutarch*, and several other Authors; make what use of it you think fitting.

Mer. The Use is plain; which is, To seek after Peace while I live, and, by the Grace of God, endeavour, as far as belongs to a Man of my Profession, to support the present Government by Law established, that we may avoid the Plague of Innovation, and the Slavery of some *Macedonian* Conquerour. One Word more, dear Cousin: How came *Athens* to produce such excellent Wits as it seems it did, in those troublesome Days?

Trav. As our Miseries under the Tyranny of the rebellious House of *Commons*, and Usurpation of a *Plebeian*, produced several most learned Works;

or

on as this Persecution of the *Prostitute*
Chaldees could the excellent *Virgins*
 of many Holy *Fathers* and *Marys* in
 Besides, you must believe that *Athen*
 had some interbellous Prosperity; but
 that in still time to compulsion for,
 I cannot think it reasonable that now in
 this Age should be oblig'd to quit all
 the Misfortunes, which of this nation
 generally produces, but hopes that the
 next Age may be (if possible) more
 happy and flourishing than we are at
 present.

Now Sir, I am hitherto perfectly
 well satisfied, and beg your Pardon for
 the Trouble which I have given you;
 but it will shorten our way very much
 in our Discourse hereafter. I shall now
 concerning the famous *Spartan* Com-
 monwealth, and then I have done.

That will not cost us much
 time. You must know then, that
Sparta was govern'd originally by
 Kings, as *Athen* was. They reckon
 nine successively to *Lycurgus*, whose
 Power was also most arbitrary. But
 then the Kingdom falling, by Right of
 Succession, to *Charyllus*, Posthumate
 Son

Son to *Polybita*, *Lycargus* his Uncle taking the Advantage of his Nephew's Minority, gave the People Laws, and made some Alteration in the Government, which consisted principally in the Institution of a Senate composed of twenty-eight of his own chiefest Friends. The Kingdom he deliver'd to his Nephew as soon as he came of Age.

Mer. What kind of Government do you call that?

Trav. Monarchy, without doubt. It is true, their Senate had given to them a greater Right of Power than ours have, who enjoy only a Right of Counsel and Consent, or a subordinate Power for the Dispensation of Justice; and the People had Liberty to choose their Senators. But the Right of making Peace and War, with several other Prerogatives, together with the Right of Succession, continued alwayes in the Prince.

Mer. I have heard much talk of the *Ephori*. Were not they created on purpose to abate the Authority of their Kings?

Trav.

Trav. Sir, they were not created, until about an Hundred and thirty years after the death of *Lycurgus*: And then if we may believe their Kings *Agis* and *Cleomeves* whom our Author hath mention'd) their Authority was only to do justice, whilst their Kings were absent in the Wars, and were properly the Kings Ministers, they usurped indeed afterwards a Sovereign Authority and dar'd to depose the Kings themselves; for which Usurpation, *Cleomeves*, kill'd divided again the Land among the People, slew them publicly as enemies to the ancient Government, and present prosperity and peace of *Sparta*.

Mar. Pray Cousin, what new Laws did *Lycurgus* institute with his new Government.

Trav. Many Sir, but sure not much to our purpose, or fit for our imitation; for at first they had none, *Non habentibus Spartanis leges instituit*, &c. Their Prince's will, being (as I have already observ'd) the only rule. But *Lycurgus* considering, I imagin, the greatness of the *Spartan* name, fram'd Laws most

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proper

proper for the encouraging War, and educating the People from their infancy in a military kind of Discipline; Amongst other Laws he totally forbid the use of Gold and Silver, *Auri argenteque usum, et veteris avaritiam sceleris materiam sustulit*, he forbid traffick, but encourg'd idleness and stealing; and He commended parsimony and hardships, and order'd that all the People of Sparta, should always eat together, that none should eat at his own house, except upon great occasion. That the young Women should dance, sing, exercise publicly without any manner of covering upon them, and many such, too long to repeat at present.

Judges then how ridiculous and unpracticable, and unnecessary these Laws would appear in our age, and in our climate and circumstances; To conclude, let me refer you to two sufficient Authors, concerning the Spartan Laws. The first is Aristotle, in his 7. *Pol. cap. 14.* who tells us, that the chief admirers of the Spartan Commonwealth, have plac'd its sole excellency, in having Laws adapted most

par-

Particularly for War and Victory: "on
 &c. The other is *Euripides* in his *An-
 dromache*. His Words are these;

*Si vis Martia
 Vobis laeones abesse, et ferri decus,
 Spectatur ultra quid sit exitium, nihil.*
 What can ye boast, ye Spartans, if ye
 To fight like Dogs, and live like Men
 in Peace.

Add to all, this single Consideration,
 That *Lacedaemonia* was but as a small
 Province, in Comparison of the King-
 dom of Great Britany; and *Sparta*,
 no more than a Corporation Town.
 And when you have done this, let their
 Law, or Form of Government, be what
 it will, I dare undertake to make it ap-
 pear, that they are so far from being
 made an Example for our Imitation,
 that our own Government, as disem-
 per'd as our Author would have it, even

at this time, while we are discoursing, is a more excellent Form, and the Laws more just and reasonable, and conducing more to the Safety and Perpetuity of the Government, and Peace and happy Subsistence of the People, than either *Sparta* or *Athens* ever enjoyed, or any other part of *Greece*, or Government in the World, except that Monarchy, which God himself was pleas'd to institute, and which, above any other, ours does most particularly imitate. And this, I hope, is a sufficient Answer to whatsoever our Author hath offer'd concerning *Greece*.

Mer. Dear *Cousin*, You have more than perform'd your Promise; and that my Pleasure as well as Profit may be compleat, pray let us proceed with our Author.

Trav. Assoon as you please.

Mer. What say you then to the first Day?

Trav. Very little, save only that I never knew a Day worse spent in my Life, nothing being more nauseous than to read the impertinent Complements of three Fools, extolling one anothers
great

great Parts and Learning; when, if we may believe the Publisher, who comes in like *Sapientum octavus*, the eighth wise Man, the whole *Triumvirate*, or if you will, *Quatrumvirate* are included in the *politick individuum* of the English Gentleman.

Mer. Really, I was almost deceiv'd at first, and did begin to fancy that I knew the Physician.

Trav. It was without doubt his Design to deceive all Men.

Mer. To what Purpose?

Trav. That he might make the credulous Reader believe, that there were more learned Men of his Opinion besides himself. But truly, I think that neither the State of *Venice*, nor Colledge of *Physicians*, are much oblig'd to him, for picking out two of their Societies, to make up so ridiculous a *Comedy*.

Mer. Is that way of writing Ancient or Modern?

Trav. Dialogue was oftentimes very properly used among the Ancients; but they seldom introduc'd more than two, if the Subject of their Discourse were grave and serious.

Mer. Why then hath our Author made choice of three?

Tea. I suppose the noble *Venetian* wanted Learning enough, to comprehend so profound a Discourse, and the *Physician*, we must imagine, had not anatomiz'd or studied the Body Politick, so thoroughly as he had done the Body Natural, and so could not see so far into a Millstone as a *Venetian* Statesman can, who, as our *Nobleman* tells us, will sometimes discover a *State Marasmus* breaking out, two hundred Years after the passing an indigested Law; and this without the help of any *Telescope*; both therefore possessing separately these eminent Qualifications, became joynctly an Auditory worthy of Sir *Politick Wouldbee's* Doctrine. Besides, you know the number Three is most perfect. But had I been advis'd withall, I could have shewn our Author this Number of Three so ingeniously and politically plac'd, that our *Medicopolitico-Venetian Publisher* might have born a better part than he does, in his Book, without either altering the Number or spoiling the Figure.

But,

But, to be serious, I must confess, *Cousin*, that I have sometimes heard two or three *Fools cogitating* one another, as our Author calls it; and it hath been pleasant enough: But that one *Cogition* should presume to *cogitate* three Kingdoms, impose upon His Majesty, despite the Wisdom of the Lords and Commons, His Majesty's Privy Council, and Learned Judges of the Land; and last of all, to give the Fool to all our Worthy Ancestors, who have liv'd within the Compass of four hundred years, according to his Account, is so ridiculous a piece of Insolence, that I know not whether I should be more angry at his Arrogance, than laugh at his Impertinence. But, let us proceed, and see whether the second Day will afford us any thing better.

Mer. Nothing, Sir, can be more acceptable to me. But, I think, the ringing of that Bell tells us, that Dinner is ready. In the Evening my Coach shall carry us into a pleasant Air a little farther from home; where, if I shall not see much else of you, I should be ex-

treemly pleas'd to hear your Opinion
of the Second Part.

Trav. Most willingly, Sir; and by
that time I shall have rubb'd over some
few of my old Notes, whereby I may be
able to give you a little better Satisfac-
tion than hitherto I have done.

Mer. Dear Cousin, I shall own my
self much oblig'd to you; and in the
mean time, let us go drink a Health
or two to our Good Friends at Lon-
don.

Trav. Sir, I wait upon you.

Second Discourse.

Mer. **C**OME Sir, we are now in the
open Air, and, I think, in a
pleasant Country. And, to tell you
the Truth, I am so much pleas'd with
our Morning Discourse, that I cannot
any longer forbear importuning and
persecuting you, untill we shall have
got through our politick Author, and
examined whether we be really so sick

as he would make us believe we are;
and if we be, whether he hath ghesst
right at our *Distemper*, and our *Cure*.

Trav. In good faith, *Cousin*, I am
perswaded he plays the *Knave* with us,
as those idle People did, when they
took in the Gentleman's Doublet, ma-
king him believe he was in a *Dropfie*,
and only let it out again when they
thought fit to tell him he was cur'd.
But however, pray Sir proceed.

Mer. The first Remark which you
have made lies, I perceive, upon the
high Commendation which the Noble
Venetian hath bestow'd upon our Coun-
try, in Page 16.

Trav. Pray read it.

Mer. He saith then, That since he
arriv'd in England, he finds it one of the
most flourishing Kingdoms in Europe, full
of splendid Nobility and Gentry, the
comeliest Persons alive, valiant, courte-
ous, knowing and bountiful; well stor'd
with Commons, honest, industrious, fitted
for Business, Merchandise, Arts, or Arms,
prodigious for Learning, and succeeding
to Admiration, in the Perfection of all
Sciences.

Trav.

Trav. Add to this, the good Character which our Author himself gives of us. That there is not a more Loyal or Faithful People to their Prince in the whole World, than ours are: that we have as gracious and good a Prince as is any where to be found, having never yet heard that he did, or attempted to do, any the least Act of Arbitrary Power, in any publick Concern, or endeavour'd to take from any particular Person, the benefit of the Law: that his only Brother, and Heir to the Crown, is a most glorious and honourable Prince, one who has expos'd his Life, several times, for the Safety and Glory of this Nation, who pays justly and punctually his Debts, manages his own Fortune discreetly, and yet keeps the best Court and Equipage of any Subject in Christendom: is courteous and affable to all: and in fine, hath nothing in his whole Conduct to be excepted against, much less dreaded. These are our Author's own Words. Now, dear Cousin, if all these extraordinary Happinesses be the Symptoms of a distemper'd Government, then the Lord keep me and my Friends out of a healthful one.

Mer.

Mer. But yet you see, that both the *Venetian* and himself concur in this, That the Posture of our Affairs is turbulent, the Government and the People disunited, the Gentry discontented; and to cure all this, he tells us, That the present Constitution of the Government it self lies agonizing, must be alter'd and chang'd from what it is, or all will come to Destruction.

Trav. Indeed I am apt enough to believe, that somewhat is amiss amongst us. But to lay the fault upon the Government rightly understood, that I think is unreasonable.

Mer. Pray Sir, please to inform me what you mean by Government rightly understood.

Trav. Most willingly, since it is extremely necessary to avoid Equivocations, of which, our Author, and most such malicious Writers as he is, are very full.

Government then, is divided into the *Material* part, and the *Formal* part. The material part, or *Subiectum materiale*, is the People. The *Subiectum Formale*, or *Proprium*, est persona singularis

pluresve pro cuiusque gentis legibus ac moribus, is one or more Persons, according to the Customs of different Countries, in whom the right of Power resides.

Now, by this distinction, when a Man shall tell you that our Government is distemper'd, you will certainly ask him, whether he means in the *material* or *formal* Part, because Government, by use, is become an equivocal Word.

Mer. I understand you, and suppose that our Author means the *formal* part.

Trav. Without doubt he does; but therein, I think he is mistaken. For, when the whole *Crafts* of a Body is decay'd, and Infection is gotten into the very Marrow, and Soul of Life, the Body consumes all over, and in every part, and never produces such lively and beautiful Marks of Health and Vigour, as those which the Noble *Venetian* and *English* Gentleman have numbered up. But on the other side, when a little *Choler* only, or *Heat*, or some sharp *Humours*, abound, they generally shew themselves in some little *Tottars* or *Pimples*, on the Face, without infecting the

the whole Mass of Blood; And though I be no Physician, am yet perswaded, that they may be easily cur'd by some slight *Purge*; or, if you please, *breathing a Keim* with some proper *Juleps*, and keeping a little Diet for some

Now these *Terrors* and *Rumors* in our Body Politick, are some of those few discontented Gentlemen, whose number, our worthy Author has himself augmented, or some of the ignorant and turbulent Commonalty. But, had I been call'd into Consultation with our State-Physician, *whom, between you and I, Cousin, I believe to be only a Quack*) I should never have agreed, that the whole *Oeconomy* and *System* of the Body, should be so much dissipated to purge it of Humours so easily removed. But what if this Choler run on untill it come to the Disease which they call *Atta bilis* or *Tran*. It would be ill advis'd, to neglect the Cure so long: but if they should, a few stronger Medicines apply'd, by a skillful hand, would remedy all at last.

But

But of these matters, we shall dis-
 cuss more fully, in a more proper
 place. And in the mean time, pray go
 on. *Mr. In Page the twentieth, you*
note these Words: The evill Counsellors,
the profane Parliament, the through-
put Judges, the flattering Divines, the
base and designing Papists, the French
Cavies, &c. are not the cause of our Misfor-
tunes. What have you to say to this?
Trav. Little, Sir, save only, I would
 have you remark the Malice of the
 Man. But he and his Party are known
 enough, that their Tongues are become
 no Slanders. For first, as to evill Coun-
 sellors, we must believe, that there ever
 hath been such, and ever will, whilst
 Men have different Judgments: that is
 to say, if we mean those, as in all Cha-
 rity we ought to do, who following
 their Opinions, give sometimes Coun-
 sel, which in truth, may be prejudi-
 cial rather than advantageous for us;
 witness our *Author himself*, whom sup-
 posing to be (as in great Charity we
 may) an honest Man, hath yet given
 Counsell, even undesir'd and unautho-
 riz'd,

ris'd, more pernicious to our Govern-
ment and Happiness, than the worst of
our evil Counsellors could ever have in-
vented.

As to the *Pensioner* Parliament, I
must confess, till of late days, I never
knew it was a Crime for a Parliament
Man to hold an Employment from the
King, nor a fault in the King, to un-
deavour to lessen the Rancor of a wil-
derness Member, any more than in an
indulgent Father, to hire, by fair Words
and Promises, a froward and perverse
natur'd Child, to live peaceably and
decently in the Family amongst the rest
of his Brethren, since the Design both
of the *Pater Patrie*, and *Pater Famil-
ias*, is no other than to procure to him-
self and Family, a quiet and happy
Life.

For the *Judges* and *Divines*, if their
great Worth and Learning, and most
exemplary Lives, did not speak plainly,
and loud enough in their Behalf, they
would not want better Pens than mine
to defend their Cause.

But I think their Sphere is much a-
bove the noise, much more the danger
of

of this barking Mongrel. When he nam'd the *busy and designing Papist*, I was in great hopes, that he would have added the *Presbyterians* too, and then we might have come betimes to the Cause of our Misfortunes. But, since he has thought fit to leave them out, I shall also let them alone till occasion requires. For his *French Counsels*, I know them no more than himself does, and, in my Opinion, had our Author had any Wit in his Anger, he might have forbore in this place, to have revild the *Divines and Judges* of our Land, the *King's Council*, and *Parliament* it self; that is to say, all that we hold under the King, *sacred and religious* amongst us: especially since he tells us immediately, that *these are not the Causes of our Misfortunes*; the finding which out, is, I think, one main Design of his Politick Search.

Mer. Very well, Sir. The next thing is, We have plaid bandy dandy with *Parliaments*, and especially the *House of Commons*, (*the only Part which is now left entire of the old Constitution*) by *adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving* them,

them, contrary to the true meaning of the Law.

Trav. That's enough. I have only to remark his two Parentheses. In the first he tells us, That the House of Commons is the only part that is now left entire of the old Constitution. Pray, Cousin, Have you heard what is become of the House of Peers? or, Do you know how it comes to be less entire than ever it was? I am perswaded you cannot tell me.

Mer. I imagine his Meaning may be, that their Estates are not so great as formerly they have been; or that the House of Commons depended more upon them formerly than now they do.

Trav. For the first, it is false, there being as great Estates now in the House of Lords, as, generally, ever there were. And for the dependance of the Commons upon the Lords, that is to say, wearing their blew Coats, making up their Lords-train, waiting upon them to the House of Lords, and making a Lane for them to enter, and such like, as he tells us, pag. 135. Let him endea-

Vour to reduce the House of Commons to this *old Constitution* if he can, and He will soon see, how far the Commons will think themselves oblig'd to him for it. If not, why does he talk of an *old Constitution*?

But Sir, with his good leave, and the Commons too I take the House of Commons to be the latest Addition to that Assembly, which altogether we call a Parliament. I do not remember to have heard any News of a House of Commons, as it is now understood, untill several Years after the *Norman Conquest*, that is, untill the end of the Reign of *Henry the Third*, at soonest. But though some contend for the eighteenth of *Henry the First*; But the House of Lords hath subsisted, and been a Court of Judicature, even before the *Roman Conquest*, 1700 Years ago. Witness, amongst many other Passages, the Dispute between King *Cassibelanus* and *Androgeus Duke of the Trinobantes*. Whose Son, or Nephew, having slain the Son of the King, *Cassibelanus* commanded the Duke to surrender him, in order to his Tryal, that he might suffer

for such Punishment as the Noblemen or Lords of the Kingdom should judge most fit. *Commodus Rex Androgeo mandavit, ut nepotem suum sibi redderet paratum talem sententiam subire, qualem Proceres regni judicarent.* So we read of *Vortigern*, the British King, *Portagerius exortatus perstreptentium vocibus super statu publico in medium consulit Sententias Magnatum.* So of the *Saxon Ethelwulfus*, *Cum concilio Episcoporum ac Principum conciliam salubre ac remedium uniformem affirmavi, &c.* So *Edmundus Rex Anglorum cum concilio & consensu Optimatum in eorum*, &c. Besides many hundred of such Instances (proving the Existence of a Court of Lords from the Conquest of *Will. the First*, untill the end of *Hen. the Third*) are to be found in *Eadmerus* and other good Authors.

But, it being none of my business to defend, in this place, the Prerogatives of the House of Lords, I shall not offer any thing further concerning them. But since our Author troubles himself so much about the old Constitution of the House of Commons, and (detracting

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from

from the House of Lords) calls the Lower House the *only entire part of the old Parliaments*. I shall beg leave to mind you what was the Cause and Design of their *first Institution*; as I find it in the best Histories of those Ages; and by that you will easily perceive their Antiquity, as also, which was the eldest Constitution.

P. 57. 154. William the Conquerour,
211. (called by *Eadmerus*, and others, *William the Great*;) having master'd the Power and the Fortune of the *English Nation*, what he retain'd not, in Providence, as the Demesnes of the Crown, or reserv'd not, in Piety, for the Maintenance of the Church, the rest of his Kingdom he divided amongst such of his principal Lords as sail'd hither with him in the Barque of his Adventures, giving to some, whole Countries, to others, considerable parts of it; so as in the County of *Norfolk*, for instance, there were not above threescore Chief Lords or Owners, and half of them not very considerable, as appears by *Doomsday*.

And

And as the Estate, so the Council of the Kingdom was entrusted into few Hands, none being employed in the publick Councils, but only these great *Lords and Peers* who were *Conciliarii nati*, born to that privilege, and came thither without Leave and without Summons.

And although at first this great Power and Trust in so few hands, was look'd upon as a great Obligation to *those Lords*, and a great Security to *that King*, so long as their Interests stood united in their new Conquest; yet, in the next Age, when the heat of that Action was over, their Interests divided, and the Obligation forgotten, it proved to the succeeding Kings so great a Curb and Restraint to Sovereignty, that nothing fell more intimately into their Care, than how to retrench (as much as they durst) the Power of that Nobility which they began to suspect, and was like, in time, to make even Monarchy it self.

Though others foresaw the mischief in time, yet none attempted the Remedy untill King *John*; who no soon-

er began to reign (in his own Right, for, by the way, he practis'd a little in his Brother's time, and by that Experience found *Mat. Paris* his Words true of the Barons, viz. *Quot Domini tot Tyranni*.) But he bethought himself to frame his Counsel of such a Constitution as he might have Credit and Influence upon it.

To be short, he was the first that durst restrain the tumultuary access of the Barons to Council; he was the first that would admit of none but such as *he should summon*, and would summon none but such as *he thought fitting*; and besides, he would send out Summons to several of the *Commons* (or *lesser Tenants*) mixing them with the Nobles, and engaging them thereby to his Interest; and whereas, before, the Council consisted of the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, he erected a *third Estate*, a Body of the *Commons*, or *lesser Tenants*, which might, in some measure, equal the rest, and be faithful to him. All which appears in the *Clause Rolls* and *Patent Rolls* of the sixth Year of this King; and in vain, before that time, shall any
Man

Man look either for *Summons* or *Advice* of the *Commons* in any of these great *Councils*.

King *John* having put this *Cheque* upon the *Councils*, considers next, how to ballance the unequal power of the unequal *Barons*; and first he tampers with the *Bishops* and *Clergy*: for he would have drawn them into his *Party*, at least, to his *Dependency*; but that *Trial* cost him dear. In the next place therefore, that he might create new *Dependencies* and new *Strength* to himself, he becomes a great *Patron* and *Founder*, or at least, *Benefactor* to many considerable *Corporations*, as *Newcastle*, *Turmouth*, *Lynn*, and others; in-somuch, that he is taken notice of by *Speed*, and other of our *Chroniclers*, and stiled particularly, the *Patron* of *Corporations*: Thus you see not only when, but for what *Reason*, the *Institution* of the *House of Commons* was first thought upon; and indeed, according to their old or first *Constitution*, their *Attendance* in *Parliament*, or (as we say) their serving in *Parliament*, was look'd upon rather as an easier *Service*

vice due to the King, than otherwise, as a *Priviledge* granted to the People; as may be seen, not only in the Case of the *Burgesses* of *St. Albans* in *temp. Ed. 2.* recited by the Worthy *Dr. Brady* against *Petit*, but also by many other good Authorities, too long for this place.

But, begging your Pardon for this long Story, I now proceed to the second *Parentbesis*; in which, he makes no Scruple, to accuse his present Majesty, and his late *Sacred Father*, of *breaking the Law*, in *adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving Parliaments*.

Indeed, *Cousin*, I know nothing that reflects more truly upon the Constitution of our Government, than that it suffers such pestilent seditious Men, as our Author seems to be, to live under it. For nothing sure is more evident, in the whole or any part of the Law, whether *Statute, common or customary*, than that the Kings of *England*, ever since the first Parliament that ever was call'd, have had, and exercis'd the same Power, in *adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving them*, as his present Majesty

or

or his *Father* of Blessed Memory, ever did.

And, that you may have *Plata's own* Authority against *himself*, I must anticipate so much of his Discourse, as to inform you, That in p. 105. you will find these very Words; *That which is undoubtedly the King's Right, or Prerogative, is, to Call and Dissolve Parliaments.*

Nay more, so great was the Authority and Prerogative of our Kings over the House of Commons, according to their *old Constitution*, That they have in their Writs of Summons named and appointed the particular Persons all over England, who were to be returned to their Parliaments: sometimes have order'd, that *only one Knight* for the Shire and *one Burgess* for a Corporation, should be sent to their Parliaments, and those also named to the *Sheriffs*, and sometimes more; as may be seen, by the very Writs of *Edw. 2.* and *Edw. 3.* fully recited by the *asore said Dr. Brady*, from p. 243. to p. 252.

Besides, Sir, what is more reasonable and equitable, than that our Kings should

should enjoy the Power of Adjourning, Proroguing, and Dissolving, that their Council or Parliament, when, and as often as they please, since our Kings alone, in Exclusion to all other imperial Power in England whatsoever, enjoy solely the Privilege of Calling or Assembling these their Parliaments, when, and where, they alone shall think convenient.

Mr. I confess, we generally say, That it is a great Weakness in a cunning Man, to raise a *Spirit* which afterwards he cannot lay; and that in such case the *Spirit* tears him in pieces first who rais'd him. And, I think, we have had the Misfortune to see somewhat very tragical, of this kind, in the beginning of our late Troubles, if it were not possibly the great Cause of his late Majesty's fatal *Catastrophe*. But truly, excepting that case, I never heard the King's Authority, in proroguing or dissolving Parliaments, question'd before.

Trav. Well, Sir, go forward to the twenty fifth Page; for all between, is nothing but quabking, and ridiculous Complements, or Matter as little worth our notice.

Mer.

Mer. He tells us there, that it remains undiscovered, how the first Regulation of Mankind began; that Necessity made the first Government; that every Man, by the Law of Nature, had, like Beasts in a Pasture, Right to everything. That every Individual, if he were stronger, might seize whatever any other had possessed himself of before.

Trav. Hold a little, Sir, that we may not have too much Work upon our Hands at once. I think he said before, at Page 22. That he would not take upon him, so much as to conjecture how and when Government began in the World, &c.

This, Cousin, I cannot pass by, because it seems to be the only piece of Modesty, which I observe, in his whole Treatise. And I should commend him for it much, but that I have great reason to suspect, that he pretends Ignorance, only to cover his Knavery, and thereby leave room to introduce several other most false and pernicious Principles, which we shall endeavour to refute.

First therefore, I shall take the Liberty, not only to conjecture, but to tell him plainly, when and where Government began, and how also it continued.

Government then, began with the World, and God, who had the Sovereign Right of Power over the whole Universe, invested *Adam* with so much as was necessary for the Government of this World, and that in such express Words, that there can remain no doubt, but such as is malicious and willful. *And God said, be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it, and have Dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowl of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth.*

And, lest those Words, *every living thing*, should not yet be general enough to comprehend Mankind, God gives *Adam* the rule over his Wife *Eve*, the only humane Subject that was then upon Earth, and from whom, all the Race of Mankind was to proceed.

And surely *Adam* had naturally a Right of Power over those whom himself

self begot. Unto *Cain* God gave the rule over his Brother *Abel*, and after God had banish'd him from the Protection of his Father, he builds a City, and secures it by Walls. Can any body be so blind as not to see that *Cain* was absolutely Governour of the Place, and had an undoubted *Right of Power* over those Subjects which proceeded out of his own Loins?

I confess, the Affairs of that Age before the Flood, are a little obscure; and since *Moses* thought fit to pass them over with so great Silence, it is reasonable we should do so too. But, we may most probably conjecture, as well from that short History in the Bible, as from the Authority of *Josephus*, and after him *Grotius*, That the neglect of Government, and of the exercise of Power in those days, produc'd the Deluge: for formerly Government was but a trouble; and as the best of Men cared for no more than was necessary for the Preservation of their particular Families, so some were unnatural enough to abandon their Children to the Licentiousness of their
own

own corrupt Inclinations. Whence proceeded *Violence*, as the Text says, *The Earth was corrupt, and filled with Violence.* And, as *Grotius* tells us, *Ante Diluvium Gigantum irate promissum invaluit ceterum licentia.* And from thence follow'd the Punishment of their Violence, by that universal Cataclism.

But howsoever it was before the Flood, I suppose it will be sufficient for our purpose, if we deduce the History of Government, and the *Right of Power*, from the Restauration of Mankind to the first *Grecian Kingdoms*; which, I hope, may be done so plainly, and that by the Authority of approv'd Authors, that not only *Europe, Asia, and Africa*, but even *America* it self, according to the imperfect Accounts of *Solon, Plato, and Pliny*, and of later Authors, *Josephus Acosta, and Herrera*, will appear to have been re-peopled and govern'd absolutely by *Fathers of Families*.

But, not to embarque into so wide an Ocean as that is, we shall keep our selves within the *Streights*, where Affairs being more certainly known, they will

will prove more pertinent to our purpose. Which is, to shew, *when*, and *how* Governments, and the first Regulation of Man began in the World after the Flood.

I think, there are very few who doubt the Truth of the Flood it self. Common Experience, even in our Days, in several Countries attesteth it; besides, most Authors, both Greek and Latine, agree to it, even as it was deliver'd by Moses.

I confess, the Greeks, from the Assyrians, talk of a Deluge happening under Syrbithrus, or Xisuthrus, as also Ogyges and Deucalion. But we are assur'd by Grotius, *de verit. Rel. Christ.* That they signify the same in Greek as Noe in the Hebrew Language. Philo de præmiis & piens tells us plainly, that whom the Chaldeans call Noe, the Greeks call Deucalion. *Τὸν ἑκκλῆστιαν ἀδελφῶν, καὶ αὐτὸν ὃς Νόε ἐπικροῦται.* And many other good Authorities there are, it being most usual among the Greeks to contrive expressive Names. So Plato observes of Solon, That he, searching into the Force and Signification of the

the

the *Hebrew Words*, turned them into the *Greek Idiom*, *vim ipsam significati-
onemque nominum personatus ea ipsa no-
stro vestivit Sermone.*

This being granted, I suppose all Men must agree, that *Noe* had a Right of as *absolute Power* in him, as any Man upon Earth ever had. Not only as he inherited it from *Adam* and the rest of Mankind, but even from his own Father *Otyartes*, if we will believe *Abydnus* the *Assyrian*, and *Alexander Polyhistor*, who say, that *Otyartes*, being dead, *Andræus* his Son reigned in his stead eighteen Tears; in which time, the Deluge happen'd. However, a Monarch he was, and I do not hear, and am confident you will not believe, that he receiv'd any *Inveftiture* or *Right of Power* from his Children, but that as his Authority was successive, so it was divided among his Children, according to their Generations, by whom the World was progressively re-peopled.

Mer. But, Sir, if the World was re-peopled progressively, as you speak, that

is,

is to say, from Father to Son, sure Fathers were more humane than to suffer their Children to live together like Beasts in a Pasture, as our Author says; Men having not, certainly, debased their Natures so soon, to be equal with the Beasts which perish, and turn their young ones out a grazing, without any farther Care, what became of them.

Trav. No surely, *Cousin*, for besides natural Instinct, which we have common with other Creatures, and by which we are desirous to preserve our Young, God has bestow'd upon us all a *rational Soul*, more than the rest of other Creatures have, by which we may find out the best and easiest way to obtain artificially what naturally we thus desire.

Mer. Methinks then, Sir, we should easily contrive a way to live happily together, and peaceably, Peace being, undoubtedly, more rational and natural than War. Nor can I easily believe, That naturally we should covet what another hath possess'd himself of before; but rather leave that to every Man which he had appropriated to himself

and Family. Pray, Sir, is Nature a God or a Devil?

Trav. Nature is certainly a God, or else, rather, the *Opifex Deus*, whom we call *Natura naturata*, that is, the *Causa Causata*, or second general Cause of all sublunary Beings whatsoever. God is the first Cause, who out of nothing hath made Matter. Whether that nothing be a Nothing, which to us is incomprehensible, *Nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam*, or whether it be that *Materia prima*, which some Philosophers have believ'd antecedent to the Elements themselves, and which others agreeing with the Rabbins, have call'd *Hyale*, *Ench. phys. Rest. Can. 18.* by which they seem to mean a kind of Shadow, or Darkness, incomprehensible, the fancy of a thing rather than a thing indeed; a Matter without Form, yet most desirous and capable of all Form; without a Body, and yet the Foundation of all Bodies; in short, a vast abyss of Cold and Night, which we cannot comprehend. I say, whether God created all things out of *Nothing*, which we cannot conceive, or out of this *ma-*
teria

teria prima, which we can as hardly explain, I'll not determine. It is sufficiently for my purpose, to declare, that God is the *first Cause*, and made matter, and that what I here call *Nature* is the *second Cause*. Who, working upon the second Matter, or *materia Elementata*, produceth several Effects, according to its several Dispositions.

In the next place, *Nature* can neither create nor yet destroy; her Power extends no further than Generation and Preservation, or changing old Matter into new Form. The God of *Nature* only hath the power of Annihilation; and as he made all things out of nothing, so he alone can again reduce all things into nothing.

To conclude, *Nature* is most just and good in all her Actions. And as she hath receiv'd the Command of *Preservation* from him who hath given her the Power of Generation, so she hath transmitted that inviolable Preceptum to all things, which she hath made, according to their different Kinds and Species. And this is the Ground and Foundation of that universal Law of

Nature, which is so immutable, that it cannot be changed. *Jus naturale adeo immutabile est, ut nec a Deo quidem mutari queat*, saith *Grot. l. 1.*

And this is sufficient for the Explanation of *Nature*, what she is; that is to say, a Spirit, infinitely good and just, and abhorring violence and Destruction.

Dear Cousin, this is extremely satisfactory; to shew what *Nature* is; and by consequence, what her Laws must needs be. And indeed, we see it most plainly by the Effects: for, amongst the various kinds of Beasts and Fowl, there is scarce a Creature found which is not solicitous to preserve its Young. And by this Law of preserving what we have produc'd, the World was govern'd, from *Adam* to *Moses*. And had we as exactly observ'd this Law of *Nature* as she hath obey'd that of the first Creator, the World sure would have need'd no other Law, nor known any other Government.

This, Sir, is that Law, which to our shame, continues uncorrupted amongst Birds and Beasts. An Eagle

stoops

stoops not upon an Eagle; a Lyon preys not upon a Lyon; Man only devours Man, and from being made a little beneath the Angels, degenerates below the worst of Beasts.

Mer. This sure proceeds from some accidental Corruption; to recompence which, God Almighty hath given us Reason, which, methinks, joyn'd with the natural Law of Preservation, should produce Government, and by consequence, Peace and Happiness.

Trav. Your Observation is most just: for, the World being peopled, as well before the Flood as since, successively, Succession begets Inequality, the Father being greater than the Child. And Inequality necessarily produces Superiority, which eternally includes a natural Right of Power.

Mer. By this Rule then, *Noah*, as well as *Adam*, being our first Parent, should have been an Universal Monarch; the whole right of Power being lodged originally in himself, pray what became of this Power?

Trav. First you must observe, that Power never dyes, but descends to him

who best represents the last Possessor, and that is naturally the *eldest Son*: for his Title being before those who are posterious to him, it cannot pass to them but through him. So you see *Noah* settles the Power only upon his eldest Son *Shem*. *Canaan*, he saith, shall be a *Servant to him*, and *Japhet* shall dwell in the *Tents of Shem*; which, according to the Interpretation of the best Expositors, is, under the Government and Protection of *Shem*.

Mer. How came this Power then so soon divided, as we hear in the Histories of those elder times.

Trer. By the expresse Will of God himself, who whilst the People were building *Babel*, confounded their Language, and dispersed them abroad, that the Earth might be the better repopled.

Mer. Did then the People of different Languages choose to themselves particular Governours who were to conduct them, or did every Man go according to his own Fancy?

Trer. Neither, but were all govern'd according to their different Languages,

by

by the *Head of the Family*, that happen'd to be in that *Language*, whose Right of Power proceeded from their Father *Noah*, and from them the first Kingdoms of the World were begun and continued.

Mer. Can you name me any of those Kingdoms so begun?

Trav. I think I can. And first, *Japhet* is said to be Father of the *Europeans*. *Japetus Europæorum genitor*, says *Grot.* *Gomer*, his Son, of the *Galatians*, or *roumæns*. *Magog* founded the vast Empire of the *Scythians*, where his Name is to this Day remembered; *Madian* the *Medes*, *Javan* the *Greeks*, as hath been already observ'd: these are the Sons of *Japheth*. The Sons of *Javan* were, *Elisbath*, *Tarshish*, *Kittim*, and *Dodanim*. By these, saith the Text, were the *Isles of the Gentiles* divided in their Lands, every one after his Tongue, after their Families in their Nations, *Gen. 10.* From *Ham* proceeded the *Africans*; from *Cush*, his Son, the *Cusei* or *Ethiopians*. From *Saba*, the Son of *Cush*, the *Sabæans*. From *Assur*, the Son of *Shem*, the *Assyrians*. From *Lud* the

the *Lydians*. The *Caldæans* from *Alphaxad*; and from his Grandson *Eber*, the *Hebrews*.

But it would be too tedious to relate in this place, all the Kingdoms, Countries, and Cities, that had their Beginnings and Names from the Sons of *Noah*. If therefore you be not yet satisfied, I shall only recommend you, beside the Bible, to *Eusebius*, *Nicholaus Damascenus*, *Pliny*, *Strabo*, *Josephus*, and of our Modern Authors, to *Grötius*, and the Learned Doctor *Stillingfleet*.

Mer. Sir, I am very inclinable to believe all that you have here observ'd, having heard and read much to this purpose. But then, Sir, People must always have liv'd under some Government, and have been obedient to some Superiour, which will surely destroy our Authors perpetual State of War, as also his universal Right, which every one had to all things; and, in a Word, will so totally divest the People of that original Liberty, which he pretends they had, and Right of Power which they were able to bestow, and upon which Foundation he seems to build the
great

greatest part of his Discourse, that according to your Principles, we shall not meet with any People who had any right of Power or Liberty, but such as was granted them, and derived from their Governours.

Trav. Sir, This Liberty is no where to be found, but in the shallow Brains of such conceited Men as our Author seems to be. And I am perswaded, that he will never be able to produce one single Instance of any People whatsoever, even to this day, that were so free, or enjoy'd such an *original* or *virgin* Liberty, that they could of themselves give a Right of Power, which never had been possess'd but by themselves. From whence it will follow, That all popular Governments have been *Usurpations*, except such People alone, who having leave from their *Mother City*, have planted Colonies in Foreign Countries. Such were most of those *Grecian* Governments, which we find in *Asia*, and in *Italy*, and in some parts of *Greece* itself. And they all bore generally this Mark, That they followed the form of Government of those

those from whom they proceeded, and
 ever paid them a dutiful Respect: which
 when neglected or denied, generally
 produc'd War; witness the long *Pela-*
ponese War, largely described by *Thu-*
cydides. These things consider'd, let
 us draw this Conclusion, to which all
 Politicians must agree, and even our
 Author himself, whether he will or no,
That all Commonwealths have been
founded upon Usurpation or Rebellion,
on the Grant or Permission of some Super-
ior and antecedent Power.

Mer. How comes it then to pass,
 that so many Philosophers, and all
 our Antimonarchical Authors, pretend
 That the People were before the Prince,
 that they are above him, that they made
 him, and by consequence, may depose
 him. That their Liberty and Freedom
 was independent upon any, untill, for
 their own Interest and Advantage, they
 parted from it; and much to this pur-
 pose?

Trav. From the Ignorance of some
 ancient Philosophers, and the impious
 Complaisance of some of our modern
 Wits.

Mer.

Mer. What do you mean by the *impious Complaisance* of our modern Wits?

Trav. I mean, Sir, that neglecting the History of *Moses*; which being the most ancient, and most authentick of any extant, is penn'd besides by the Assistance of the *holy and infallible Spirit* of God himself: neglecting, I say, what our very Faith obliges us to believe most sacred; we run foolishly after the blind Conjectures of Men, who were as much inferiour to *Moses* in Learning and Wisdom, as they are posterior to him in Time.

Mer. What is it these Philosophers teach us contrary to *Moses*, and wherein lies their Error?

Trav. It consists chiefly (as it relates to our Case) in their Ignorance of the History of the Creation, and want of a true Notion of the Deity. Hence they teach, That the World was made, or rather, made it self, by *chance*, and that Mankind was, at first, but the natural Production of the Earth, as Plants, and some few Animals at present are produc'd. So the *Epicurean*
Lucre-

Lucretius tells us in his second Book.

*Jamque adeo affecta est ætas, efferaque
tellus,*

*Vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta
creabit*

*Secula, deditque ferarum ingentia corpora
partu.*

*Haud, ut opinor enim, mortalia secula su-
perne*

Aurea de Cælo demisit furis in arva.

*Nec Mare, nec fluctus plangentes saxa
crearunt*

*Sed genuit tellus eadem, quæ nunc alit
ex se.*

*The Earth's grown now so barren, so
decay'd,*

*She scarce brings forth a Mouse, who
all things made:*

*In her once pregnant Womb all Crea-
tures lay:*

*Thence monstrous Beasts and Gyants
broke their way:*

*For I can't think the golden Chain of
Jove*

*E're let them down from their bright
Heavens above;*

Or

On that the Billows of the working
 Main, Made those vast Rocks which do them-
 selves contain :
 But that the Earth, as other Mothers
 use, What're the seeds, did first her self pro-
 duce.

Diodorus Siculus gives us a long ac-
 count of the Creation ; where, amongst
 other things, he tells us, That when
 the great Separation was made of the
 Waters from the Earth, the Earth re-
 main'd, nevertheless, very moist, over
 which a *Pellicule*, or kind of *Skin*, in
 most places was spread. This preserv'd
 the Seeds of all things whatsoever, which
 after due *Fermentation*, and the nou-
 rishing heat of the Sun, the *Pellicule*
 broke, and all sorts of living Creatures
 appear'd. Those which participated
 most of *Heat*, became Birds and Fowl.
 Those which were of a more gross and
 earthly Composition, were made Men
 and Beasts ; and the more moist became
 Fish.

After

After this, the Moisture and Surface of the Earth being hardened, and dry'd, by the continual heat of the Sun and drying Winds, the Earth could no more produce any considerable Creatures, but that they were henceforward propagated by Generation, according to their several Kinds and Species.

Now, Sir, notwithstanding this fine Fancy, you may easily see its great Error, if you consider, that the Earth produc'd those living Creatures either by Chance or Accident, or by the positive Will of God.

If the last, then we shall easily agree with you, it being indifferent to us which way God was pleas'd to take for the making of Man, supposing he was made and propagated successively by Gods Order: but this the Philosophers generally deny.

If the first, Then how comes it to pass, that Accident and Chance should form Male and Female, so fitting for the work of Generation, that few things do more manifestly declare the Wisdom of our Maker, than the Composure of those Organs, which serve for the
Nutri-

Nutrition of the Infant in the Womb, and whatever else belongs to our Conservation and Propagation.

And indeed, when we come to consider seriously of what many of the Ancients have deliver'd concerning the Creation of the World, we shall not find them so different from the Doctrine of *Moses* as some imagine.

The *Phœnicians* and *Egyptians*, and some later Philosophers, as *Aristotle*, *Anaxagoras*, and amongst the Poets, *Hesiod*, *Orpheus*, *Ovid*, *Virgil*, and others, supposing that Mankind proceeded originally from the Earth, have ascribed the Production to some particular Cause, as the brooding of a Pigeon upon the Chaos, *incubitu columbæ*, *Anaxagoras* to a Mind, *Ὀὐς δ' αὖτ' ἀνὰ σῆμα*, *σῆμα ἄνθρωπος*, *Aristotle* to Nature, most of the Poets to *Amor*, or *Love*: but all as they have fetch'd these Notions from the *Phœnicians*, and they from *Moses*, so they mean the same thing which *Moses* did, that is to say, God; which for want of that Illumination which *Moses* had, they could not better express.

Now

Now some Men, not well understanding what the Philosophers meant, and others refining upon Notions which the Philosophers themselves had too grossly interpreted, have deliver'd Opinions most ridiculous.

Hence Mr. *Hobbs* will have Men produc'd like *Mushrooms*, *fungorum more*. But sure it were most reasonable, that those *Mushroom* Men should be kept in some sharp and sour Pickle, untill they had disclaim'd a foolish Fancy, which is so contrary to the Word of God; which is the publick Rule of our moral Actions and Obedience.

Mer. Sir, I believe most assuredly the History of the Creation, as *Moses* hath wrote it, and think, that in Reason, as well as Conscience, we ought so to do. But, setting aside the Divine Inspiration, Are there any other Reasons why we ought rather to believe *Moses* in that Particular, than any other of the Learned *Grecian* Philosophers?

Trav. Yes, Sir, there are three principal Reasons, which ought to engage

gage our Belief for *Moses* rather than for any other Historian whatsoever. And they are, first, The *Antiquity* of his History; secondly, The *Reason* in his History; and thirdly, the *Testimony* of others concerning both,

For the first, It is agreed by the *Greeks* themselves, That they have no History ancienter than that of *Homer*. *Constat apud Græcos nulla invenitur conscriptio poemate Homeri vetustior*, saith *Iosephus contra Appion*. And yet *Homer* liv'd above six hundred Years after *Moses*.

But, not to trouble you with what you may find elsewhere, I shall refer you to the same *Iosephus*, and to *Grotius de Verit. Rel. Christ.* and last of all, to the *Origines Sacræ* of Dr. *Stillingfleet*, or Mr. *Gale's Court of the Gentiles*.

For the Reason of his History, especially as it relates to the Creation of Man, nothing seems more just, than that God Almighty, who is the Fountain of all Wisdom and Goodness, should have rather chosen to propagate

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the World at first, as he did at last after the Flood by *Succession*, than by such a promiscuous Production of the Earth as is before mention'd; that even thereby he might prevent (as he did) that *State of War* suppos'd by our Author, and those many Mischiefs and Inconveniences which would attend an Equality intolerable, and never yet known upon the Earth. And notwithstanding the ridiculous Arguments of Mr. *Hobbs*, and some others, they could never yet produce any good Authorities or Examples, where this Equality was ever to be found, except in their own Understandings. The Learned *Pompenatius*, in his Treatise *de immort. Animæ*, tells us, That if the Inequality which is amongst Men were taken away, the Race of Mankind would be destroy'd, or at best, subsist with great Inconvenience; and that it is not the occasion of Discord, but rather of the most perfect Harmony. *Hæcque inæqualitas, si toleretur, aut genus humanum periret, aut non commode constaret. Neque inæqualitas inter homi-*

homines, commensurata tamen, debet discordiam parare, imo sicut in symphonia vocum commensurata diversitas concentum delectabilem facit sic commensurata diversitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum & delectabilem generat.

On the other side, by this successive Propagation God hath secur'd Man's Preservation, and that by introducing a natural form of Government and Obedience, so certain, and so reasonable, that it might have continued even to this day, had not the Negligence of the Governours in the first Age permitted a Confusion. And the Ambition and Avarice both of the Governours and Governed in the latter Age, so entangled the Reins, that they have made it sometimes as hard to drive as to be driven.

In the next place, the compiling of the Law of *Moses* shews so demonstrably the Wisdom and Reason of the Law-giver, that his Laws have been the Ground and Patterns for the best and most ancient both of the *Attick* or *Greek*, as well as *Roman* Institutions.

And lastly, for Testimony concerning the *Veracity* of his History, we find even the very Particulars confirm'd by the most ancient Authors. *Hesiod, Homer, and Euripides*, declare, That *Man was made out of Clay*. *Calimachus* calls Man *μαδὶς ἠγευμένη*, *lutum Prometheum*. The History of *Adam and Eve*, of the *Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*, and the *Serpent*, are attested by *Sanchuniathon*.

In the most ancient of the *Grecian Ceremonies and Mysteries*, they used to shew a *Serpent* crying out *εὖρα* for *Eva*; *Hesychius, Clemens in protreptico* and *Chalcidius ad Timaeum* tell us, that according to the account of *Moses*, God forbid our Fore-fathers the eating of the *Fruit of certain Trees*, lest thereby they should come to the Knowledge of good and Evil, *ex quibus notitia boni malique animis eorum obreperet*.

The Story of the *Gyants* is attested by *Pausanias, Philostratus, and Pliny*. *Berosus*, and *Abydenus the Assyrian*, with many others, give a perfect Account of the *Deluge*. *Trogus Pompeius*

peius, Polemones, Manetho, Lyfimaribus, and others, of the flight of the Children of *Israel* out of *Egypt*, under the Conduct of *Moses* himself. All which, and a great deal more to this purpose, abundantly confirm the Authority of *Moses* his History, and oblige our Approbation and Belief, even without the exprefs and indisputable Command both of God and Man.

Mer. I am perfectly satisfy'd, and shall reap this advantage from the long Trouble I have given you, that I shall henceforward apply our Authors Propositions to the History of *Moses*; and according as they are conformable to it, approve them, or otherwise, if contrary, totally reject them; and for the present, am sufficiently convinc'd that the first Regulation of Mankind began from paternal Governments. For his Necessity, universal Right to all things, the regulating of Ownership and Property, and the Mediation of some wise men, for the consenting to the establishing a Government, I shall look upon them hereafter as canting Terms, contriv'd

by some Commonwealths Men, and not at all consonant to Reason or Truth, especially since he hath not produc'd one Instance of any Government originally so begun, against twenty which you have, and I believe can produce, for the deducing many great Governments from *Fathers* of Families.

Trav. You will find, that the force of all his reasoning, quite through his Book, depends chiefly upon such canting Propositions as you have here repeated. But pray proceed.

Mer. He tells us then, p. 31. *That could we trace all Foundations of Politics that now are, or ever came to our Knowledge since the World began, we shall find none of them to have descended from Paternal Power.*

Trav. Did you ever meet with a more impudent or more ignorant Author? You remember, I suppose, those Instances which I have already produc'd to demonstrate the repeopling the World by *Fathers* of Families, which are confirm'd to us by approv'd and irrepreachable Authors. Besides, what
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is more notoriously known, than the History of the *Edemites*, or the Posterity of *Eſau* or *Edom*, and the Hatred which continued in his Family against the Sons of *Jacob*, when they deny'd the *Israelites* Passage through their Country. Nay so certain is it, that that great Nation descended from *Edom*, who was the eldest Son of *Isaac*, and Father of his Family, and that they spread as far as the *Red Sea*, that the *Greeks themselves*, from his Name *Edom*, which they interpret *ἑρυθρῶν*, have left the Name of *Mars Erythraeum*, even to this day.

Nor less known is the Genealogy of *Ismael* the Son of *Abraham*, from whence the *Ismaelites* or *Arabians*, whom *Epiphanius* calls the *Saracens*, are lineally descended.

And, as a constant Mark of their unquestionable Descent from *Ismael*, they have, to our Age, retain'd the Custom of being circumcised after the *thirteenth* Year, according to what we find written of their Father *Ismael* himself.

There are besides, as I told you, many more undoubted Instances in those Authors, which I have already nam'd to you. And if our Politician hath any respect for the Holy Bible and History of *Moses*, let me recommend him to the twenty fifth Chap. of *Genesis*, where *Moses* numbring the Children of *Ismael*, concludes, *These are the Sons of Ismael, and these are their Names, by their Towns and by their Castles, twelve Princes according to their Nations. And they dwelt from Havila unto Shur, that is before Egypt, as thou goest towards Assyria.* And whilst he hath the Book in his hand, let him turn forward to the thirty sixth Chapter of *Genesis*, where, after a long Catalogue of the Dukes and Kings which descended lineally from *Esau*, it is said, ver. 31. *And these are the Kings that reigned in the Land of Edom before there reigned any King over the Children of Israel. And these are the Names of the Dukes that came of Esau, according to their Families, after their Places, by their Names.* And Verse the last, *These*
be

be the Dukes of Edom according to their Habitations, in the Land of their Possessions, he is Esau the Father of the Edomites.

Now what can be more particular or express, than what I have here produc'd? Or what can he mean by tracing the Foundation of Politics, which are, or ever came to our Knowledge since the World began, if these will not pass for such?

He cannot pretend that we should bring a long Roll of Parchment, like a *Welsh Pedigree, ap Shinkin, ap Morgan*, and so from the Son to the Father, untill we arrive at *ap Ismael, ap Esau, ap Magog, ap Javan*, and so forth: that would be too childish to imagine of him; for we know very well, that all the Kingdoms upon the Earth have oftentimes chang'd their Masters and Families.

But if he means, as surely he must, if he mean any thing, that we cannot name any such Kingdom or Government that hath been so begun, then he is grossly mistaken: for, the *Assyrians*,
the

the *Medes*, the *Ethiopians*, or *Cusae*, the *Lydians*, the *Javes*, or *Greeks*, and very many others, are sufficiently known, and preserve to this day the very names of their first Founders; who (as is made appear) were all Fathers of Families.

Mar. Cousin, I begin to be very weary of this rambling Author. Pray, therefore let us go on as fast as we can.

Trav. Read then what follows.

Mar. As for Abraham, whilst he liv'd, as also his Son Isaac, they were but ordinary Fathers of Families, and, no question, govern'd their Households as all others do. What have you to say to this Holy Patriarch and most excellent Man?

Trav. I say we are beholden to our Author, that he did not call him a Country Farmer, some such a one, it may be, as in his new Model of the Government, is to share the Royal Authority. Indeed it is hard, that whom the declar'd Enemies to the Hebrew People have thought fit to call a King, we
who

who adore the Son of *Abraham*, will not allow to be better than a common *Houſholder*?

Mar. I confeſs, my Reading is not great; but as far as the Bible goes I may adventure to give my Opinion: And if I miſtake not, the *Children of Hebr* own'd him to be a mighty Prince among them.

Trav. Yes, Sir; and the Prophet *David*, in the hundred and fifth *Pſalm*, calls him the *Lords Anointed*. But, becauſe I perceive the *Word of God* is too vulgar a Study for our Learned Statesman, I have found out a *Prophane* Author who concurs with the *Hiſtory of the Bible*.

And firſt, *Juſtin* makes no Scruple to call him in plain Words a King. *Poſt Damascum Axillus, Mon Adores, & Abraham & Iſrael, Reges fuer.* lib. 36. *Joſephus* alſo, and *Groſius*, who are Men of no ſmall Reputation even amongſt the moſt Learned, have quoted *Nicolaus Damascenus* to vindicate the Regal Authority of *Abraham*.

His

His Words are very intelligible, *Ἀκούσας οὗτος ὁ λαὸς οὐκ ἐπίστευεν.* And tells us moreover, that in his Days (which was in the Reign of *Augustus*) the Fame of *Abraham* was much celebrated in that Country: and that there was yet a little Town remaining, which was called by his Name.

Mer. I perceive, when Men grow fond of their own Imaginations they run over all, and neither Reason nor Religion have any Power to stop them.

Trav. Then he introduceth *Samuel* upon the Stage, chiefly I suppose, to insinuate, that the People had a *Power*, and did *choose* themselves a King: which is so notoriously false, that they never had the least share, or pretended any in the election of *Saul*. It is true they chose rather to be govern'd by a temporal King, who was to live amongst them, and rule as other Kings did, than continue under the Government of the King of Heaven and Earth; and so the Word *chose* relates wholly to the *Government*, but not to the Person

son of the Governour. For which, *Samuel* also reproves them, and accordingly they acted no farther, leaving the Election of their new King wholly to God, and their Prophet, and God did particularly choose him from the rest of their People, and *Samuel* actually anointed him before the People knew any thing of the matter.

Afterwards, lest some might have accus'd *Samuel* of Partiality in the Choice, he order'd *Lots* to be cast, which in the Interpretation of all men, is, leaving the Election to God; and *Saul* was again taken. What *Junius Brutus*, another old antimonarchical seditious Brother, objects concerning renewing the Kingdom at *Gilgal*, where it is said, *And all the People went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul King before the Lord*, will serve very little to prove any Right of Power in the People, no not so much as of Election: for confirming and renewing the Kingdom, and such like Expressions, signifie no more, than the taking by us the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, which

which I think were never thought to give the King any Right to the Crown, but only a just Right to punish us for our *Perjury* as well as *Disobedience*, in Case of Rebellion. So *renewing the Covenant with God*, as particularly a little before the Death of *Joshuah*, cannot be supposed to give a greater right of Power to God Almighty, than what he had before, but is only a stricter Obligation for the Peoples Obedience, that they might be condemned out of their own Mouths. *And Joshuah said unto the People, See ye are Witnesses against your selves.*

So *Samuel* makes the People bind themselves to God, to their King, and to their Prophet, that they would faithfully obey him whom the Lord had set over them. *And behold, saith Samuel, the Lord hath set a King over you.* But having spoke more to this purpose elsewhere, and the Case being most clear, as well by the History it self, as by the Authority of *Grotius*, and other learned Men, that *Saul* and the rest of the *Hebrew Kings*, did not
in

in the least depend upon their People, but received all their Right of Power wholly from God, we will proceed with our Author. Only I must note by the way, that (with the learned Gentleman's leave) neither the *Sanhedrim*, the Congregation of the People, nor the Princes of the Tribes, had any manner of Power, but what was subordinate, and that only to judge the People, according to the Laws and Institutions of *Moses*. And so they continued to the *Babylonish* Captivity, *Grotius* only observing, in favour of the *Sanhedrim*, that they had a particular Right of judging concerning a whole Tribe, the High Priest and a Prophet.

Mer. Well, Sir, we are now come to our modern despotical Power. What say you to *Mahomet* and *Cingis Can*.

Trav. Prethee, *Cousin*, let's not trouble our selves with those *Turks* and *Tartars*, they are yet far enough off, and not like to trouble us, nor does their Government much concern us; we have Laws of our own sufficient,
which

which as they secure us from the danger of any Despotical Power or arbitrary Government which can rise up amongst our selves, so they do no less protect the Person of our *Supream Magistrate* or King, from all manner of Violence or Jurisdiction of the *People*.

Mer. In the next place then we come to an *Aphorism*, which is, That *Empire is founded in Property*. Upon which, he tells us, *he must build the most of his subsequent Reasoning*.

Trav. Ay marry, here's Work indeed. And no doubt but the Foundation being so solid, the Building will last eternally. But let us see, in page 40. he gives us this *Aphorism* in Latine; and then it runs thus, *Imperium fundatur in Dominio*: which, lest we might not understand, he tells us his meaning of *Dominium*, is, *the Possession of Lands*. And that what Kings soever in former times had no Companion in the Sovereign Power, they had no share likewise in the Possession of the Ground or Land.

Truly, *Confin*, I do not remember to have met with such grave and seri-

ous Fooling in any Author besides himself. But we will examine his Reasoning, and his *Aphorism*, as fully and impartially as we can. And in the first place it is most necessary that we should *define* the Word *Imperium*, which surely we cannot do more plainly, than when we say, That *Imperium est jus Imperandi*, Empire is a Right of Command. Now that this Right of Command should be fix'd or founded upon what in it self is incapable of receiving any Command, or paying any Obedience, I mean *Land*, is so absurd a Proposition, that it makes Empire an empty Name only, and Sound: for when you thunder your Imperial Laws through your hollow Rocks, your shady Groves, and Woods, those *stiff* and *stately* Subjects of your new found Empire, will pay no other Homage or Obedience, than a Return of your Commands upon your own *Royal Head*, by the Repetition of a foolish *Eccho*, the only *Subject*

I which

which can entertain you with Discourse.

You, in the mean time, must remain like *Midas*, amidst his Gold, without Service or Sustenance, except being wholly transform'd into an *Ass*, or grazing, like *Nebuchadnezzar*, amidst your fertile Pastures, you might indeed in such case become a *fat and lusty*, though a *beastly*, Emperour.

But, *Cousin*, to be serious, the great Folly of our Authors *Aphorism* will appear more demonstrable by putting a familiar Case or two, and such as may shew us plainly, upon *what* Empire is truly founded, and upon what it is not.

Let us suppose then, that the King should make some Nobleman or Gentleman, Duke or Prince, or (if you will) Emperour of some vast tract of Land, in the *Western Part* of *Terra Australis incognita*; which we will also imagine totally uninhabited. What kind of Emperour do you think this Nobleman would be?

Mer.

Mer. Truly, Sir, if he had no Subjects, I think he would appear much such another kind of Prince as Duke *Trinkolo*, in the Comedy.

Trav. You have hit upon a very proper Instance.

Mer. But pray, *Confin*, why may not our Emperour have Subjects having Land to bestow?

Trav. Undoubtedly so he may; but they must be procur'd one of these three ways: either from his own *Loins*, as in the old World, that is, from his *Wife* and *Children*; or from *Slave's*, such as may possibly be bought in some other Part of the World; or from *Free People*, whom he may probably carry over with him.

Mer. Very well; and why may not the Land be peopled, in time, by his own *Family*, especially if *Polygamy* be permitted, as formerly it was, and both himself and Sons take to themselves several Wives.

Trav. So it may, Sir; but this will not do our Business; for, his Empire, in that case, will not be founded upon the *Possession* of his *Land*, but the Persons of his Children; who become naturally his *Subjects*, even when he did not possess one *Acre* of Land. For God and Nature have so invested a Sovereign Right of Command in Fathers over their Children, that no Power upon Earth can take that Right away.

'Tis true, the Civil Law, for the Good of all, has reduc'd even Fathers themselves under the Civil Government, who is still *Pater Patriæ*. But, naturally, every Father is Emperour in his own Family.

Mer. I understand you, Sir; for, Fathers having naturally a Sovereign Right of Command over their own Children, if then he peoples a Country by his own Posterity, the Possession of his Land gives him no more Power than what he had originally

ginally, and from a higher Title too, before. It is plain; but why may he not then stock his Land with *Slaves*, from *Guiney*, or other Parts of *Africa*?

Trav. O *Cousin*, but properly speaking there is no Empire of *Slaves*. 'Οὐκ ἔστι δούλων Ἀγὰς' ὁδὰμῦ πο-
λε.

For *Aristotle*, lib. 8. de *Rep.* and from thence *Grotius* assure us, That such a Government is not properly an *Empire*, but an over-grown *Family*. *Qui ergo tali tenetur imperio populus, in posterum non civitas erit, sed magna Familia.* Besides, Reason it self convinces us of this Truth: for no Man is a Slave willingly, and what we hold by force is not truly an Empire, which, as I said, is *Jus Imperandi*, but a *Tyranny*, which always includes *Injustice*.

Mer. But, by your leave, may not a Man justly command his Slave.

Trav. Yes Sir, as he may use his Oxe or his Horse, and they are always look'd upon as part of our Personal Estate, and pass accordingly. But naturally, or according to the *Law of Nature*, which is Justice, no Man is born a Slave, *Servi natura, id est, citra factum humanum; hominum nulli sunt*, saith *Grotius, lib. 3.* Whence the *Civilians* tell us, *Contra naturam esse hanc servitutem*

Lawfully indeed, which is humane Institution, Men become, and are sometimes born *Slaves*, but *Subjects* we are both by *Law* and *Nature* too.

All *Politicians* therefore, and *Civilians*, have made a Distinction between *Subjects* and *Slaves*: the last are so by Accident and Misfortune, and against their Will, for the sole Benefit of their Lord and Master; the others are *Subjects* by *Nature*, and willingly continue so, not only for the Honour of their Emperour, King, or Supreme Governour,

vernour, but for the peaceable and happy Subsistence of themselves. So Tacitus distinguisheth them in these Words, *Non Dominationem & servos, sed rectorem & civis cogitaret.* And Xenophon of Agesilans, whatsoever Cities he reduc'd under his Government he exempted from those servile Offices which Slaves pay their Lords, and only commanded such things as were fit for Free-Men to pay their Supreme Governour. *Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀνδράσι ἀρετῆς.* Nor are there, or ever were there, any such Kingdoms of Slaves.

For, though the Turk and Tartars at present, the Persians, and generally all other Eastern Kings, anciently govern'd despotically; yet their Subjects always had a Civil as well as a Personal Liberty, and were generally so far from being govern'd against their Wills, that, as Apollonius observes, the Assyrians and Medes ador'd their Monarchy, *Τὰς μεγαλὰς ἐκείνης.* The Cappado-

cians would not accept of the Liberty which the *Romans* offer'd them, *Negantes vivere se posse sine Rege.*

The same *Philostratus* tells us of the *Ibracians*, *Seythians*, and those *Myfians* which inhabited about the *Hellespont*, that they had no manner of Satisfaction in the Proposition of a Liberty, which they car'd not for. And the *Turks*, at this day, being so taught by their Prophet and their *Alcoran*, think it an Honour to dye by the Command of their Emperour.

Mer. This I comprehend well: but why may not those Slaves be made free?

Trav. That indeed they may. But then they come under the third Consideration; which is, That our Emperour may People his Country with Free-Men, whom he is suppos'd to carry over with him. But then I must ask you, Whether you imagine, That Men who are Free at home will become Subjects in a

For

Foreign uncultivated Country, un-
healthful it may be, and dangerous,
and very remote from all their
Friends and Relations, and what-
ever else they once esteemed, with-
out the Hopes of some Recom-
pence and considerable Advan-
tage.

Mer. Without doubt, they will
not: But, why may not the Pro-
prietor of the Land grant such Pro-
portions of it, to these Free-men, as
may encourage them to transplant
themselves and Families, as they do
at present, to *Carolina*, and other
Colonies.

Trav. This is, and may be done:
but then, Sir, you must observe,
that, according to our Authors, A-
phorism, *part of his Empire must go
for it*; whence will arise the most
ridiculous *Solécism* that ever was
heard of, which is, That *by how
much he increaseth in Subjects, by so
much he decreaseth in Empire*. Which
is as much as to say, That by how
much he becomes powerful, and rich,
and

and *strong*, by so much he becomes *less* an *Emperour*.

Nay, and in process of time, when his Lands shall happen to be all peopled, he shall be no *Emperour* at all.

Mer. But, Sir, Why may he not retain, suppose, half the Lands to his own use?

Trav. He may, Sir: Yet still the Empire being founded upon the Possession of the Land, he is but *half* so great an *Emperour*, now his Empire is *half* peopled, and begins to be supply'd with all *Necessaries*, as he was when no *humane Creature* besides himself, did inhabit it. Which is so *absurd*, that nothing can be invented more unreasonable.

Mer. I know not what to say against this; but must only ask you one Question more. Whether you pretend to make an *Emperour* without Land?

Trav. I do not say I would, nor was there, it may be, any such *Emperour* ever known. Yet I must tell

tell you, that it is more rational to affirm, That a Man may be an Emperour without *Land*, than without *People*. So many of the *Roman* Generals were called Emperours, when they had little to fix their Empire on, besides their Army.

But this also we shall illustrate by this following Case. Suppose then, That after the Death of this present Emperour of *Germany*, the Princes Electors should think fit to choose this present King of *France* in his stead. I do not know that he hath any Lands in *Germany*; yet, nevertheless, what kind of Emperour do you suppose he might prove?

Mer. Without doubt, as great as his Predecessor.

Trav. Truly, I believe as great, and as perfect an Emperour, to all Intents and Purposes, as ever enjoyed that *August* Title, since *Charlemagne*. Which, sure, is an Argument most demonstrable, that Empire is not founded according to
our

our Authors erroneous Aphorism, in
the Possession of Lands.

The wise Queen *Eliz.* understood
this Truth well enough, when she
us'd to say, That she car'd not to
rule in her Subjects *Purses*, but in
their *Hearts*. And the truly poli-
tick Church of *Rome* knew most
assuredly, that they should raise
their temporal Empire to the ut-
most height that their Ambition
could suggest, not when they inva-
ded some few *Territories*, belong-
ing to some of their neighbour
Counts and Princes, but when they
could fix their Empire in *Mens*
Minds, perswading them that they
had a Right of Power over their
Souls and *Bodies*, the *Lands* fol-
lowed then of Course; and you
find them presently deposing Em-
perours, and disposing of King-
doms, and other temporal Possessi-
ons, with no less Freedom than they
did their *spiritual Benefices*.

And, to comply with our Au-
thor's Country Comparison of a
Car-

Carter and his Teem, let him command his Waggon, or his Cart, with all the Rhetorick and Artifice he can, see whether all his Endeavours would not prove ineffectual to obtain the least Motion; and whether himself would not look ridiculous. Besides, could the Cart obey, and drag the Teem after it; where could we see a more irregular and preposterous Sight?

But by governing well and commanding his Horses, the Cart will certainly follow with ease, and both arrive safely and happily at their Journeys end.

Whence it is easie to infer, That Empire is always founded upon *Living Bodies*, and not upon *Lands* or *Things insensible*.

Mer. Pray, give me leave to ask you, Whether you think this Aphorism of our Authors *false* in itself, or by him *ill understood*?

Trav. Sir, I am not oblig'd to defend another Man's Proposition. It is sufficient for me, if I prove that
it

it is false, according to his own Interpretation.

But however, that I may give you all the Satisfaction which you can reasonably desire, I will so far comply with you, as to tell you, That *Empire* may be well enough said to be founded in *Property*, but by no means when he constrains *Property* to signify the *Possession of Lands*.

Mer. Dear *Cousin*, I must entreat you, that you will give me your own Interpretation, especially since the true understanding where *Empire* ought to be fix'd, will be a farther Light to me.

Trav. Sir, If you can have Patience, I shall endeavour to satisfy you, as briefly as the Subject will permit. And first, I must again remind you, that the *formal* part of all *Empire* is *Power*, or a Sovereign Right of Government; whether residing in one or more is not material.

Pow-

Power thus fix'd in some Person, hath for his Objects, first, the Persons to be govern'd; secondly, the Territory containing them.

The first is sometimes alone sufficient to create an Empire; the second may be divided or chang'd; the Empire remaining still entire. *Imperium*, says Grotius, *duas solet habere materias* De Jure B. & P. l. 2. c. 3. *sibi subjacentes; Primariam personas, quæ materia sola interdum sufficit: Secundariam locum, qui territorium dicitur.*

This second Matter Grotius calls *Dominium*, as it is distinguish'd from *Imperium*. *Ideoque*, saith he, *Dominium non in civis tantum, sed & in extraneos transit, manente penes quem fuit imperio.*

These rightly understood, it will be no difficult Matter to affirm, That Empire is founded in a Sovereign Right of Command, or Government, or Power over Persons and Men; which that we may bring under the Term of Property, we will say, That

That Empire consists in holding this Government or Power, as Grotius expresses it, *In pleno Jure proprietatis*, or, *In patrimonio imperantis*, that is properly, or in Property, or in chief, or how else you please to render these Words in English. Which Grotius, in the same Chapter, explains, by a *Jus regendi, non aliunde pendens*. A Right of Government not depending upon any other humane Authority whatsoever.

Mer. But, Sir, since you have founded Empire upon a Supreme Right of Government or Power over Men, how comes it to pass that we find a Right of Power, and Priviledges, and Government too, so founded in the Possession of several Lands, that the Possession of those Lands alone gives a Man several Rights and Prerogatives.

For example, amongst us 'tis said, That whosoever hath the Right and Possession of the Barony of Burgaveny, besides some others,
be-

becomes thereby a Baron of *England*, and enjoys those Priviledges which belong to it.

In *France* I have heard say, That nothing is more common than for Men to receive their *Titles* according to their *Lands*, whether Count, Baron, Marquess, and so forth.

Is it not plain then, That the Right of Command or Power, which is Empire, may be founded upon *Property*, according to our Author's Interpretation, that is, the *Possession of Lands*?

Trav. I agree to what you have urg'd; that is to say, That several Priviledges, and Right of Power, are annexed to several Lordships or *Terres Nobles*, that they have thereby *haute & basse Justice*; and their Jurisdiction extends to *Life and Death*. Nay more, in several parts of *Italy*, and particularly in *Lombardy*, there are several *Imperial Feuds*, which *Grotius* seems to call *Regna Fendalia*, which have almost

as great Prerogatives as some other Kingdoms have. They make *Laws*, raise *Taxes*, and mint *Money*, as other greater Kingdoms do. And yet all this makes little for our Author's Aphorism, as by him interpreted.

Mer. The Reason, if you please.

Trav. Because all those little Lordships, or Principalities, whether they were instituted at first by the *Goths* and *Vandals*, or *Lombards*, or granted afterwards by several later Emperours and Kings, or *both*, as is most probable, yet they did, and still do, at this day, depend upon a *Superiour Power*, and pay *Homage* and *Fealty* for those Priviledges which they enjoy; which is much different from Empire, or a *Sovereign Right of Power*. And yet, even in this Case, this subordinate Power is so far from being founded upon the *Possession* of all the *Land* belonging to the *Fend*, which is our Author's Proposition, that very often

often their Liberties depend only upon the *old Walls of a ruined Castle*, and a *very inconsiderable Number of Acres*, which represent the *whole Feud*, or *Mannor*, the rest of the Land having been sold away, and become the *Property* of others, some small Rent only, or Acknowledgment, being reserv'd. And after this manner, the Supreme Power may as well tye Priviledges to a *Post*, and grant the Possessor of that *Post* such Royalties as the Proprietor of such a Castle or Land. Which is very far from proving, that the *Possession of Lands* doth thereby originally create a *Sovereign Right of Power*.

Mer. Cousin, I have heard, and read too, I think, that the Sea hath formerly eaten up a considerable part of your ancient Patrimony, and from thence, it may be, you are no Friend to Lands. But, for my part, I will stand up for Land as long as I can; and must therefore ask you,

Why those Rents or Acknowledgments were reserv'd, if not to testify, that they came originally from the Lord, and that thereby he still keeps up a kind of Sovereign Right to the *Lands* themselves; knowing well enough, that his *Power*, according to our Author, is *founded* upon *them*.

Trav. This yet signifies nothing: for although the Reservation of these Rents or Services do preserve the Memory of the Benefactor, and continue the Respect due from the Tenant, yet this is *personal* only, and hath no Relation to the *publick Right* of Power or Government.

For, when this Rent was not reserv'd, yet whosoever lives within the Jurisdiction of such a Fewd or Mannor, is always subject to him, who enjoys the Lordship.

So in *England*, *Services* and *Quit-Rents* have been generally *receiv'd* and *paid*, untill the late King, and his present Majesty, were pleas'd to dispose of them.

But

But to believe that this hath lessened his *Sovereign Right of Government*, is a Fancy that sure cannot enter into the Head of any sober Man. But let us put a plain Case.

Suppose the Kingdom of *England* were at any time obtain'd by absolute *Conquest*, as I conceive it was more than once, and that such *Conquest* gives the Conquerour a *Sovereign Right*, not only to our *real* and *personal* Estates, which we find to have been wholly in the hands of some of our Kings, but also over our *Liberties* and *Lives*, as may be fully seen in *Grotius, de Jur. B. & P.*

Now, Sir, supposing a People in this Condition, and having nothing of their own, submit themselves, and *all* they have, to the *Mercy* of the Conquerour, as the *Carthaginians* did to the *Romans*, you will grant, I imagine, that this Conquerour is an Emperour to all Intents, having an *absolute Right of Power* over the *People* and their *Land* also.

Mer. Yes certainly, as long as he keeps himself and People in that Condition there cannot want any thing to make him an absolute Monarch.

Trav. But we will farther suppose, That our Conquerour (being of a more noble, and more humane Temper, than, it may be, our Author would have been) orders diligent *Inquisition* to be made into the Value of his conquer'd Lands. Which being done, and enter'd into a Register, such as we call *Doomsday Book*, the Conquerour divides most of these Lands between the Conquerours and the Conquered; some he returns to their former Owners, upon certain Conditions or Services; others he changeth. To his *Noblemen* and *Favourites* he grants great *Titles* and *Priviledges*, to the Gentry less, and to the *vulgar* or *common sort*, some small *Possessions*, which with a little Labour and Diligence, will enable them to live easily

sily and peaceably the rest of their days.

All these become an Inheritance to themselves and their Heirs, according to their several *Tenures*, (which the Conquerours have generally created) and which we call *Property*. These, Sir, being thus established, and the Lands of the Kingdom settled after this manner, the Conquerour or King himself reserves, it may be, a small part, which we call *Crown Lands*; and in Consideration of his *Right of Conquest*, and those *Benefits* which he hath bestowed upon his People, in granting them their *Liberties, Livas, and Lands*, he continueth to himself the *Power of making and abolishing Laws*, according as he shall think most fit, and proper for the *Peace, Honour, and Safety* of his Government. He creates Magistrates for the due Execution of these Laws; who, in *his* stead, and by *his* Authority, have a Power to judge between his Subjects, and in some Cases between his

Subjects and himself, or his Attorney.

Besides these, he retains the *sole Power* of making *Peace and War*, of *disposing* of the *Treasury*, whether it be his own *particular Revenue*, or such as may be granted for the *Defence* and *Security* of the *Kingdom*, and such other *Prerogatives* as *Sovereign Princes* generally pretend to.

And after all, he obligeth all his Subjects, generally and in particular, to pay him *Homage* and *Fealty* for the *Land* and *Priviledges* which they *hold* or have *receiv'd* from him, and to *bind themselves* and their *Heirs* for ever to become *true* and *faithful Subjects* unto him their *Liege Lord*, his *Heirs* and *Successors* for ever; as may be seen at large in the Form of our general *Oath* of *Allegiance*: and this under no less *Penalty* than the *loss* of our *Lives*, *Honour*, and *Estates*, whatever they be.

Now

Now, *Cousin*, after the Disposition of the Lands, as hath been here suppos'd, and this Establishment of the Government, according to the *good Will and Pleasure* of him who is *Master of all*, and the *Consent and Confirmation* of the *People*, who have receiv'd those *Lands and Priviledges*, can you believe that our Conquerour is less an Emperour than he was, when he kept all the Lands in his own Hands, and undistributed?

Mer. Methinks, in good Reason, in Justice, and in Gratitude, he should lose nothing of the Power which he hath reserv'd, by reason of the Graces and Priviledges which he hath granted.

Trav. No sure, Sir, he rather acquires another Right, and becomes doubly their Sovereign, that is to say, both *King* and *Father* of his *Country*; for since Government is agreed even by our Author, to have

have been instituted for the *Good of Man*, certainly, that Governour who doth the greatest Good, is by consequence the greatest Emperour. So *Josephus* (in the Speech which *Judah* makes in the Behalf of his Brother *Benjamin*, to his unknown Brother *Joseph*, chief Minister of the *Egyptian* Kingdom) observes, That Power was given Men to do Good. And by how much we extend our Bounty, by so much we enlarge our Empire, *Ad servandos homines potentiam datam existimare, & quò pluribus salutem dederis, hoc te ipsum illustriorem fore.*

Mer. Cousin, all this is very fine, and seems indeed most reasonable and most just. But I perceive we are not yet come to a right Understanding of the Case.

For, if a Prince or Sovereign Monarch shall, out of a Principle of *Goodness*, or what you please, entrust Part of his *Power* in the hands of the *People*, let the Conditions be
what

what they will, when they are once possessed of that *Power*, most likely they will think it reasonable, to *share* the *Government* also; or, to use our Author's Expression, *p. 45.* if the People have the greatest Interest in the *Property*, they will, and *must*, have it in the Empire. So if a Master of a Family shall think fit to arm his Servants, to the Intent only, and upon the express Condition, that they shall never use them but in Defence of their Master and *Family*, and that only according to his own Commands; yet, nevertheless, if in process of Time the Servants shall believe that the Master doth not govern his Family for their mutual Advantage and Security, it is ten to one, but that having the *Power* in their Hands, they will pretend to govern the *Family* as well as the Master: nay, and if the Master prove too obstinate, turn even himself out of the Government and Family too.

Trav.

Trav. Very well. I did indeed expect, that at last we should come to *Club Law*, and that your convincing Arguments would end in the invincible Force of *Powder, Ball, and Musket.*

Pardon me, Sir, I do not speak this of your self; for I know, that according to our Agreement, and for the Support of our Discourse, you only personate our Author, whose Words are, *They will and must have it in the Empire.*

Now, though *will* and *must* are not proper Terms amongst civiliz'd and reasonable Men, yet nevertheless, since we know that Deformity in some Countries, and when in Vogue, passeth for Beauty; and a Disease grown Epidemical assumes the Name of Health, according to that of *Seneca, Recti locum tenet error, ubi fit publicus.*

I shall endeavour to pull off the ugly *Vizard*, and unmask our ignorant *State-Physician*, and demonstrate first, That it is not reasonable, that those

those who have the greatest Interest in the *Property*, or the Possession of the Lands, according to our Author's Interpretation, should have any *Right of Power* in the Government, otherwise than what is *subordinate*, and deriv'd from the Supream Magistrate.

Secondly, That by having this Interest in the *Property*, they have not thereby more *Right*, no nor more *Power*, than if they had it not.

Thirdly, That all Sovereign Princes have a *Right of Power* over the *Lands* themselves, notwithstanding the *Property* be divided amongst the People.

Fourthly, That most Kings who have had the Sovereign Power, have yet had many *Companions* and *Sharers* in the Possession of the Land.

And lastly, I shall give an Answer to your Instance which you have produc'd concerning a *Master* and his *Servant*.

Mer.

Mer. Dear Cousin, Excuse the Liberty I take, since you know, we at first granted it to each other. Besides, the deciding these main Points will be in a great measure ending the Trouble which I give you. And being confident that you will be able to make good what you have promis'd, I shall reap the Advantage of your Pains, and you the Honour and Satisfaction of confirming me, and it may be many others in an Opinion, which we were rather willing to believe than able to justify.

Trav. Sir, not to lose Time, I shall begin with the first, That it is not reasonable, that those who have the greatest Interest in the Property, should have any Right of Power in the Government, except what is subordinate and deriv'd from the supream Magistrate.

To prove this, we must make these two general Distinctions, which are, and ever were in all Governments
what-

whatever: That is to say, between the Governour and the Governed, which must of necessity be two different Persons: for, as *Plutarch* observes in his Introduction to the Lives of *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, one Man cannot be *Master* and *Servant*, nor can he who commands be able at the same Time to obey. So *Grotius* tells us, *Quod cogens & coactum requirunt distinctas personas, neque sufficiunt distincti respectus*. I never heard but that the People were always taken for the Governed. To moderate and regulate whose unruly Passions and Inclinations, Government it self has been hitherto continued in the World, and they are generally call'd the *Body* of the Kingdom. The Governour has been ever understood to be a *single Person*, or *Counsel*, or more, who are likewise properly call'd the *Head*. Both form the *Body Politick*. Right of Power is like the *Soul*, and is seated in the *Head*; whence dispersing its vital Heat, through proper Arteries

ries and Veins, it nourisheth and gives Motion to all the Body, and every part of it. The *Body* thereby is enabled to preserve the *Head* from Violence. The *Head* alone commands, and the *Body* performs. The *Body* cannot command, nor hath the *Head* any Action, nor can it possibly obey. The *Head* separated from the *Body* destroys both.

Mark, that *Right of Power*, which is Empire, hath no other *Object* or *Subject* than the *Body*, and in its Exercise, is properly and solely founded thereupon. The *Body* parted from the *Head*, is no more a *Body*, but a *Carcass*. And the *People*, without a Supreme Governour, is no more a *People*, but a confus'd deform'd, and unactive *Multitude*. Mark, that the *People* have no Life, nor Power, nor Motion, but what they receive from the *Head*. This is the constant Doctrine of the most Learned Authors who have ever treated of Government.

Mer.

Mer. Sir, I have often heard this Comparison made: but, if you allow that a *Head* may be compos'd of several Members, as you seem to suppose, when you say, a *Council*, or *more*, we shall then easily agree. For all we desire is, That a *Head* may be chosen or made up out of the rest of the *Members*.

Trav. Necessity sometimes, and Violence, have compos'd such a monstrous *Head*, over which also they have been forc'd to raise another *Phantasm*; such as the *Stateholders* in *Holland*, the *Doge* of *Venice*, or *Duke* of *Genoua*. So I have observ'd in many places, and particularly in the *Prince's Gallery* at *Monaco*, two famous *Heads*, which were so artificially contriv'd, that at first Sight, or at a Distance, they have represented a humane Shape. But upon a stricter Examination, we have found them patch'd together of several sorts of *Fishes*, *Fowls*, *Beasts*, or *Insects*.

L

Now

Now, besides that all unnatural and monstrous Productions have been observ'd by Naturalists, to be generally of short Continuance, so they do not at all destroy my Proposition, which is, That there must be a perfect Distinction between the *Governour* and the *Governed*: and that howsoever the *Head* be compos'd, whether of one *Monarch*, or *thirty Tyrants*, as in *Athens*, or of *five Hundred*, yet there the *sole and total Right of Arbitrary Power*, doth and must reside.

Mer. I cannot approve of *Arbitrary Power*; and I should think, that in this Case there can be no Danger of it: for, the Body having by much the greater Force and Strength, may not only refuse to obey what they do not approve of, but if the Head should impose too obstinately, by virtue of their *Strength*, they may *resist*, and easily reduce their Head to their own terms; nay, even to *obey the Body*.

Trav.

Trav. They may so, Sir, and ever might since the Beginning of *Bodies*, and ever may whilst *Bodies* continue in the World; no matter whether they be *fat* or *lean*. But the Consequence also ever was, and ever will be, Confusion, Dissolution, and the Destruction of both.

This puts me in mind of a Fable which *Plutarch* relates in the Life of *Agis*, King of *Sparta*; which if our Author would have impartially consider'd, it might have stop'd the furious Current of his *Popular Pen*. The Story is this :

The *Serpent's Tail*, who had been ever us'd to follow its imperious *Head*, grew weary, at length, of this servile Complaisance, disputes the *Præcedency*; and having brought the *Body* into its pernicious Faction, the *triumphant Tail* begins to take the place, and *marches first*. But being no ways qualified for that Government which it had *usurp'd*, it train'd the *Head* through Thorns and Briars, through Waters, and

down Precipices; till having totally blinded and disabled the Head, and the Tail no ways able to support its Life, both became a Prey, and were swallow'd up by a *Vultur*, who had watch'd the fatal Consequence of this *unnatural* and *irregular* Motion.

You see here the Effect of *Force* against a *Right of Power*; which, since it comes in my way, it is most necessary we should distinguish: for *Power*, by Abuse, is become, I perceive, another of our Authors *equivocal* Words.

All *Power* came originally from God Almighty; for, *There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God*, Rom. 13. 1. which must be always understood a *Right of Power*; for God doth neither *Violence* nor *Wrong*. *Namque odit ipse vim Deus*. And if sometimes we have seen *Violence* and *Force* prevail against *Power*, which is a *just Authority*, it is only a mark of *Permission* in the Divine Providence,

dence, as a Punishment for Sin, not of *Approbation*. *Narratur in testimonium divinae Providentiae id permittentis, non in facti humani approbationem.* These are the Words of *Grotius*.

The *Body Politick* is compos'd of *Men*, that is to say, *Dust* and *Clay*, without Form or Action, untill God breath'd into his Nostrils the *Breath of Power*, and it became a living Soul.

Power then is a *Ray* of the Divinity it self. And notwithstanding the insolent Mockery of our Atheistical, conceited Author, where there is a *Sovereign Right of Power* there is *Jus divinum*.

So when God, at the Request of *Moses*, who was unable to govern so great a People without *subordinate Officers*, instituted the Court of the *Sanhedrim*. God took of the *Spirit* that was upon *Moses*, and gave it to the *seventy Elders*, which was this *Right of Power*, and they began to prophesie; a constant mark

of this *Right of Power*, which they deriv'd from *Moses*, and was subordinate as generally the *Constitutum* is to the *Constituens*.

So when *Saul* was anointed King as a Mark of his undoubted Right of Power, he prophesied amongst the Prophets. So again, when *Moses* growing old, desir'd that God would set a *Man over the Congregation*, that they might not be as *Sheep without a Shepherd*, the Lord said unto *Moses*, Take *Joshuah the Son of Nun*, and lay thy *Hands upon him*, and thou shalt put some of thine *Honour upon him*, that all the *Congregation of the Children of Israel* may be obedient.

What should all the *Congregation of the Children of Israel* be obedient to, but to the *Commands of Joshuah*, who had received this *Right of Command*, which is *Power and Government*, immediately from the *Hands of Moses*.

Power then is the *Soul of Government*, receiv'd from God himself.

self. It is a *Spirit* which gives Life to the *Body*, but not the *Body* it self.

Power is like that nourishing *Heat* and *Light* of the *Sun*, which we are sensible of by its *Effects*, that is, its *Influence* upon all sublunary *Bodies*, by its *Attraction*, *Reverberation*, or *Transmission* through proper *Vehicles*. Not by contact of the *Body*.

Nay, we are assur'd, that the *Æther*, which is nearer the *Sun*, is *dark*.

Power shews it self by its *Effects*, that is, *Government*, which it produces by *Transmission* also of its *Influence* through proper *Vehicles*, which are *subordinate Officers*, whom it *animates* and *inspires*.

Power is *invisibile*, *incomprehensible*, *eternal*: Power never *dies*, and in its original it is *Omnipotency*, which is *God*. And when *God* himself had invested *Moses* with this Power, he was pleas'd to tell him, That *he should be unto his Brother Aaron instead of a God*.

Mer. Sir, I am much pleas'd with this Description which you have given of Power. And indeed, since Government is one of the greatest and most necessary Blessings which Mankind enjoys, that Government cannot subsist without *Power*, and that *Power* is originally in God, who is the Fountain of all *Power*, nothing seems more reasonable, than that we should deduce all humane Authority from that inexhaustible *Source*, and respect it accordingly.

I have only one Argument against what you have propos'd; which, however it may seem strange, yet I must beg leave to offer it to you. And it is this, That I have heard some Learned Men, both *Ancient* and *Modern*, seem to maintain, That although God may possibly be the universal Governour of the World, or governs the Universe in general, as the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, and so forth, yet that he doth not, (as being beneath so great

great a Majesty) inspect or mind the little particular Governments of our small Globe of Earth.

Trav. This is, indeed, the pernicious Doctrine of the *Epicureans*; which, with its Disciples, ought to be banish'd all good Governments, *Qui ex bene moratis urbibus eje-
cti sunt*, as *Grotius* tells us, *cap. de pœnis. Ita & coerceri posse ar-
bitror, nomine humanæ Societatis, quam sine ratione probabili vio-
lant.*

Gassendus, I confess, in his *Trea-
tise de Vita & Moribus Epicuri*, seems too much to favour this Opi-
nion. But *Grotius*, whose Judg-
ment I prefer before the Philosophy
of both; and *St. Paul*, whom we
Christians ought to respect before
all three, tells us, *Heb. 11. v. 6.*
*That he who cometh to God, must be-
lieve that he is, and that he is a
Rewarder of those who diligently
search him.* *Grotius* also, in the
same Chapter, says farther, That
that

that Religion which in all Ages has been accounted true, is chiefly grounded upon four Principles; the third of which he says is this, That God takes Care of humane Affairs, and determines them according to his most just Decrees, à Deo curari res humanas & æquissimis Judiciis dijudicari. And after he hath quoted, to the same purpose, Cicero, Epictetus, Lactantius, and others, he concludes, That *Revera negare Deum esse, aut negare à Deo curari actiones humanas, si moralem effectum respicimus, tantundem valet.* That to deny there is a God, or to deny that he regulates humane Affairs, is in Effect the same thing. And particularly in the same Chapter, Sect. 44. he tells us farther, that Epicurus, when he took away the Providence of God, in the Government of the World, he left nothing of Justice, but the empty Name. That Justice is no farther necessary than profitable, and that we ought to abstain from hurting one another, out of no other

other Consideration, than the Fear that those, whom we offend, should revenge themselves. *Epicurus cum Divinam providentiam sustulisset, Justitiæ quoque nihil reliquit nisi nomen inane, &c.* But these, and many other of the *Epicurean* Principles, are rather plausible than solid, witty than judicious, and striking the Senses, are rejected by a sober Understanding.

Besides, *Cousin*, we Christians are obliged by a truer, and much more Divine, Philosophy; to which, we have all subscrib'd, and which is become a publick Law and Rule amongst us: and with good Reason, for nothing is more dangerous in all Governments, than to regulate *Publick Actions* according to *Private Opinions*.

Publick Actions must have *Publick Rules*, and *publick Obedience* must have *Publick Laws*, under which we must acquiesce, untill they be alter'd by *Publick Authority*; otherwise we may eternally wander after
the

the false Lights of foolish Men, who from their *Extravagancies* would be accounted witty.

Mer. Sir, I shall not dispute any farther, either your Reasons or your Authorities; both which I allow as most authentick: pray, therefore, proceed. •

Trav. Having told you then, what *Power* is, I come now to *Force*; and as the first is the spiritual part of Government, so the latter is the material part. *Force* is the *Arm* and *Nerve*, which being animated by lawful Authority, produces *Power* in the general Acceptation, which is properly, and in a good Sense, the *Union of both*. *Force*, without this *Right*, is, *Vis injusta*, or *Violence*. With it, it becomes the *just Defence*, which Nature hath given all Creatures, as well as Man, to preserve to themselves their *Lives*, *Liberties*, and *Possessions*. Without it, that is, when we invade the
Pos-

Possessions of another, it becomes
Robbery and Rapine, and is no
 more excusable in *Alexander* than
 the *Pirate*. *Tully de Officiis* 3. and
Grotius, who cites him, besides ma-
 ny others, tell us the same Truths
 in plain Words, *Ut quisque malit*
sibi, quod ad vitæ usum pertineat,
quam alteri acquiri, concessum est,
non repugnante natura. Illud natura
non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis no-
stras facultates, opes, copias augea-
mus. And *Grotius* adds this Con-
 sequence, *Non est ergo contra Socie-*
tatis naturam, sibi prospicere atque
consulere, dum jus alienum non tol-
latur. Ac proinde, nec vis, quæ jus
alterius non violat, injusta est. It
 is *Right of Power* therefore, which
 makes *Force* justifiable, both accor-
 ding to the *Laws of Nature*, and the
Laws of Man.

To conclude, *Power* or *Authori-*
ty, and *Force*, are generally so uni-
 ted, that they oftentimes are mi-
 staken, and pass for one another.
 But they are also sometimes separa-
 ted,

ted, as a *Right* may be from the *Possession*, and by this Instance we may easily distinguish them. A lawful Prince hath *first Power and Authority*, to which *Force* is added. A Rebel *first procures a Force*, or *Strength*, and afterwards *usurps a Power*.

Mer. This is plain enough; and I have nothing to reply.

Trav. Having then made these necessary Distinctions, I affirm, That the People, (which is the *Force and Strength* of all Kingdoms) by how much their *Strength* is *great*, (whether in Land, or Personal *Estate*) by so much their *Power*, which is *Authority*, or *Right of Government*, ought to be the *less*. And this not only because it is incongruous and unnatural, that the *Governed* should become their own *Governours*, or that the several destructive Appetites of the Members should train after them, the *Reason* which

which ought to regulate all; but it is also very imprudent, and against all the Rules of true Polity and Government. For it hath been ever the Rule and Endeavour of wise Men, so to ballance *Power* and *Force*, that neither may offend the other, but that by the harmonious Accord of just *Commands*, and faithful *Obedience*, a State may become most *happy, invincible, and eternal.*

Hence Power never ought to assume an *adventitious Force*, such as *Mercenary Souldiers*, which have generally prov'd destructive both to Prince and People; nor the *People* usurp a Power, which belongs not to them; such as the *Seditious Tribunes* of *Rome* often pretended to, which lost them both that *Power* and *Liberty* which they had. Government consists in *Command* and *Obedience*; whence Empire is defin'd by some to be *certus ordo in iubendo & parendo.* Command is the *Effect* of Power, Obedience the *Result* of both,

both, and Peace, Happiness, and Security, the *end of all*. The general Interruption proceeds from want of due Obedience; the sole Consideration of their Force makes Men dare to disobey.

What then can be more irrational and absurd, than that the Governour should, by granting a *Right of Power*, countenance their *Violence*, and by giving a pretence to *Disobedience*, make it more difficult, if not impossible, for himself to govern. It is like uncubbing, or laying the Reins upon the Necks of headstrong Horses; which is against the Reason and Practice of all good Governments upon Earth.

Were the *Beasts* well tempered, it were yet more practicable; but by how much their Strength is dangerous, by so much a stricter Hand ought to be kept over them.

What wise Pilot would ever trust the Helm into the Hands of an insolent *Crew* of Mariners? Or, What prudent Prince would submit his
Scep-

Scepter to the Will of *arrogant Subjects*, whose Wills they themselves declare to be, to *govern equally*, if not *superiour* to the King.

If our Author had meant a subordinate Power we would easily have agreed; and I think there are few People, under Heaven, who enjoy a larger Proportion of profitable and honourable Employments, than our *English Subjects* do. But, an independent Right of Power is destructive to the Prince as well as People, and would only serve the turn of a few pragmatical, ambitious, antiquated Politicians.

Mer. But, Sir, if the *People* have the *Force*, as they have by enjoying so great a share in the Land, and shall think it reasonable to have the *Government* also, how will you help your self? This is the main Point, which you have not yet answered.

M

Trav.

Trav. Have a little Patience, for my Clock cannot strike Twelve all at once: and this is the second point, viz. That by having this Interest in the Property, as our Author calls it, they have not thereby a greater Power, or Force, or Strength, than if they had it not.

And first, you must admit, that the Possession of Lands, giving thereby no Right of Power, as hath been sufficiently prov'd: If then the People by Force only, endeavour to procure to themselves this Right, it is a formal Rebellion; and what they shall obtain thereby is absolute Usurpation.

But in the next place, by having the Possession of these Lands, suppos'd, they are not more enabled to usurp this Power than if they had them not: for, the Strength of all Governments being eternally in the Persons of the Governed, whether they be rich, or whether they be poor,

poor, it must follow, that when they please to rebell, no Government or Governours whatever under Heaven, can of themselves possibly reduce them: for the Number is even in the most popular Government, *ten thousand of the Governed to one, that governs.* And this is a natural, irresistible *Inequality of Strength,* which even in their natural, naked Estate, without other Arms than such as Nature hath given all Creatures, according to their different Kinds, puts them always in a Condition to destroy the Government when they please.

You must not urge, that a great Number may probably preserve their Obedience, and follow the Party of the Governours. For it is already suppos'd in our Case, that the greater Number, having the Possession of the Lands, *must and will* share the Government.

Might, indeed, if put in Execution, will ever be too hard for *Right*, and *May* and *Ought* can never stand against the Torrent of *Will* and *Must*.

This needs no farther Demonstration: Ten Servants in a Family will easily turn their Master out of Doors, though they have not the *Propriety* of *one foot of Land*, upon the Earth.

Examples we need not. However, since our Author hath furnish'd us with one, as he hath done many others against himself, I shall mind you of it.

The *Turk*, he tells us, who is *absolute Proprietor of all the Lands* in his vast Empire, is not yet thereby so secure, but that the *Palace* and *Seraglio* have often become the *Shambles* of those Princes.

Mer. But, Sir, that, he tells you, has been done by his *Fanizaries*, which

which he calls a *Mercenary Army*, and not his natural Subjects. But could he introduce his *Timariots* into the places of those *Janizaries*, this horrid Flaw, and Inconvenience in the Government, had been wholly avoided.

Trav. But why does he entertain these *Janizaries*, if not to preserve him from the Violence of his discontented and numerous Subjects? And why dare the *Janizaries* act these horrid Murders, if not because they know themselves too strong? And what Security can he give, that his *Spahis* would not do the same thing if their Prince should endeavour to keep them in too severe Subjection. Never, sure, did any sober Author maintain Propositions so irrational; nay, insomuch that their contrary is true. What People are more happy and quiet than those, who possessing a reasonable Proportion of Lands, live in Plenty, and enjoy, in Security, the

Fruit of their own Labours? In this our Nation is blessed particularly above all others: for setting aside *Ambition*, what do we want to make us happy? And what hinders our Happiness from being secure, who can offend us and remain unpunish'd.

Our Cattel, our Houses, our Lands, are inviolable, our Persons as free as the Air, which is it self restrain'd within certain Bounds; and we (as all Men ought to be) within the Compass of just and reasonable Laws. What People, who are at ease, would of themselves disturb their own Happiness? And what oftner occasions Rebellion than the Pretence of *Misery* and *Oppression*?

What made the People of *Athens*, according to our Author, endeavour a Change in the Government, but their great *Incumbrances* and *Debts* to the Nobility?

What

What made the People of Rome mutiny against the Senate, but the want of their Lands? And what occasion'd the Barons Wars in King John and Henry the Third's Time, but the Severity of their Tenures, and want of their Rights and Privileges, as they pretended?

What, indeed, begins all Wars on the Peoples side, but Oppression; and what establisheth Peace, but Ease and Plenty? Our Author's divine Machiavel is wholly of our Opinion, and tells us amongst other things, That if a Prince will preserve to his Subjects their Possessions, their Privileges, and their Women, he runs no manner of Danger, but such as may proceed from the Ambition of a few, which yet he assures us we may easily, and by many ways, prevent. *In odium omnium maxime adducunt bonorum direptio, & suarum raptus mulierum. Quotiescunque bonis particitur multitudinis & honori, præclare secum agi ducunt homines. Id dun-*

taxat sit reliquum oppugnandum, im-
petio nimirum paucorum, quæ multis
modis, nullaque negotio reprimi po-
test. Prin. cap. 19.

Mer. Sir, I can very hardly grant you this Point, it being one of our strongest Holds, which we must defend to the last Drop of Blood. I must tell you therefore, that though the greatest Number, such as I must own is ever compos'd of the People, be always capable of *usurping* the Government, over the Governour, who is indeed no more than a single Man against a whole Nation in point of Strength; yet whilst the Tenures are preserv'd, such as were formerly in England, the Prince had a stricter Tye upon the People, than when having relinquish'd them, he hath no other Obligation upon them than his Parchment Right of Power, and, if you please, their Oaths of Allegiance; both which are cancell'd in a Moment, while the Lands remain eternally in the People.

Trav.

Tratt. I have already told you, That *publick Right* of Government, or if you will, the *Right* of *publick* Government, doth not in the least depend upon *Tenures*: for they are only particular *Services* and *Royal-ties*, which Princes have sometimes thought good to reserve to themselves, more or less, according as they alone have thought fit, and may be alter'd or relinquish'd, without diminishing their *Publick Right* of Government over the Nation, they being such as regard rather the *private Person* of the King, as Lord of a Mannor, than his *Politick Capacity*, as *Supreme Magistrate*, or Governour of the State. And indeed, many of these *Services* and *Tenures* were rather very inconvenient and burthensome to the People than beneficial to the Government.

Many such were anciently known in *England* and *Scotland*, as well as *France*. Amongst others, what was more inhumane, than that the Lord should have a Right to lye with his
Tenants

Tenants Wife the first Night they married: which in *France* they call *Droit de Fambug*. Some Services were very ridiculous, and some extravagant. So I have heard of a *Tenure* in *France*, by which the Tenant is oblig'd, at certain Times, to drive a Cart with twelve Oxen round the Cour of the Manor House. In which time, if any of the Oxen happen to dung in the Cour, the Cart, with the twelve Oxen, was forfeited to the Lord of the Manor: but if none of the Oxen should dung, until they were driven out of the Cour, then the Lord was to receive only one Egg. Now how do these and many other such Services, relate to a Right of Government? So many Mannors were held of the King, to accompany him in his Wars in *England*, or in *France*, or elsewhere; some were oblig'd to carry his *Spear*, some his *Sword*, others his *Helmet*, and such like, which are all merely private Obligations, and which any private Man might reserve,

reserve, upon consideration of *Lands*
given, and *upon* *consideration* *of* *Lands*

It is true, the King had then a
 stronger Tye upon particular Persons,
 than since he hath released them. But
 this, I say, hath no influence upon
 his *Publiak* Right of Power; for the
 Supreme Magistrate is always (not-
 withstanding any such Release) Ma-
 ster both of our *Estates* and *Persons*, as
 far as they are necessary, for the Pro-
 servation of the Government.

So you see Care is taken that all
Lands shall pay their *Quota* towards
Horses and *Footmen*, which is in use
 at this day; which Forces so paid, we
 call the *Militia*. His Majesty may
 press *Souldiers*; and by the Consent
 of his great Council, the Parliament,
 charge our *Estates* and *Persons* with
 such Sums, as shall be thought expe-
 dient for the Occasion. And this
 brings me to the third Point, which
 is, That all *Sovereign Princes* have
 a Right of Power over the *Lands*, not-
 withstanding the Property be divided
 amongst the People. And this pro-
 ceeds

ceeds from the *Dominium Supereminens*, which is eternally in all *Supreme Magistrates* or *Magistrate* whatsoever; whose Duty it is to look after, and by all means secure, the Preservation of the *Whole*, in which every particular is involv'd. Nor is it a sufficient Objection, to say, That Laws or Impositions may lye very heavy upon particular Men, if such an Arbitrary Power should rest in any Government: for Laws cannot be always made so easie, but that Occasions may happen, which may make them seem very hard to some. *Ad modum queritur, si majori parti, & in summo profint.*

Hence *Grotius*, from *Thucydides*, remarks an excellent Passage of *Pericles* to this purpose: *Sic existimo, saith he, etiam singulis hominibus plus eam prodesse civitatem, quæ tota recte se habeat, quam si privatis floreat utilitatibus, ipsa autem universim laboret. Qui enim domesticas fortunas bene collocatas habet, patria tamen eversa, pereat & ipse necesse est, &c.* All which,
Livy

Liby thus briefly exprestes; *Respublica incolumis, & privatas res salvas facile præstat. Publica prodeudo, tua nequicquam serdes.* That whilst the Commonwealth is safe in general, our particular Concerns may be also easily secur'd. But by deserting the publick Interest of the Nation, we do thereby no ways preserve our own. Nothing, therefore, seems more reasonable, and indeed necessary, than that the Government should have always a Power, to compell every particular Subject, who standing upon their private Rights and Properties, would thereby suffer the Whole to be destroy'd.

For, though naturally every Man hath a Right to maintain what is his own, and by consequence might oppose whosoever would endeavour to take his Property from him; yet Grotius tells us, That Government, which is instituted for the publick Tranquillity of the Whole, or, *Tranquillitas publica in qua & singulorum continetur*, acquires thereby a more
Sovereign

Sovereign Right; even over our Persons as well as Possessions, than we our selves can pretend to; that is, as far as shall be necessary for obtaining that great end of publick Preservation. *Civili societate ad eandem Tranquillitatem instituta; statim civitati jus quoddam majus, in nos & nostra nascitur, quatenus ad finem illum id necessarium est.* Whence *Steuert* observes, That the Power of all is over in the Supreme Magistracie, but the Property remains, nevertheless, in the Hands of particular Subjects. *Ad Reges Potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos Proprietas.* And so, as hath been said, the King in Parliament hath a Right to dispose of our Estates and Persons as shall be thought necessary for our publick Security. And where Sovereign Princes act without Parliaments, they have in themselves the same Authority.

I have spoke already of the Power which the Government hath over

ver our *Estates*; and for our *Per-*
sons, *Grotius* hath furnish'd us with a
 Case, very strong to shew the great
 Extent of *Sovereign Authority*. He
 puts a Question, *Whether an inno-*
cent Citizen may be abandoned, ad
Exilium, etiam ad Destructionem, for
the Common Good. Without doubt,
 say all his, *Such an innocent Citizen*
may be so abandon'd. *Dubium non*
est quin deservat potest. And going
 still on, how far such a Citizen is
 oblig'd to deliver himself, he con-
 cludes, *That he may be forc'd to it,*
and sacrifice it self to prevent an inno-
cent Mischiefe, both against his Will,
and entirely innocent. Quare & in
 nostra controversia, *merito videtur*
cogere posse civem, inquit, si talis sit,
Though one Citizen cannot compell
another to any thing more than what
is strictly just according to Law, yet
the Superiour hath a lawfull Autho-
rity, as Superiour, to force an inno-
cent Man to suffer for the Common
Good. *Par parem cogere non potest,*
nisi ad id quod jure debetur strictè
dicto.

dicto. At superior cogere potest, etiam ad illa, quæ qualibet virtus præcipit quia in jure proprio Superioris, quæ superior est, hoc est comprehensum.

We find, even in the Commonwealth of *Holland*, so much envied and applauded by Men, who are given to change, that in the late Wars with *England* and *France*, they taxed Mens Purses with such heavy Contributions, that they were almost as much dissatisfied with their Governours at home, as afraid of their Enemies abroad: and all this was done much against the Wills of almost every particular Subject. Nay more, I have heard say, That their *Fond*, or 'Principal, (the greatest part of their Estates, for want of Land, consisting in Money) is so involv'd in the great Bank, that they can never retrieve their Principal again. But their Estates being wholly at the Dispose of the Government, when that falls, they perish.

I con-

I confess, I do not know of any Christian Kingdom where a more arbitrary power is exercis'd. But it is, it seems, necessary for their affairs, that it should be so. Yet nevertheless it is no rule for our imitation, their circumstances being extremely different from ours.

Mer. I perceive you will not be perswaded, to let us enjoy our properties, and our share in the government together, notwithstanding our author assures us, that we *will* and *must* have it. But pray, Sir, setting aside your reasons, why you have taken from us our shares, (which indeed at present, (I know not how to confute) let me prevail with you to be rul'd, in this matter, by examples of other great Kingdoms. And you know, *Plato Redivivus* tells us for certain, that those Kings who had no companions in the Sovereign power, had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or possession of the land. But if the Senate or people, or both did share the land, they shar'd also in the Administration of the Sovereignty. And pray why should

N

we,

we, (who enjoy no small possessions) be excluded?

Trav. Cousin, under-favour, your *Plato redivivus* is a most impudent Ghost. For provided it serves his turn, he makes no Conscience of advancing downright *falsehood* for undeniable *matter of fact*, which will appear more fully hereafter. We will begin with the *Scythians*, who contending with the *Egyptians* for antiquity, have been thought the *first people*, which inhabited the earth after the flood. The *people* were not known in History before their Kings, whose power also was *arbitrary*. So sure it is, that the *first known Governments* upon earth were Monarchical. *Principio, rerum, gentium, nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat*, says *Justin*. And immediately after, *Populus nullis legibus tenebatur, arbitria Principum pro legibus erant*. And yet we find the ground so common to all, that every man was as much *Proprietor* as the King himself. *Hominibus inter se nulli fines, neq; enim agrum exercent, nec domus illis ulla, armenta & pecora semper pascentibus,* & per

per incultas solitudines errare solitis. Every man had a propriety to as much ground as was *necessary* for himself and his cattle, which also he chose, as he thought most convenient. Yet so far were the people from pretending any *share* in the Government, that no Kings were more absolute than the *Scythians*, nor did any enjoy their Government longer. And if we follow them into the upper *Asia*, which they totally conquer'd, we do not find their Kings pretending to *one foot of the land*.

Mer. What good then did their conquest do them, if they did not enjoy the possessions of the conquered?

Trav. They made the same use of it, as all Conquerors generally have done, that is to say, leaving the lands to their proper owners, they only exacted a *Tribute*, which was gathered amongst themselves. Yet nevertheless, contrary to our Author's Proposition, *they always retain'd the Empire*, or Government over them, and that for no less time than 1500 years. *Asiam perdomitam vectigalem fecere, modico tributo magis in titulum imperii,*

quam victoria primum imposito. His igitur Asia, per mille quingentos annos vectigalis fuit. Pendendi tributi finem, Ninus Rex Assyriorum imposuit. Ninus then was the first, who freed the *Assyrians* from their Tribute, and the *Scythian* Empire. Nor do we read, that he enslaved them more under his own. But leaving them their *possessions entire*, yet preserving always the *Supreme right* of Government, required only such *Contributions*, as himself thought necessary.

After the *Assyrian* Empire, that of the *Medes* began. But no alteration can I find in the *Property of the lands*. On the contrary we read, that the *Persians* became only *Tributary* to the *Medes*. *Sed civitates, quæ Medorum tributaria fuerant, mutato imperio, conditionem suam mutatam arbitantes, à Cyro defecerant.* That *Those Persian Cities*, which were tributary to the *Medes*, under *Astyages*, revolted from *Cyrus*. But to leave no dispute in the case, *Xenophon* in his *Cyri Inst.* l. 4. tells us in plain words, that *Cyrus* bid the *Assyrians* be of good heart, that their condi-
tion

tion should be no ways altered, but in the change of their King. That they should enjoy their houses and their lands as formerly they did, and have the same right over their wives and children. *Cyrus victos Assyrios jubebat bono esse animo, eandem ipsorum sortem fore, qua fuerat, mutato tantum Rege. Mansuras ipsis domos, agros, jus in uxores in liberos, ut fuisset hactenus.*

This, I think, shews most clearly, that the people enjoy'd the Property in their lands, not only under the Medes but the Persians also. And yet they were so far from sharing any part of the Government, that all men agree, no Prince to have been more absolute than the Medes and Persians.

Now if this be true, as sure it is, for Xenophon was a very good Judge, who wrote particularly the History of Cyrus, what an ignorant, or what an impudent Author is Plato Redivivus, who boldly affirms, p. 52. that Cyrus by name, and other conquering Monarchs before him, took all for themselves.

From Asia, let us travel into Egypt, and by the way we will take notice

of the Government of *Sodom* and *Gomorrha*, and those five Kingdoms which we read in Scripture, to have been subject to *Senacherib* King of *Assyria* for twelve years. But we do not find, that either before or after their defection, the King of *Assyria* had any right to their lands, but only a tribute, which they at length refus'd to pay.

With the History of the Bible *Josephus* agrees, who tells us, *chap. 10. Eodem tempore, cum Imperium Asia penes Assyrios esset, Sodomitarum res, tam opibus, quam numerosa juventute florebat, ut a quinque Regibus administrarentur, donec victi ab Assyriis, Tributum eis solvebant.*

The Egyptian Kings, notwithstanding the conceit of our Author, and it may be of some other his Antimonarchical *Accomplices*, were as absolute as any Kings of the East. *Egyptiorum Reges, saith Grotius, ut alios Reges Orientis summo imperio usos, non est dubium.*

From the first Egyptian King to *Chencres Pharaoh*, who was overwhelm'd

whelm'd in the Red Sea (for *Pharaoh* like *Augustus* is only a title of honour) Authors have reckoned a Succession of *Ten Kings*, a time long enough to have establish'd a firm Government. And yet we see in the days of *Joseph's* Administration, his Subjects had an undoubted property in their lands, which at last they sold, with their freedom also, to purchase bread. *Quibus agri fuere, saith Josephus, partem aliquam in prætium alimentorum, Regi decidebant*— And again, *Non solum corpora sed animos gentis in servitutem redegit necessitas*. Which servitude we must interpret slavery, and was now distinguish'd from subjection: for there is no question, but that Subjects in those days, were free both in their persons and estates, which they enjoy'd in property, and only liable to such *Impositions and Services*, as concern'd the publick happiness and security of the Government.

We can by no means agree with our Author, that the *Egyptian* Kings held a kind of *precarious* Kingdom, such as the *Heraclides* in *Sparta*. But being absolute, according to *Grotius*,

or *summa potestate prediti*, were not yet so barbarous, as to appropriate to themselves, *all the possessions* belonging to their Territories, or otherwise enslave their Subjects, than according as misfortunes or necessity forc'd them to sell their Liberty. Yet even in this case we find, that *Pharaoh* return'd the Lands to most of them, upon payment of the Sixth part only of the usufrute which he retain'd, as *Josephus* tells us, *Jure Dominii*, which conditions they most gladly accepted, *Lati insperata restitutione agrorum*. And to conclude, let me inform you (from good Authorities) that the *Egyptian* Kings were so far from retaining or reserving *all the lands* to themselves, that after the general division of their Territories, their *Lands* were distributed into *Three Equal* parts ; One part was appropriated to the *Kings use*, and was *Demesne* or *Crown-lands* ; the *Second* part was assign'd to their *Priests*, for their *Subsistence*, and the support of the necessary charges of their *Sacrifices*, and other Offices belonging to the *Worship* and *Service* of their *Gods*. And the
Third

Third part was allotted to their *Calasiri* or *Milites*, which were those who professed arms for the defence of their Country.

In the next place, The *Romans* who held the Sovereign Empire of so great a part of the world, had it so little in their thoughts to make themselves *Proprietors* of all the land belonging to their Empire, that as well in their *first* as *latter* Monarchy, they seldom took away more from the Conquered, than was almost necessary for preserving their Dominion over them, by the maintaining of *Garrisons*, or planting such *Colonies*, and *Præda militaria* amongst them, as might, at their own expence, and charges, preserve their fidelity to the *Romans*, and secure the publick peace: Hence *Petilius Cerealis* reproaching the *French* (after his victory over them) for their folly, and defection from the *Roman* protection, he tells them, *That although the Romans had been often provoked, yet they added nothing more to what they might claim from their right of Conquest, than such conditions as might secure their publick*

lick peace. For (saith he) there can be no peace without arms, nor can armies be maintain'd without pay, nor can pay be procured but by Tribute and Taxes. Nos quanquam toties laceffiti, Jure victoria id solum vobis addidimus, quo pacem tueremur, nam neque quies gentium sine armis. Tac. Hist. 4. Salluste tells us, That the ancient Pious Romans took nothing from the Conquered but the liberty of doing injury or wrong: Majores nostri religiosissimi mortales nihil victis eripiebant, præter injuriæ licentiæ. And that they encreas'd their Empire by their goodness and mercy. Ignoscendo auxisse Pop. Rom. magnitudinem.

Certain it is, that Romulus and some others of those first Roman Monarchs, us'd their victories with so much moderation, that the Conquered were scarce sensible, or sorry they were overcome; whence Claudius (blaming, in his Speech to the Senate, the severity of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians) At conditor noster Romulus, Tac. Ann. xi. (saith he) tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein Cives habuerit:

But

But our Founder Romulus was so prudent a Prince, that he caus'd many to become Citizens of Rome, who the same day had been the Roman enemies. And Grotius takes notice particularly out of Appian, that the Romans when they subdued Italy, took but a part even of those Italian lands Grot. de I. R. & p. l. 3. from the Conquered. *Romani cum Italiam armis subegissent, victos parte agri mulctarent: and again, etiam victis hostibus, terram non omnem adimebant, sed partiebantur.* And this hath been done (as is already observ'd) for their support and security. And it hath been universally a Custom amongst all Nations, that (howsoever the Conquerors might differ concerning the Persons or Personal estate of those whom they overcame or what might fall to them *nomine prade*) they generally left the Lands in the possession of their ancient Proprietors and Inhabitants of the Country (except sometimes in the case of Colonies) upon the payment only of certain *Tributes* or Taxes. Very many examples occur in all Histories, I shall only therefore

fore take notice of what *Tacitus* observes of our ancient Britains, *They paid* (saith he) *their Tribute readily enough, and performed such other Duties as were commanded them, provided they had no affronts or injuries put upon them, for those they could not bear; being brought only to obey, but not to serve. Ipsi Britannii dilectum ac Tributa, &c.* in *vita Agrip.*

These then were the Customs of the *Romans*, and *Greeks* too, concerning *Lands* between themselves and the Conquered; let us now see how they dispos'd of their *Lands* between themselves and their Natural Subjects, and we find that *Romulus* made the first general distribution of his Free men into *Tribes*, and that *Those* again he distinguished into *Patres* and *Plebes*, who were afterwards called *Patricians* and *Plebeians*, or *Lords* and *Commons*; the *Patricians* were compos'd of such as were eminent either in *Birth*, *Courage*, *Wealth*, or any other remarkable *Virtue*, and to these many great Priviledges and *Possessions* were granted; out of these alone were chosen
their

their *Priests*, as well as *Senators*, and other inferiour *Magistrates*.

The *Plebeians* minded only Tillage and Husbandry, and other mechanical employments, and were called *Commoners*, or *Roman Citizens*, which title became afterwards an honour of no small esteem, and was much affected by their neighbours, and purchased by particular *Admission* or *Denization*; many such were chosen out of the *Sabins*, *Volscians*, *Samnites* and others: but lest this distinction between *Patricians* and *Plebeians* might beget on the one side, *Insolence*, and on the other, *Envy*, those prudent Monarchs thought fit to unite them by a more endearing Relation, whence the *Patricii* were called *Patroni*, or *Patrons* of the *People*, and were to protect them, not only in all *Law Suits*, but in what other occurrences might happen to them. The *Plebeians* also were styled *Clientes* or their *Clients*, who besides the *Protection* of their *Patrons*, received also *Lands* from them, under certain conditions, which remained many years inviolable:

lable: for example, in case the *Patron* should be *taken* by the *Enemy*, the *Client* was to contribute towards his *Ransome*, as also towards the advancement of their *Daughters* in their *Marriages*; they were not to *inform* or *give testimony* against their *Patrons*; or if they did, they were *accursed* and *condemned* as *Traitors*, *Diis inferis devovebantur*, & *proditionis erant rei*, besides many other obsequious duties and respects: so we read that *Appius Claudius* gave *Lands* to his *Clients* even in the very *Infancy* of the *Roman Government*.

Nor was this *justutolare*, personal only, but it was also *Gentilitium*, that is, it extended it self into whole families, as for instance, some of them (with their whole Generation) were *Clients* under the protection of the *Æmilian*, some under the *Julian*, and others under the *Claudian Families*. This constitution was of great use to the *Common-wealth*, for the credit which the *Patricii* had with their *Clients*, was sufficient oftentimes to appease their popular disturbances, who

who yielding either to the *Authority* or *Entreaties* of their *Patrons*, were brought to acquiesce, though with some little prejudice to their own right, and this continued many Ages, until the ambition of the *Tribunes* interrupted this good correspondence between the *Princes* and the *People*: and so honourable did the name of *Client* grow, that many *States* and *Governments*, who have voluntarily committed themselves to the *fidelity* or *protection* of the *Romans*, did not disdain that Title.

Thus we see the *Lands*, even within the narrow compass of the *first Roman Monarchy*, divided amongst the *Princes* and the *People*, which *Lands* so given to the latter, were called *Clientela's*; and accordingly we may observe under *Servius Tullius* their sixth King, a Register of their particular *Estates*: *Regis solertia, ita est ordinata respublica, ut omnia Patrimonii, dignitatis, atatis, artium, officiorumque discrimina, in tabulas referrentur. Flor. c. 6.* So we read of the Confiscation of the particular lands of *Tarquinius superbus*;

perbus ; and yet *Romulus* and his successors were as *absolute Monarchs*, as any of the *Cæsars* have been ; and *Julius Cæsar* himself by *Will* deviseth part of his own *private estate* to the *Romans*.

Thus was *property*, or the *possession of Lands*, divided amongst the *people*, during the *first Roman Monarchy*, thus it continued under the *Roman* as well as *Gracian Empire*, thus it remains at present in the *German Empire*, and thus it is established in *all* the most *Christian Monarchies* upon earth ; and not to forget our own *Country*, I must observe out of a learned *Author*, that our ancient *British Kings* who were as *absolute* as any, made distribution also of their *Land* amongst their *Subjects* after this manner ; one part they gave to the *Archflamens* to pray for the *Kings*, and their posterity, a *second* part to the *Nobility* to do them *Knights service*, a *third* to the *Husbandmen* to hold of them in *Soccage*, and a *fourth* to the *Mechanicks* to hold in *Burgage*. *l. MS. Hist. Brit.* And yet *Plato Red.* dares
obtrude

obtrude this proposition upon us p. 40.
*That in all states, if the King had no
 Companions in the Sovereign Power, he
 had no sharers likewise in the Dominion or
 possession of the Lands.*

But for further satisfaction let us
 consider the Government of Gods
 people, or the Kingdom of the Jews:
 I think all will agree, that the He-
 brews were proprietors of their Lands,
 and held them upon as good a Title,
 as the people of England do theirs,
 even at this day. We find in that
History a particular account of the
 distribution of the Lands according to
 their Tribes, who were at that time
 under a Monarchical Government,
 whether we look upon God Almighty
 as their King, who according to Gro-
 tius, Hobbs, Junius Brutus, and all
 good Authors, was *Rex peculiaris Isra-*
elitarum, or as Brutus tells us *De jure*
Mag. p. 226. Ab initio Deus ipse ater-
nus ejus Monarcha fuit, non eo tantum
nomine quod ipse rerum omnium supre-
мум dominium obtinuit, sed singulari
quodam modo, nempe, &c. Or whether
 under their High Priest, who was
 O Gods

Gods *vicegerent*, except when he raised them up a *Judge*. We hear of no *Tenures or services* amongst them, other than such as all Subjects upon earth, are oblig'd to perform for the honour of the King and publick safety.

It is plain from the story of *Ahab* in the case of *Naboth's vineyard*, that *Naboth* had a *clear right and property* in the possession of his lands, and that their Kings had no authority, in their *private capacities*, to force any Subject, so much as to *sell his land* upon reasonable conditions. Yet nevertheless, neither the Kings of *Persia*, nor of *Egypt*, nor of any part of the East, were *more absolute* than the Kings of *Israel* were, and yet none had a less proportion in the possession of the lands.

Mer. Sir, I shall grant you all except this, That the Kings of *Israel* were *absolute*, which I can hardly believe, especially since our Author tells us the contrary, and instances in the *Sanhedrim*, the *Assembly of the Tribes*, and *Congregation of the Lord*, who all had a share in the Government, as they had in the property.

Trav. I

Trav. I confess several zealous Commonwealths men have asserted this false doctrine, and amongst others, their old *Coryphaeus*, *Junius Brutus*. But I find no colour of pretence for this their assertion, but we will examine the case, as fully as this occasion will permit, and refer you afterwards to what I have writ more at large concerning this point elsewhere.

And first, it is necessary that we should agree, what we mean by an *absolute Monarch*, which is indeed a point rather controverted, than clearly decided by any Author, that I have yet met withal.

Sallust thinks it consists in an exemption from all humane jurisdiction, *Impune quidvis facere, hoc est Regem esse*. Others, that to be absolute, a Prince ought to govern peremptorily, according to his will. So *Juvenal*, *Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas*.

A third sort have declar'd that King truly absolute, who giving Laws to others, is subject to none himself. *ἰπτα ἰταὶ ἀντιπύδου ὄντα*.— to command without being oblig'd to give a

reason why or wherefore *ῥαυδὸς μὴ
σαπρὸς κ' ἔν ἀπείρῳ* & *κατὰ*, as *Æschylus* saith, and again, *Rex est suo utens
jure, nulli obnoxius.* Hobbs will have
it consist in the subjection of our wills
to that of the Prince, *Homo ille, vel
concilium illud, cujus voluntati singuli
suam voluntatem subjecerunt, summam
potestatem sive summum imperium sive
dominium habere dicitur.*

Grotius, whose opinion I must al-
ways esteem very much, tells us, that
the most absolute or highest power, is of
that Prince, whose actions are not ac-
countable or subject, to any other mans
right or authority, so as that they may
be made void, according to the will or
pleasure, or decrees of any other mortal
man, *Potestas summa illa dicitur, cujus
actus alterius juri non substant, ita ut
alterius humana voluntatis arbitrio,
irriti reddi possunt. De jure B. & P. p. 47.*

But with submission to so great au-
thorities, These do not reach the defi-
nition of an absolute Monarch, in a
good sense as it ever ought to be taken.
For though they have given their
Prince exemption from all Laws, and
power

power enough to command, yet they have not excluded *Tyranny*, which indeed is oftentimes mistaken for *absolute* power.

I confess it seems hard to destroy the *Tyrant*, and yet preserve the *absolute* Monarch. However I shall presume to give such a definition, as may do both, which I refer to the impartial judgment of those who shall consider it.

An *absolute Monarch* then is he, who having receiv'd a just authority, executes the Laws of God and Nature without controul. By receiving a just authority, I exclude one principal mark of a *Tyrant*, which is *intrusion*, or *usurpation*. In the next place, I oblige the absolute Monarch to execute the Laws of God and Nature, and nothing contrary to them. By this also Government is freed from *Tyranny*, in the use or exercise of authority.

For he who governs according to the Laws of God and Nature (I speak of a Natural Monarch, or a Monarch in the state of Nature) does no unjust thing, and is by consequence no *Tyrant*.

And lastly, as I have secur'd the absolute Prince from Tyranny, so I have plac'd him above all conditional limited Governments, by these words, [without controul.] For he who commands or governs as far as the *Laws of God and Nature* permit, hath certainly as ample, and as absolute a Jurisdiction, as any mortal man can justly possess. This is so large a power, that he who acts beyond it, that is, contrary to it, is deservedly esteem'd a Tyrant, and in such case the people are not oblig'd to obey. And the reason is, because the Prince, having never receiv'd an authority to command that which is unjust, that is to say, contrary to the *Laws of God and Nature*, the people are acquitted from their obediences as to that particular command.

All that we have now to do, is but to apply this definition to the *Hebrew Kings*, and from thence we shall be able to judge of their absolute power.

And first it is certain, that they receiv'd their right of power from *God himself*, and no other, which continued by Succession, especially after *David*, unto the *Babylonish* captivity. I

I have not time at present to enlarge upon this point, and answer those frivolous objections which some men have brought against it. You will find this done more fully in another place, and confirm'd by the authority of *Josephus*, *Grotius*, and the History of the Bible.

I know some have pretended that *David* received his authority from the people, and would prove it by a passage in *1 Chron. 11.* where it is said, *that the Elders anointed David King over Israel.* But we must observe, that *David* was Anointed first by *Samuel*, and that by the express command of God himself, and next, this second Anointing by the people signified nothing more, than to exclude by this publick act, the pretensions of *Isboseth* eldest Son to *Saul*, Who without the special reveal'd will of God, would have succeeded his father. And this was ever practis'd, where there was any interruption or dispute in the Succession. So *Solomon* was anointed, because of the difference between him and *Adonijah*, otherwise that Ceremony was not absolutely necessary,

and was many times totally neglected. Besides, in the case of *David*, it is plain, that he received no right of power from the people, but from God, and that by their own confession both before and after their anointing. And the Lord thy God said unto thee, thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be ruler over my people Israel. And again, They anointed David King over Israel, according to the word of the Lord by Samuel, 1 Chron. 11. 2, 3. Hence Grotius observes, that David gave God thanks, for that God had subjected his people unto him. *David Deo gratias agit, quod populum suum sibi subjecerit.*

Taking it therefore for granted, that *David* received no right of power from the people, by consequence he depended upon none but God, as all the most Sovereign Princes do, and this is one great mark of an absolute Monarch.

In the next place, he executed the laws of God and nature without controul. I never heard any question made of this, except in the case of judgment

judgment concerning a Tribe, the High Priest, and a Prophet. Which judgments Grotius supposed, were taken from the Hebrew Kings, *Aliqua judicia arbitror regibus adempta*. But I rather think, under favour, that they were more properly, *Principibus concessa*, which makes a considerable difference. For I find no mention of any time or power, who could take those judgments from the King.

On the contrary we read of several Kings, erecting Courts of Judicature, and making Judges both in Gods cause and in the Kings. And these three points being of the highest consequence, the judgment of them might most probably be granted by the King, to the determination of the highest Court of Justice.

In the first of *Chron. chap. 26. v. 9*. We find David making Rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half Tribe of Manasseh, for every matter pertaining to God and the affairs of the King; but more particularly in the second of *Chron. chap. 19*. Jehoshaphat does the same thing, but in terms more

more plain, *And he set Judges in the Land through all the fenced Cities of Judah, City by City. And said to the Judges, take heed what you do, &c. Moreover in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites, and of the Priests, and of the Chief of the Fathers of Israel, for the judgments of the Lord, and for controversies when they return'd to Jerusalem. And behold Amariel the Chief Priest is over you, in all matters of the Lord, and Zedekiah the son of Ishmael, the Ruler of the house of Judah, for all the Kings matters.*

Indeed I should think that this is plain enough to prove, that their Kings had in them the *Supreme right*, of administering justice through their territories, and made their *Subordinate* officers, who wholly depended upon them; and I am the more confirm'd in this opinion, because I find both the *High Priests* and *Prophets* too judged, condemned and pardoned, even against the judgment of the *Sanhedrim*, by the Kings *single authority*.

So Solomon banished the *High Priest* Abiathar. *Solomon Abiatharem Pontificem*

tificem in exilium misit, says Josephus lib. 8. so Jehoiakim slew the Prophet Uriah. And they sent forth Uriah out of Egypt, and brought him unto Jehoiakim the King, who slew him with the Sword, Jer. 26. 23. The same did Joash King of Judah to Zachariah the Prophet, And they Conspired against him, and stoned him with stones at the command of the King, 2 Chron. 24. 21. and several other instances there are.

On the other side, when the Sanhedrim intreated Zedekiah, that they might put Jeremiah to death, by his own single authority he preserv'd him against them.

Merch. Under favour, Sir, I have heard this very case of Jeremiah, urg'd against the Sovereign power of the Hebrew Kings, and produced as an instance to shew the *independent right* of the Sanhedrim. For when they solicited the King, that they might put him to death, Zedekiah answered, *Lo he is in your power, the King is not he that can do any thing against you.*

Tray.

Trav. I confess I have read this example in *Junius Brutus*, and know not which most to wonder at, his *impudence* or his *impious knavery*. The words in the *Vulgar Translation*, which *Scaliger* esteems the best, run thus, *Ecce in potestate vestra est, nam contra vos Rex nihil potest. In hoc negotiorum genere scilicet*, saith *Grotius*.

But our brute Author, by an unparalleled wickedness, perverts both the sense and words of the *Holy Scripture*, and translates it, *Ipsis contradicere nulla in re posse*. And so would make the *Sanhedrim* so absolute, that the King could not contradict them in any thing, but we shall discover his imposture by the History it self, and practice of *Zedekiah* even in this very case.

And it is first certain, that the King meant nothing more by this answer, than that he left *Jeremiah* to be *Tried by his Judges according to Law*. And indeed as his affairs stood, he was unwilling to displease the Princes, in a case which they thought so nearly concerned the good of the people and safety

safety of the King, which they believ'd was indanger'd by the discouraging Prophecies of Jeremiah. Rex Zedechias, says Josephus, *nè in Principum invidiam tali tempore incurreret, voluntati eorum resistens, permisit eis, ut de Propheta Jeremia quicquid libens facerent, lib. 10. c. 10.* Yet our Villanous Presbyter is so shameless an Author as to affirm from hence, that the Sanhedrim was superiour to the King-*Rege superiorem, q. 3. p. 73.* Nay and could judge the King himself, *illi Regem judicare possunt*, which I am confident was never found in the whole History of the Bible.

But to return to this case. We find first, that Zedekiah had by his own authority imprison'd Jeremiah, ch. 30. v. 3. And Jeremiah the Prophet was shut up in the Court of the prison, which was in the King of Judah's house. For Zedekiah King of Judah, had shut him up.

Next we may observe, that the Princes applied themselves to the King, that they might have leave to put the Prophet to death, and that in terms respectful enough, Jer. 38. 4. There-

Therefore said the Princes unto the King, We beseech thee, let this man be put to death. Now what needed this impertinent, and indeed abusive complement to the King, if the whole authority was in the Sanhedrim, or Princes themselves. But to take away all manner of dispute, we find not only application made to the King, to release Jeremiah and his own order thereupon, Ebedmelech went forth out of the Kings house, and spake unto the King, saying, My Lord the King, these men have done evil in all that they have done to Jeremiah the Prophet, whom thou hast cast into the dungeon, &c. Then the King commanded Ebedmelech the Egyptian, saying, Take from hence thirty men with thee, and take up Jeremiah the Prophet out of the dungeon before he dies, cap. 38. I say, besides this, we read also in the same chap. That Jeremiah made his address to the King, that he might not dye, which most assuredly, being a Prophet of the Lord, he would never have done, had it not been in the Kings power to have granted his request, or had it been an infringement of the

the

the lawful power of the *Sanhedrim*. And thereupon *Zedekiah*, without asking leave of the *Elders*, promis'd him that he should not dye, and in terms which sufficiently express his Sovereign authority. Then *Jeremiah* said unto *Zedekiah*, *If I declare it to thee, wilt thou not surely put me to death. So Zedekiah the King swore secretly to Jeremiah, saying, As the Lord liveth that made us this soul, I will not put thee to death, neither will I give thee into the hands of these men, that seek thy life, v. 15, 16.* I think these words need no explanation, I shall only add this remark to shew the *fourberie* of our Author, which is, That in case this story could have pass'd according to his own sense of it, yet it would not have prov'd what he design'd it should have done. For *Zedekiah* at that time was not absolute as the former Kings of *Judah* had been, but was tributary to the King of *Babylon*. And when the year was ended, &c. King *Nebuchadnezzar* made *Zedekiah* King over *Judah* and *Jerusalem*, 2 *Chron.* 36. 10. Which is confirm'd by *Josephus* in these words.

Ne.

Nebuchadnezzarus exprobat ingratitude
dinem Zedechia, quod cum à se accepisset
regnum, accepta potestate abusus esset, in
authorem beneficii. It being then most
 clear, that the Hebrew Kings were ab-
 solute, or enjoy'd a Sovereign right of
 power, and yet notwithstanding this,
 the property was divided amongst the
 people, who had yet no share in the
 right of Government, but what was
 subordinate; I must conclude that *Plato*
Redivivus is no less impudent and false,
 than his master *Junius Brutus* was,
 when he affirms universally, that if
 the people had a share in the property, they
 had a share in the Government, or where
 the King had no companions in the Sove-
 reign power, he had no sharers likewise
 in the Dominion or possession of lands.

Mer. Sir, So many men amongst us
 have asserted an Independent right of
 power in the *Sanhedrim*, that I cannot
 yet get off from that opinion, unless
 you can shew me somewhat more par-
 ticular, than yet you have done, con-
 cerning their institution, and that they
 receiv'd not their power from God,
 but from man, which in such case will
 make

make them *subordinate* and *subjects*.

Trav. I have already told you, that at the request of *Moses*, God was pleas'd to admit of such a *Council* or *Court* of *Judicature*, and that then they receiv'd their power, not only from the *hand* of *Moses*, but even from *that* power which *Moses* himself had, and no *new* power immediately from God. But if this be not plain enough, I will offer you another passage, by which we shall determine the two main points. First, *whence* the *Court* of *Seventy Elders* received their authority. And secondly, *How large* it was.

In the first of *Deut. v. 13.* you shall find *Moses* thus speaking to the people, *Take ye wise men and understanding, and known amongst the Tribes, and I will make them rulers over you.* So I took the chief of the Tribes, wise men, &c. and I charg'd the Judges at that time, saying, &c.

Here you see the authority proceeding wholly from *himself*, and for its extent you read immediately after, that *Moses* reserves *all* appeals to himself, which is the undoubted mark of

Supreme Authority, *And the cause which is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it.* And so you see, in the forementioned cases of *David, Jehosaphat, Zedekiah* and others, that the practice was conformable to the institution, where the Kings of *Judah* exercised their Sovereign power, even in those cases which belonged most particularly to the knowledge of the *Sanhedrim*. This *Brutus* confesses in express words, who contradicts himself, as such false men do, in most that he says. *Propterea boni Reges, quales David, Jehosaphat & ceteri, quia omnibus jus dicere ipsi non potuissent, etsi in gravioribus causis, ut e Samuele apparet, supremum sibi judicium recipiebant, nil prius vel antiquius habuerunt, quam ut Judices bonos & peritos, ubique locorum constituerent, q. 3. p. 89.*

Of these Judges the greater Court was call'd *Sanhedrim Gedola*, the Supreme Senate, the lesser *Sanhedrim Ketanna*, the lesser, and inferiour Court.

The lesser was again subdivided, and out of these, were Judges distributed into most of the Cities, for the ease of the people. From

From them appeal might be made to the Court or *Sanhedrim Gedola*, which always was at *Jerusalem*, and who had many priviledges above the others, possibly not much unlike our *House of Lords*, at this day. Now, Cousin, if I understand Latin and English, I think the case is plain, that the *Hebrew Kings*, (notwithstanding the *Sanhedrim*) had the *sole Sovereign right of power*. But I refer all to your better Judgment.

Mer. I have nothing to reply against Scripture arguments, especially when they are so *clear*, as these seem to be. I am only afraid, that this great trouble which I have given you, hath taken away the pleasure you might have had in viewing our Country, and talking of some other more diverting subject. But presuming still upon your goodness, I must desire that you would compleat the Reformation, which you have more than begun in me, and by giving me some account of the *Goshick Government*, which it seems hath prevail'd in a great part of *Europe*, you may make me capable of defending the

doctrine, and the good constitution of our Government, against all *hot-brain'd* and *ambitious innovators*.

Tertio. Sir, I have no greater pleasure than in obeying your commands, nor have I lost thereby the advantage of this fine evening.

The *Goths* therefore, if we may believe *Jordanes*, who was himself of that race, and whom *Procopius* (writing only of the latter *Goths*) no where contradicts, broke out of the Island *Scanzia*, or *Scandinavia*, and with all their substance, men women and children, advanc'd *south-east*. And after several Skirmishes and Victories by the way, they at last sat down about the *palus Maotis*.

Here they inhabited many years, and following the warmth of the Sun, spread Eastwards towards the South of *Scythia*, and the lower *Asia*. Their Government all this while, which lasted many hundred of years, was an *absolute* Monarchy, and the *Tenth* part of the lands were generally appropriated to the support of their Prince, who descended from father to son, as at this day

day amongst us, and in *Ostrofrising*: you have a long catalogue of their names, and an account of their memorable actions.

But in process of time, (those Northern people, propagating very much under a warmer climate than their own,) a great detachment past over into *Europe*, whence came the distinction of the *Visigoths* and *Ostrogoths*, which is as much as to say, the *Southern*, and the *Western Goths*.

The latter spread themselves over *Germany* and *France*, and erected several Kingdoms. Their Government was *Arbitrary* enough, and somewhat more than that of the *Germans*. *Pante jam addictius regnantur quam cetera Germanorum gentes*, saith *Tacitus* de moribus *Germ*. Yet we find the *Germans* themselves under a Kingly Government, the lands divided, and yet neither their Noblemen nor people, had any other share in the Government than by way of Council, or a subordinate authority for the Administration of Justice, which is much different from a right of Power or Command.

*Agri pro numero cultorum ab universis
per vices occupantur, quos mox inter se
secundum dignitatem partiuntur.*

These were like great Farms, which
they chose according as the situation
pleas'd them. *Colunt discreti ac diversi,
ut fons, ut nemus, ut campus placuit.*
Their Councils were compos'd of the
Commoners, and of the Nobility, but
were distinct, and the Noblemen had
the greatest interest. *De minoribus re-
bus Principes consultant, de majoribus
omnes. Ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum
penes plebem arbitrium est, apud Princi-
pes pertractentur.*

But in all these elder Governments we
must consider their circumstances,
which were *confus'd*, and much diffe-
rent from those, which are at *this day*
established generally all the world
over. The people were more *barba-
rous* than now they are, *unsettled*, and
much addicted to *Wars*.--- Whence they
appear'd more like the children of *Israel*
in the *Wilderness*, than the people of
God in *Jerusalem*. And I cannot think
that their *polities*, (though they make
little against us) ought to be propos'd
by

by any sober man, as examples for our imitation.

We come now to the *Ostrogoths*, as nearer to our time, and purpose.

A great body then of these, passing the *Danube*, possessed themselves of *Hungary* or *Pannonia*, and some of *Thrace*, where they inhabited forty eight years. In *Hungary* they had their Kings, and paid them too such an *awful* obedience, that they esteemed it the greatest impiety, so much as to *whisper* any thing that detracted from their honour. *Solummodo susurris lacerare nefas ducunt.*

And if by chance any of the Noblemen should have offended their King, though in never so *small* a matter, and even *unjustly accus'd*, yet the poorest *Scullion* belonging to, and sent by the King, had a power, though alone, to *seize* that Nobleman, encompassed and guarded by all his friends and adherents: And thus without *Messenger* or *Serjeant*, both *imprisoneth* or otherwise *punisheth* the unhappy offender, according to the *Order* of the Prince, whose *Will* passeth amongst all for an

unquestionable Law. *Quod si aliquis ex comitum ordine, regem, vel in modico, offenderit, quando etiam iniuste infamatus fuerit, quilibet infima conditionis lixa, a Rege missus, Comitem licet satellitibus suis stipatum, solus comprehendit, &c. Sola Principis voluntas apud omnes pro ratione habetur. Ottofris. de reb. gest. Fred. primi, lib. I. ca. 31.*

Now if *Plato Redivivus* will needs produce *ancient customs* among the *Goths*, and impose them, without any farther consideration upon us, I hope he will give me leave also to offer the example of *these Loyal Ostrogoths*, which I am sure, if duly followed, would prove a better cure for us, whatever our disease be, than our *Doting Mountebank* impudently proposed.

From *these Ostrogoths*, and *Gepidae*—sprang the *Lombards*, whom *Narses*, the *Roman Patrician*, inviting into *Italy*, and shewing them the goodness of the Soyl, and warmth of the climate, by the richness of the *Wines*, and pleasantness of the *Fruit*, which
he

he sent them as a *Present* to encourage their remove, at last they undertook the journey, and finding the Countrey fully answer their expectation; from *guests*, as they were intended, they became *masters*. And having introduced several of their *own* Laws and Customs, have left many of them remaining even to this day, with the name of *Lombardy* to one of the most fertile Provinces of *Italy*.

Merch. Pray what kind of Government did they settle amongst themselves?

Trav. The most *popular* that could be contrived. For hating the *Roman Emperors*, from whom they had *usurped those Lands*, which they did possess, (as the offender is oftentimes the last reconciled) they set up a Government as *contrary* to Monarchy as they could invent. For, obtaining leave to use their own form under *certain conditions*, and restrictions, they chose to be governed under *Consuls*, which they elected annually, for the most part, out of three orders, which they distinguished into *Captains*,

tains, Vairvods, and the Commonalty. And that they might secure themselves from the ambition of the great ones, they made no scruple to choose into the most honourable employments, the most mercenary Tradesmen and Artificers. Inferioris conditionis juvenes, vel quoslibet contemptibilium, etiam mechanicarum artium opifices, quos ceteræ gentes ab honestioribus, & liberioribus studiis tanquam pestem propellunt, ad militis cingulum, vel dignitatum gradus, assumere non dedignentur.

Merch. What was the effect of this their Popular Government?

Trav. The same which generally happens in all such *low irregular* constitutions, that is to say, *defection* from their Sovereign, and *division* amongst themselves; so that every Town became a different Commonwealth, and were never *united* or friends, but when they were to *oppose* the *Emperor*, and that they seldom fail'd to do, as often as occasion happened.

For instance, the *Emperors* always reserved a certain *tribute*, which they called

called *Fodrum*, to be payed them as often as they should pass out of *Germany* into *Italy*. The denial of this *Fodrum*, produced most desperate Wars, insomuch that the *Emperors* were generally forced to fight their passage to *Rome*, through their own Dominions.

At last under *Frederick* the first, most of those Corporation Towns were utterly destroyed.

Amongst these, *Milan* was the chief seat of Rebellion; then *Brescia*, *Bergamo*, and several others shared in the same fate, as they had done in the same fault.

Merch. I thought there had been several Imperial feuds in *Lombardy*, as you lately observed, and Counties—what became of them, did they follow the Government of those great Towns?

Trav. Sir, there were several Marquisses and Counts, who had great *priviledges* and *possessions*. But in the absence of the *Emperor* they were in a manner necessitated—to acquiesce under the irresistible force of an *insolent*

lent people. *Vixque aliquis nobilis, vel un-*
magnus tam magno ambitu inveniri que-
at, qui civitatis sue non sequatur im-
perium. -- But many times upon the
 return of the Emperor into those parts,
 they have been established in their
 Dominions, and the Rebels severely
 punished, as in the case of *William*
Marquiss of Monferat, and the Bishop
 of *Aste*; to whom when the Citizens
 of *Aste*, and *Quiere*, (the chief
 Towns belonging to them) had re-
 fused to do justice concerning their
 rights and priviledges, the Empe-
 ror, *Frederick* the first, punished those
 Citizens most severely, as *Rebells* and
 his declared enemies.

Now, Sir, if you have observed any
 thing in the Government of those
Lombards, which either makes for
 our Authors proposition, or pleases
 your self, let me know it, and I shall
 shew you all the farther satisfaction I
 can.

Merch. I have nothing more to offer
 concerning them. I hate their Go-
 vernment, which I think makes little
 for us. But I would gladly hear some-
 what

what more of the *Goths* and *Vandals*, because tis said, they lived under a Monarchy, though *limited*.

Trav. The later *Goths*, which were of the race of the *Visigoths*, being much weakned and *harrassed* by the *Romans*, at last, under their King *Alaric*, obtained permission from the *Emperor Honorius*, to retire into *Spain*. But being treacherously pursued by *Stilico*, whom they overcame, were so incensed against the *Romans*, that they immediately returned, and *sack- ing Rome* again, set down in that part of *France*, which they call *Provincia*, or *Gallia Narbonensis*. There being again beaten, they entred into *Spain*, and possessed it, which happened about the year of our Lord 412. Here they settled a Monarchical Government, but not so absolute as formerly it had been, before their separation, a great part, both of the power, as well as the possessions, being in the people.

Much such was the case of the *Vandals*, (who after they had run over almost all *Italy*, taken *Rome* and *Naples*,

ples, and had spread themselves all over *Campania*,) follow'd the *Goths* into *Spain*, whence (being invited by *Bonifacius* General to the Emperour *Valentinian*) they pass'd the Streights at *Cadix* into *Africa*, which they possess'd near 100 years, according to *Procopius* his account, until *Belisarius* General to the Emperour *Justinian*, routed them, and restor'd the Province to the *Roman* Empire. This happened about the year Five hundred and thirty.

Now, Cousin, you must observe, that though both these *Goths* and *Vandals* instituted a kind of Kingly Government, yet their Prince was rather a General than a Monarch, and their affairs were for the most part so *turbulent*, that they were in a continual state of *war*. Sometimes their success was good, but generally bad. And, as the honour of Victory is given to the chief Commander, so the ill fortune falls heaviest upon his head, who governs. Hence those insolent people might possibly, as our Author says, *beat the Kings brains out*, or commit many outrages upon his person, who was

was indeed in some things *accountable* to his people, and held a Kingdom so *precarious*, that *Grotius* thinks them not worthy of the *name* or *title* of Kings.

But no man sure that had not his hands in some measure, already dy'd with the blood of one of the best Kings, could have commended a people for *beating out the brains of their Sovereign*, nor imagined, that some excellent person, as he says, contriv'd a Government, in which the people have ever been call'd and accounted *most barbarous*, by all the most civiliz'd Monarchies, and learned men in *Europe*, and even by *Procopius* himself.

He tells us, that *nothing remains, that may give us any great light, in what their excellencies consisted*. Truly our Author seems to have grop'd in the dark for all the arguments and authorities which he hath produc'd to favour his innovation. But no wonder, men avoid the light, when their deeds and principles are evil.

Mer. But what say you to the possession of lands, and share in the Govern-

vernment, which are the points that chiefly concern us.

Trav. Sir, you may easily believe, that if the people were Masters of the Government, they would not fail to give themselves large proportions of the lands. But this made their Government so irregular, and subject to so many inconveniencies, that instead of being settled according to the exact rules of the Politics, as our Author thinks, it was most *insupportable*, and not capable of any long subsistence. And in effect, we see both their name and government so totally extinct, that those people who possessed almost all *Europe*, are not now to be found in any part of it.

Such was the case of the once flourishing Kingdom of the *Jews*; which (when the Seditious people, as *Menabemus*, *Eliazarus*, and others, endeavoured to set up a popular Government,) was utterly destroy'd, and of two such mighty Nations, nothing is left, but some few *wandering remains* or *old rustick monuments*, which serve only to testify that they once have been.

" I confess, had the authority of the Gothick Kings been Absolute and Independent, I know no great inconvenience, that their *distribution* of the *lands*, could have produced. Yet that too ought to be done, with discretion and good consideration, or many mischiefs, and ruine in the end may ensue.

To this purpose, our Author, I thank him, hath put us in mind of a memorable example. For *Plutarch* tells us, that *Cleomenes* King of *Sparta*, endeavouring to make himself Absolute, slew the *Ephori*. And the better to ingratiate himself with the people, *divided the lands* amongst them. But being desperately attack'd by *Antigonus* King of *Macedon*, before he had well established his Sovereign Authority, he could not raise money, to pay either his *Mercenary soldiers*, or his own *Citizens*. Whence for want of that power, he was totally routed, *Lacedemon* sack'd, and the whole Kingdom became a Province to the *Macedonians*.

Mer. Without doubt many Contingencies may happen, in which an *Absolute Power* in the Prince, may prove the greatest security to a Kingdom against a Foreign Invasion. For whilst the people are consulted withal, or intreated to contribute toward the necessary expences of war, by an untimely frugality, and indiscreet husbandry the whole may be lost.

I remember a story very apposite to this purpose, in the wars between the Greeks and Turks under *Constantine* the Fifteenth, and last Christian Emperour of Greece. The numerous Army of the *Turks*, had so wasted the besieged in *Constantinople*, that *Constantine* had no hopes of preserving the City, but by a supply of *Mercenary Soldiers*. To procure these, a considerable sum of money was requisite. But the brutal and covetous Greeks would not be prevail'd upon to part with any thing at present, though they had no other hopes, to preserve all for the future. So the unfortunate Emperour was slain, and the City taken, and sack'd from top to bottom, with all the

the insolences that might be expected from a *Pagan Conquerour*. Among the *Greeks*, the Admiral *Notaras* was accounted the *most rich*, and had been the most solicited by the Emperour to prevent, by a *chearful contribution*, and his good example, the *fatal hour* of the *Grecian Empire*. But *curst avarice* doth often blind our reason so much, that we are forc'd to yield That to our *enemies*, which might have once preserv'd our *friends*. And so it happened. For *Notaras* burying all his *Treasure*, whilst the *Siege* endured, at last to preserve his life, and complement the New Emperour *Mahomet* the second, he raised his dead money from the grave, and presenting it with himself at the Emperour's feet, offer'd the one to secure the other. But the generous *Turk* looking sternly upon him, *Thou dog*, said he, *I take thy Treasure, not as thy gift, but as my due, by right of conquest. Which hadst thou in time given to thy poor Prince, whom thou hast perfidiously betray'd, thou mightest have preserv'd both thy Country, and thy King.* Go then with a mischief, and

receive the just reward due to thy Treachery. So he commanded him to be executed with no less severity, than if he had been a *Traytor*, even to *Mahomet* himself.

But, Sir, Begging your pardon for this Digression, let us return to the *Goths*, of whom I think you were saying, That they have left little behind them, which retains the memory that they once have been. Pray, what say you to those *Tenures*, which are yet extant in many parts of *Europe*. Were they not of the *Gothick* institution, and do they not sufficiently testify, not only that they *were*, but that they were also a *wise people*, since their Government has remain'd so long after them.

Trav. Sir, I perceive you use the word Government promiscuously, as indeed our Author himself does. Sometimes he makes it signify the *Supreme* right of power, sometimes the *Subordinate*, and sometimes *neither*, but only the *effects* of Government as in this case.

Now though these *Tenures* have remained in some Kingdoms, yet they
prove

prove little of the wisdom, and nothing of the excellent Government of those *Goths*. For the last, it is either totally lost, or else so changed, that it is not any more to be known. For I do not hear or read of any such precarious Kingdom as theirs was, extant at this day in *Europe*. Nor is it probable there should, for as hath been already observed, such a constitution is so irregular, and contrary to the nature of Government, that it cannot continue long in that neutrality. For either the people will take all the power into their hands, whence some little Commonwealths have sometimes sprung up, or else the King will by degrees become absolute and independent, such as most of the Monarchs are at present throughout the whole world. And for their Tenures, you will easily find how they were continued, if you consider that many little Kingdoms have been built upon the ruins of the declining *Roman Empire*, which had been overrun by the *Goths* and *Vandalls*, *Roma paulatim cæpit minui jam gentes qua Roma-*

*nonum provincias non regna habitabant,
Reges creare jam ex illorum potestate sub-
daci--- & in proprii arbitrii autoritate
stare discunt.*

These new Princes thought no-
thing more conducive to the establish-
ment of their new Governments, than
to make as little *innovation* as they
could, but rather leave the conquered,
who were afterwards to become their
Subjects, in the same condition as
they found them. And those *Tenures*
having no great matter of ill in them,
provided their Lords had no right in
the *Sovereign Authority* as they had
not; many of them have continued,
with little alteration to this day.

This, Cousin, is I think sufficient to
prove, that contrary to our Author's
proposition, most Kings which have
been in the world, though they had
an absolute and an independent right
of power, yet they have permitted the
Lands to be divided, and in the posses-
sion of the people. And that though
in the mixt Monarchy of the barba-
rous *Goths* and *Vandalls*, some part of
the power as well as possessions, were

in the Comithionality, yet that is no reason to us, why, neglecting all the other more civilized and flourishing Empires of Egypt and Asia, as well as Europe, we must alone bring those Northern instances, in contradiction to all the Southern, and the Eastern learning, as the only true politick examples, for our present imitation. And to conclude, The instance which you have brought of a master, who entrusts the sword into the hands of his servants, with conditions, nevertheless, oaths and obligations to use it only in defence of their master, and according to his command, and no otherwise, yet you say, these servants, having the power in their hands, may when they please govern the Master himself, and turn him out of doors too, if they think it convenient so to do. This indeed cannot be denied, but it proves nothing still of our Authors proposition. For although they have the sword in their hands, yet it being delivered upon the forementioned conditions, and under such obligations, they receive thereby no right of power, but are rather under

der *strieter* vows of obedience, And truly Cousin, when *law* and *conscience*, *vows* and *protestations*, and all that is binding upon *Earth*, or *sacred in Heaven*, prove but *slender bonds* and *tyes too weak* to keep us within the compass of a *sworn Allegiance* to our *Lawful* and *Natural Princes* and *Governours*, all Government in such case must break in pieces, and the *Governours* can by *no other way* be secur'd from the *insolences* and *unjust force* of the governed. And seriously, Sir, *Plato Redivivus* speaks of the Church with such *malicious disrespect*, and in such *seditionous terms* of the State and Government by Law established, that it is shrewdly to be suspected, he hath neither fear for God, nor honour for *the King*. What kind of *cure* then might be expected, supposing we were distemper'd, from such a *loose, irreverent* and *Atheistical quacking Fop*, I leave to your self and all sober men to determine.

Mer. Dear Cousin, I am most entirely satisfied with all that you have said, from the very beginning of our first discourse. And though some of
my

my impertinent questions, may have made the subject more tedious to you, than otherwise it might have been, yet you have thereby totally remov'd all scruples, which might have remain'd concerning the *good and reasonable constitution* of our Government. Being most assur'd, that no people upon earth, can live more happy and secure under theirs, than we under our own, provided the *strictness* of our *obedience*, correspond with the *justness* of our *Laws*. Besides, we have also gain'd this advantage, from the assurance of our *health*, that we need not trouble our selves to look after a *phantastical cure* for an *imaginary disease*, which is no where more truly to be found, than in the *shallow brains* of *Plato Redivivus*. Being therefore fully convinc'd, that the Constitution of our Government, is, thanks be to Heaven, very *healthful and vigorous*, you have in your discourse this evening, sufficiently answer'd our Author's whole *Libel*, so that I shall not give you any farther trouble concerning it, but shall sacrifice the whole to the *flames*, or to some other,

other, not very *respectful* end or office.

Trav. I shall esteem my self very happy, if I have contributed any thing toward your satisfaction or divertisement. However if you please, to morrow morning we will run over what is worth the observing, in the rest of his *second and third Discourse*. And I am apt to believe, that it will prove *less tedious*, and more *pleasant*, than what we have done this afternoon.

Mer. Most gladly, Sir, For if it be not troublesome to you, nothing can be more acceptable to me. In the meantime, we will bid the Coachman drive us home, where we will remember all *honest and Loyal good Subjects* in a glass of the best Wine in the Cellar.

Trav. I approve very well of your motion, and if you please, we will conclude all with our *heartly wishes and prayers*, for the good *health, safety and prosperity* of his most *Sacred Majesty*, whose unparallel'd goodness is so great, that as none of our *Virtues* can ever equal it, so neither can our *vices* reach it,

it, except it be the most barbarous transcendent malice of his merciless and blood-thirsty enemies.

Discourse the Third.

Mer. **G**ood morrow to you, Cousin.

Trav. The same to you, Sir, or a better. How have you rested after our long discourse yesterday?

Mer. I perceive by the time of the day, that I have slept long enough, but really my head has been so full of *Politicks* and *Proclamations*, that I am sure I have done more work in six hours sleep than our *Plato Redivivus* can ever effect, all the days of his life. I have *Reform'd Monarchies*, *Regulated Republicks*, *Transform'd Aristocracies*, pull'd down, and then set up and new modell'd vast Empires. In a word, I have settled the whole world under such excellent forms and politics, that we shall never hear more disputes betwixt *Priviledge* and

and *Prerogative, Property and Power, People and Prince.* No more Sedition nor Civil wars at home, no more Invasions from abroad, but having regulated the *Universe* according to the *Polity* of private States, we may begin when we please to turn our *Swords* into *Plough-shares*, and our *Spears* into *Pruning-hooks*, for we are to enjoy an uninterrupted peace and security even unto the end of time, and all things.

Trav. Nothing is more common, than for the discourse of the day, (especially when it is out of the common road) to furnish matter sufficient for dreams at night. But pray what kind of Government had you set up.

Mer. 'Twas a Perfect free Monarchy, which so incens'd *Plato Redivivus*, who methoughts was of the Company, that in the height of our debate we had like to have fallen to Cuffs. At last I told him plainly, that I did not take him for a *Conjurer*. With which opprobrious word, being more offended than with all that had been said before, rather than not pass for a *cunning man*, he was not ashamed to confess,

self, that he had studied the *Black art*, dealt by the *Devil*, and understood *Cornelius Agrippa*, better than he did his *Creed*, and that to convince me of my *mistake*, he would shew me such an infallible *proof* both of his *skill* and *parts*, that I should be asham'd for ever after to have treated a *person* of his *talent* and *qualifications* with so little respect. And immediately (whilest I was expecting the event) our *old Committee man*, had transform'd himself into a *little Cubb Fox*. But to that small body there was fixt a pair of *Asses Ears*, so large and disproportionate to the Head, that this most ridiculous object occasion'd so hearty, and so loud a *laughter* among the Company, that I awakened with the noise, and my *Politics* ended.

Trav. The Conclusion was pleasant enough, but indeed I should have thought, our Author had had no part about him, of so *modest* and well *temper'd a beast*. But let us proceed in his examination, which hence forward shall be done with as much brevity as the case will admit.

He

He tells us, p. 40. that for personal estate, the subjects may enjoy it in the largest proportion, without being able to invade the Empire, and that the subjects with their Money cannot invade the Crown. This is the first time, that I remember to have observed where lay the weak side of invincible Gold. Indeed till now I should have laid the odds for money against land, and I am the more confirm'd in that opinion, because I remember very well, that in an election of a Knight for the Shire, a certain money'd Merchant, not having three hundred pound per Annum lands in the world, was able nevertheless, to carry the Election against a worthy Gentleman, of an ancient Family, who had at that time, above four thousand pounds per Annum lands of inheritance. And it was thought, that the force of money, procured the advantage. Many such cases I suppose have happened in other Counties, which argument, sure will hold in a Kingdom, as well as in a County, since the former is composed of the latter.

But

But our Author, who has the legislative power in his head, makes there, what card trump he thinks fit. And from his unerring judgment, there is no appeal.

Merch. I think *Plato* is mistaken. But Sir, you have slip't a remark a little before this; and it is, that *Modern* writers are of opinion that *Egypt*, till of late, was not a Monarchy; and the only conjecture, which he produces, is, that originally all Arts and Sciences, had their rise in *Egypt*, which they think very improbable to have been under a Monarchy.

Trav. O silly, truly for our Authors reputations sake, I thought to have pass'd by so childish a conjecture. I will not go about to prove, that really all Arts and Sciences had their rise in that Countrey, because our Author hath confessed it. Nor tell you that *Egypt*, was an absolute Monarchy many hundred years before, because I have already given you good authorities for it. Neither will I trouble you with a long Catalogue of most excellent men, for all manner
of

of learning, who lived as well under the elder Monarchies, as later ones of Rome, Germany, Spain, France, England and many others. Let our Authors own profound Learning, rise up in judgment in this case against himself, since it is plain, that his vast politick knowledge, sprang up, bloom'd, brought forth fruit, withered and decayed, and all under a Monarchical Government. For whether we consider him in the days of King Charles the 1st. or under Oliver, or at Rome, or since his present Majesties happy Restoration, he hath still sucked in a Monarchical Air. I do not hear that all was effected at Geneva, though most probably the first sower Grapes came from thence, which have set his teeth on edge ever since.

Merch. Indeed I think so sober a politician might have spared such a little malicious remark. But to go on, he tells us, p. 45. That Rome was the best and most glorious Government, that the Sun ever saw.

Trav. Our Statesman hath coupled best and glorious together, as Poulterers use

use to do a *lean* and a *fat Rabbit*, that one may help off with the other. But his vulgar cheat must not pass. For *glorious*, we will admit of that Epithete, and good Authors give us the reason how it came to be so, which is not much to our purpose. But for *best*, we must examine that a little farther.

I could cite many Authorities to prove that the *Roman Commonwealth* was one of the *worst Governments*, that ever subsisted so long. But because I would speak somewhat to our noble *Venetian*, who ought to have read his own Authors, concerning Government at home, before he came to judge of another abroad, I will refer him for full satisfaction in this point, to the *Discorsi politici* of *Paulus Paruta*, a Nobleman and Senator of Venice, and Procurator of Saint Marco. Who in his first discourse, comparing several Antient Commonwealths, with that of Venice, when he comes to Rome, he tells us plainly, That the Sun never saw a more confused State. That it was really no regular government at all, and

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that

that its chief default proceeded from the exorbitant power of the people. Whence Tacitus calls it, lib. 3. *Corruptissima Respublica*.

Now, Sir, if this noble Senator, who also had been Ambassador abroad, understood any thing of Government, as I believe he did, even more than the *English* Gent. Young *Venetian* and learned Doctor, put all together, then we must conclude, that our Author is mistaken. But since it is not the first time, we will put it to account.

Mer. Well, Sir, he saith next, p. 52. That *Moses, Theseus, and Romulus* were founders of Democracies. What say you to that ?

Trav. If I mistake not, he tells us the same thing in p. 28. 32, & 69. In some of which he calls their Democracy, in plain *English*, a Commonwealth. For *Moses*, I have already prov'd his authority to have been Independent, even in the highest measure, upon any but God, and that in the exercise none ever us'd it more arbitrarily, witness the severe punishments against the Idolaters, when he came down from

from Mount *Sinai*. Where without any farther Ceremonies, or *legal trial*, he call'd the Sons of *Levi* to him, and said : *Put every man his sword by his side, and go in from gate to gate throughout the Camp, and slay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour. And the children of Levi did according to the word of Moses, and there fell of the people that day about 3000. men.*

Many other instances there are of his Despotical power ; besides, the Text saith in plain words, that *Moses was King in Jeshurun*.--- For the calling together the Congregation of the Lord by sound of Trumpet, all men, who ever read the Bible know, that it was generally to tell them some *message* from God, *reproach them* for their misdeeds, exhort them to *amendment*, and such like. But I am confident they never did any one act, which proceeded from a *right of power* while *Moses* liv'd. Nay, on the contrary, when the Seditious Princes, *Corah, Dathan*, and *Abiram*, as also *Aaron* and *Miriam*, murmured against *Moses's* Sovereign

raign authority, being desirous to have shar'd with him in the Government, we find that God punished their *Sedition* most severely, and the *two last* escaped the Justice of Gods sentence, only through the great intercession of *Moses*. Who knows not that his *Præfecti Jethroniani*, were only subordinate Judges appointed by his *own order*, and for his *own ease*. All which, besides the common consent of learned men, makes it clear that *Moses* held the Supreme *Civil* power, *wholly* in himself, call him King, or Captain, or what you please.

Next *Theseus* being own'd after his long Travels, by his father *Aegæus*, found *Attica* Tributary to *Minos*, King of *Candia*, and the Kingdom divided in it self, into several little *Burghs*, which set up for so many particular several Governments. *Theseus* therefore being a discreet Prince, endeavour'd to reduce them to their former obedience by peaceable means. To that purpose he perswades them to unite under one Government, knowing that they would become thereby, (like a bundle of Arrows) much the stronger. And

And that the name of Tyrant might not affright them, or the loss of their fond *power* and *freedom* discourage them, he promised to abate so much, of his own *Sovereign right* of Government, as to *consult* with them, and take their *opinions* in weighty affairs, as he did in a common Hall or meeting place called *Asty*. In this method things went prosperously on until one *Mnestheus*, a factious and an ambitious Prince of the house of *Erichthonius*, insinuating to the people, that *Theseus* intended at last to *enslave* them, he caused the *Athenians* to rebell. *Theseus* retired to the *Island Scyros*, where he ended his days. *Mnestheus* usurped the Kingdom; but having held his ill gotten honour but a little while, the sons of *Theseus* were remitted to the Throne of their father, and *Theseus* was ever after *adored* amongst them as a God.

Now if there be any thing in this story, which makes for our Author, much good may it do him.

And lastly, *Romulus* cannot sure be said to have instituted the Common-

wealth of Rome, any more than Charles the Fifth the Republick of Holland, from whose successors those people rebelled. Tacitus says most clearly, *That Rome was governed in the beginning by Kings, and that their liberty was procured by L. Brutus. Urbem Romam à principio reges habuere. Libertatem & consulatum L. Brutus instituit.* And to shew the extent of his power, he tells us, *Ann. lib. 3.* that Romulus governed them according to his will. *Romulus ut libitum nobis imperaverat.* Plutarch calls the Government all along a Monarchy, and after Romulus had instituted the Senate, composed of the *Patricii* or chief Citizens, whensoever he appointed them to meet, they were obliged, says he, to observe his orders and commands, without making any reply. *Constat initio civitatis Reges omnem potestatem habuisse,* says Pomponius. *That in the beginning of the City (of Rome) their Kings enjoyed intirely the whole Sovereign Authority.*

But not to multiply Authorities, to prove such vulgar truths, I shall refer
you

you to our Authors chief *Divine*, I mean the *Divine Machiavel*, (as he styles him more than once) his words are full and very intelligible; where he calls all three *Princes* and their Governments *Kingdoms*. *Verum ut ad eos, qui non fortuna, sed singulari virtute in Principes sunt evecti veniamus*, (speaking all the while of Kings) *excellentes dico fuisse Mosen, Cyrum, Romulum, Thesum*, and again, which puts all out of dispute, *At qui Cyrum & reliquos, qui Regna sibi pepererunt, & constituerunt, &c.* And farther of *Romulus, quo Romano imperio potiretur, de Principe, ca. 6.* And yet *Plato Red.* hath the confidence to affirm p. 31. that *Romulus himself* was no more than the first officer of the Commonwealth, and (chosen as the Doge of Venice is) for life.

But if *Plato's Divine* were not an ignorant *Ass*, then our Author is certainly a very impudent impostor.

Merch. Indeed, Cousin, I have great reason to believe, that *Plato's* authorities and examples are as false, as his principles absurd. Besides, sup-

posing these great men had instituted popular Governments, (as I am fully convinced they did not) what doth that concern us? Is there no difference between the *foundation* of a new Government, and the *continuation* of an *old one*? Is there no distinction between the *Roman State* in its infancy, which extended not for several years above fifteen Miles, beyond their Walls, and the Empire of great *Britain* and *Ireland*? We know that many priviledges may be granted to the people at first for encouragement, which afterwards may be inconsistent with the safety of the Government. And is there no regard to be had to different circumstances? but let us proceed.

In p. 62. we read, *That it is not dangerous to a City, to have their people rich; but to have such a power in the Governing part of the Empire, as should make those, who manage the affairs of the Commonwealth depend upon them, which came afterwards to be that, which ruined their libertie, and which the Gracchi endeavoured to prevent, when*
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it was too late. What means he by this?

Trav. Sir, We will preserve his sence, but giving other names to the Country, People, and Governours, we shall see more plainly how it runs. Let us say then, *that it is not dangerous for England, to have their people rich even in land* (for he speaks immediately before of the Romans purchasing lands) *but to have such a share in the right of Government as should make the King, who manages the affairs of the Kingdom depend upon them ; methinks it is very clear, and it has ever been my judgment, that the people might have what proportion their industry could procure them in the lands, provided they did not pretend to any share in the Sovereign authority.*

Mer. But this is directly contrary to his own beloved Aphorism. Sure there must be somewhat more in it, or else you will make him contradict himself.

Trav. Faith, Sir, I cannot help that, Truth will come out sometimes in spite of the Devil. Nor know I how
to

to mend his sense, except I should make him appear, at the same time, the most *false, partial, and prejudiced* scribler that ever wrote.

Mer. No matter, Sir, let us, if we can, preserve his sense, which I believe he values himself most upon, and let his *honesty* and *honour* take their chance.

Trav. Let us then see what follows, *Which, says he, came afterwards to be that which ruin'd their liberty, and which the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent.* Pray Cousin, what is the antecedent to *which*, in these two places?

Mer. Sure, Sir, that is most plain; and according to my understanding, it is, that *power in the governing part of the Empire, &c.*

Trav. You are right without doubt; and I dare affirm, that *Q. Ennius* himself, could not make any other construction of it. And if so, then the whole sentence runs thus. *It was not dangerous to the Commonwealth of Rome to have their Subjects rich; but it was dangerous that the Subject should have such a power in the governing part of the Empire, as should make their Governours depend*

depend upon them, which power of the people in the governing part of the Empire, came afterwards to be that, which ruin'd the peoples liberty. And which power (for all the world knows, that, and, in this place is a conjunction copulative) the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent, &c.

Now, Sir, the first part of this Sentence is most really sound doctrine and truth, though diametrically opposite to Plato's grand proposition, upon which undeniable Aphorism, as he says, he is to build most of his subsequent reasoning.

For indeed the people, though never so rich, are by no means to be trusted with a right of power, but as I have said, rather the contrary, lest they should confound government, or set it upon its head, with its feet upmost. And so that power, which the Roman people pretended to, under the Seditious Gracchi and others, was the true cause which made the Commonwealth no longer governable under that form. *Hac ipsa in perniciem redibant & misera Respublica in exitum*

um suum merces erat. Flor. l. 3. c. 13.

But lest all should come to ruine, and the conquering *Romans* be at last overcome by their own victorious arms, the arbitrary government of the *Roman Emperours* was introduc'd, as the *only remedy* for the truly distempered State. *Non aliud discordanti patriæ remedium fuisse quam ut ab uno regeretur,* Tacit. Ann. 1.

But how the *Gracchi* endeavour'd to prevent this power in the people, who stood up so violently for them, is a riddle, which can be salv'd this only way, That in truth, though they set on foot the popular pretence of *Liberty* and *Property*, yet *honour* and *Empire* was the true game, which they themselves hunted. *Seditionum omnium causæ* (saith *Florus*) *Tribunitia potestas* excitavit, quæ specie quidem *Plebis* tuenda, cujus in auxilium comparata est, re autem *Dominationem* sibi acqutrens, studium populi ac favorem *Agrariis*, *frumentariis*, *Judiciariis* legibus, aucupabatur.

Mer. Sir, I am apt to believe, that our Author means by *which*, in the last place,

place, The ruin of the people's Liberty, which the *Gracchi* endeavour'd to prevent.

Trav. Indeed the sence is somewhat mended, but the English is stark nought, however we'l consider it according to your construction, the story then is this, *Tib. Gracchus* an ambitious Gentleman, and *discontented* with the Senate, for what reason I care not, struck in with the people, and became their Tribune.

The first great thing which he undertook, (in outward appearance, for the good of the people, but truly for the advancement of his own private designs and Empire, which he affected) was, the establishment of the *Agrarian law*, and *restitution* of the *lands* among the people.

Mer. Pray what was the *Agrarian law*, and *land*, which the people so much desired might be restored. Had they any injustice done them, or were they forceably taken from them ?

Trav. No sure, Sir, If there were any injustice in the case, it lay in the *restoration*; but you shall be Judge
your

your self. When the *Romans* under the Infancy of their Government had conquer'd any of their neighbours, they usually took away some of their *lands*, which were disposed of, partly for the *support of the State*, or *publick revenue*, and the other part was distributed among the indigent *Citizens* and *Soldiers*, especially the *Lame*, *Ancient*, and *decrepit*, and such as had deserved well, who were thence called *Emeriti*, or *Veteranimilites*, now these *Lands* remained to *them* and their *heirs*, upon the payment of some *small* acknowledgment, or performance of some certain *Services* which were in the Nature of *Tenures*. But in process of time, when the *Roman Empire*, and with it, luxury encreas'd, the common people, following the example of their Governours, liv'd in great *ease* and *plenty*. To support which, many sold their *lands*, either to the richer Noblemen, or to their fellow *Citizens*, as they could find a *Chapman*. *Unde enim Pop. Romanus Agros & Cibarios flagitat, nisi per famem, quam, Luxus, fecerat, hinc ergo Gracchana seditio, Flor. l. 3. cap. 12.*

Mer.

Mer. Was there no difference between the Lands given to the Citizens, and those which were thus bestowed upon the Soldiers?

Trav. Yes, those granted to the *Citizens* were of the more ancient Institution and called *Clientela's*, which some good Authors believe to have been the original of all *Tenures*. Those given to the *Soldiers* were called *Præda militaria*, or *stipendiaria*, and were such lands as had been taken from some conquered *Provinces* (as hath been before declared) Those which bordered upon the Skirts of the Enemies Countries, were generally granted unto some of their principal Captains and Commanders, which became an *Inheritance* to themselves, and *posterity* upon *presumption* and *Condition*, that they should, and would defend their *Prince* and *Country*, with the greater courage and fidelity, since in effect they secured at the same time, their own Estates. Hence it is supposed, that those Inheritances which we now call *Fiefs* had (in process of time) their first Institution, though the word

Feodum

Feodum was unknown to the ancient Romans.

And it is further conjectured, That from the differences between those *Clientela's* and these *Præda militaria*, sprang our ancient *Tenures*, and their several diversities, as *grand Serjeanty*, *Knights Service*, *Soccage*, &c. Now these *Præda militaria* were not (in their Original Institution) *alienable*, so as the *Clientela's* were, whence (as hath been said) the *Citizens* or *Clientes*, took the liberty to sell these lands, as their occasions required, which lands so sold, became, as in good reason they ought, the inheritance of the purchasers, and so descended from father to son for several generations, till at last it came into the fancy of *Tib. Gracchus* to have these lands restor'd again to the people.

And that he might kill two birds with one stone, that is, *impoverish the Senate*, or Government, which (being an Aristocracy) he hated, and *enrich the people* whom he seemingly protected, he order'd that the purchasers, or those in whose families these lands were

were found, should be re-imburs'd out of the *publick revenue*.

You may guess what a disturbance this must needs make, among the Senators and Noblemen whom it chiefly concern'd, and what *inconveniences* would inevitably happen upon a *re-distribution* of those lands, which had been so long *consolidated* with their own.

Mer. Nothing, methinks, could be more unreasonable, and unjust.

Trav. No matter, Sir, for as I have seen two doors of a room so artificially contriv'd, that the shutting of one, hath at the same motion open'd the other; so generally wheresoever Ambition enters, Justice immediately avoids the place; and indeed, *Haud bene conveniunt*.---

Gracchus therefore, eagerly pursuing Dominion, *Ut qui die Comitiorum prorogari sibi vellet Imperium*, puts forward this *Agrarian Law* with great vehemency. Which, when his Colleague, and another Tribune of the people, *M. Octavius*, oppos'd; (without whose consent nothing could be

concluded, nor law pass'd) most contrary to all *Justice*, and *Law* too, *Gracchus* by force and violence, (a thing before unheard of) turns him out of his Office.

Having thus gain'd his point, and ready to finish what he had so prosperously begun, *Scipio Nasica*, with the most worthy of the *Citizens* and *Nobility* cuts him off; and for a mark of ignominy, flings his carcass into the river.

Now as the same Laws were promoted by his brother *Caius*, with this difference, that he extended his influence farther, deferring the Judgment of cases, which had been ever particular to the Senate, to the people, and introducing the antiquated *Licinian Law*, by which no Citizen was to possess above 500. acres of land, within the *Domicilium Imperii*; so the same fate attended him, and that even with the consent of the people, for whose sake he seem'd to have pursu'd this specious design; Who perceiving at length the ambition and irregular proceedings of their great Patron, the injustice of their pretensions, and the little good the restitu-

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tion of these lands would do themselves, they totally deserted him. In-
 somuch, that *Caius*, when his fatal
 hour drew near, fell down before the
 Statue of *Diana*, praying, That the
 people, who had so basely abandon'd him,
 might never enjoy that liberty, which he
 endeavour'd to have obtain'd for them.

Mer. I am much satisfi'd with this
 story, and am apt to believe, that ma-
 ny of our own worthy Patriots, who
 cry up so much for *Liberty and Proper-*
ty, and the interest of the people, in-
 tend more really their own particular
 advancement; yet nevertheless you see
 our Author calls these men *Illustrious*,
 and renowned persons, their actions and
 undertakings *Heroick*.

Trav. He doth so; and undoubtedly
 he would say the same thing if he
 durst, not only of *Brutus*, but of the
 Dominican Friar, *Ravillac*, and *Hugh*
Peters himself, (or whoever else it was)
 that murder'd our late Sovereign.

But you have heard the opinion of
Florus, with whom *Plutarch* agrees,
 and all the ancient Authors, that I
 have yet met withal. And to conclude,

Tacitus, who seems to have been friend enough to a Democratical Government, calls them *disturbers of the people*. *Hinc Gracchi, & Saturnini turbatores plebis. Ann. l. 3.*

Merch. Tis well; We come now to *Agis* and *Cleomenes*. Who were they?

Trav. They were Kings of *Sparta*, and their *Designs* and *Fates* much the same with the *Gracchi*. The difference was chiefly this, that the former being already Kings, they endeavoured by the same means, that is to say, by *abolition of debts*, or *nova tabula*, *distribution of lands* and *favour of the people*, to procure to themselves an *absolute authority* against the *usurped power* of the *Ephori*. The *Gracchi*, being truly *Subjects*, followed the same course to *usurp* the Empire, but against the *lawful Authority* of the *Senate*. This is only to be observed of *Cleomenes*, that at the same time, when he endeavoured to possess the Sovereign power, he thought it nevertheless a *Solecism* in the Politicks, to give the *property of the Lands* among the people.

In a word, the same wheel, *troublesome and dangerous ambition*, moved equally all four; against which *Plutarch* inveighs most severely, in his introduction to the Lives of those *Spartan Kings*.

Merch. And may all *ambitious disturbers* of our peace, meet with the same Catastrophe. Next our Author tells us, that *alteration of the property*, is the *Unica corruptio politica*.

Trav. I grant it, Sir, if you apply property to the *right of power in Government*, but not if restrained to *Lands*, as hath been already proved. And for the favourable opinion which he hath of confusion, or Anarchy, may himself be confounded (in this world I mean) by his own loose principles, and *ungovernable unquiet Spirit*.

Merch. What say you of the Laws and Government of *Switzerland*, and the *Low Countries*?

Trav. Little Sir; their Laws and Governments are as *notoriously* known, as their *Rebellions*; and several Authors have writ fully of both.

Merch. Very good, we come next to the most famous Republick of *Venice*, where amongst other things vulgar enough, our Nobleman tells us, that *the great difficulty in the administration of that Republick, hath been to regulate their Nobility, and to bridle their Faction and ambition, which can alone breed a disease in the vital part of their Government. And this they do by most severe Laws, and a very vigorous execution of them.*

Trav. Right: But because he hath not been pleased to let you know what those Laws are, give me leave to inform you. I shall not speak of *little Mutineers*, those poor Rogues are easily cut off. But come to the *great and noble Villains*, and concerning such their Law is this: ——— when any *eminent man*, whose *relations and dependences* are commonly very great, shall (using as yet no other weapon than his tongue) ——— *defame the Government*, by *calumnies and opprobrious Speeches*, and thereby endeavour to draw off, first the *affection*, and next the *obedience* of the people to their *lawful*

ful Magistrate, and that the Government thinks not fit to call him publicly to account, lest some disturbance might happen through the interest of his friends; or least the *municipal* Laws of the State might not be sufficient to *reach his life* for any particular thing, though his complicated ills make him obnoxious, in general to the Government, and dangerous in it, or that a *perjured Jury* should acquit him, which would make him more *malicious* than before, knowing full well, that when a man becomes so *purged*, the *Devil* enters into him again with *nine Spirits worse than himself*. I say under such circumstances, their method of---proceeding is this. First, information being given to some of the *Consiglio di Dieci*--and sufficient evidence concerning matter of fact, his *process* is made, which requires very little time, and by majority of votes he is condemned to die; the offender being all this while ignorant of what is doing, and at liberty as at other times. This done, the business comes into the hands of the *Inquisitori*.

del Stato, who are *three annual officers*, chosen out of the *Dieci*—as also the *Gao* or *Capo di Dieci*—who are also three, but chosen *monthly*, and out of *the same body*. These *Inquisitori* are to see the Sentence executed, which is left to their discretion, and which they manage according to the *circumstances* of the offender. If there be no difficulty in *taking him at home*, then the way is this: the *Inquisitori*, or any *two* of them, send for a file of Muskeeteers or more, who accompanied with an *Officer*, *Confessor*, and *Executioner*, and in the most quiet time of the night, they force (if need be) the house of the offender; where being apprehended, he is acquainted, at the same instant, both with his *offence* and *punishment*. It is too late, and in vain to plead, or dispute; but being carried away into a *Gondola* prepared to receive him, they put off, accompanied with another, toward the *Sea*, and being come to the *place* they design, the offender having received *absolution* from his *Confessor*, they place him upon the *midst of a Plank* laid between

between the two Gondola's, with a Stone about his neck, then putting off their Boat, the criminal falls, for ever forgotten, to the bottom of the Sea, nor is there a man in the whole state of Venice, who dares ever after inquire what is become of this Great Nobleman; sometimes in such case they are strangled. But if the offender happens to be a person having a great retinue (as many have of Bravos) and that the forcing of his Palace may prove troublesom, and make too great a noise from the opposition which the officer may meet withal, from the number of the Domesticks, then the Inquisitori send for some of the most daring and notorious of the Banditi, and at the same time accompany the message with a pass or safe-conduct, both for his coming to Venice, and return.

Upon his appearance before the Inquisitori, they inform him of their business, which is, to hire him, at the price of his own pardon, and a considerable reward, to shoot or stab such a Nobleman, who hath been condemned

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ned by the *Consejo di Dieci*--and that to be done *wherever he meet him* even in the midst of the place of *St. Marco*.

The *Bandito* seldom refuseth these conditions, but requires their *order* for his own *absolution*. Upon which the *Inquisitori* give him a *billet*, or piece of white paper folded up after a certain manner, and *markt* with their *nail* only, without any word or written letter whatever. This done, the *Bandito* *dispatcheth* the Nobleman, but no man knowing that this *person* had ever been *accused*, much less *condemned*. The *Bandito*, as an *assassinate*, is carried immediately to prison. Who when he comes there, demands the *Keeper* of the Prison, or *chief officer*, to whom he delivers his *billet*, upon *sight* of which, the *doors* of the Prison are immediately *set open*, and the *Bandito* returns whither he thinks fitting himself.

After which, *none* even of his near *Relations*--*dare* ever make any question concerning his *death*. Such is the *punishment*, and such the manner of executing *notorious* and *eminent Calumniators*

niators of the *Venetian* Government. And sure it hath been one of the greatest reasons, that hath preserv'd that State so long from a Popular or a Monarchical Usurpation.

Now though this be the practice of the most renowned Republick of *Venice*, yet I am confident our Author would much blame such an *Arbitrary* way of proceeding under any Monarchical government, especially if himself (as he justly deserves) should happen to be made the *first* example, as he is of that kind, one of the *greatest* offenders.

Mer. The *Tongue* indeed is an unruly and a dangerous member, and in my opinion, in *some cases*, ought to be restrain'd under no less penalties, than we do the violent actions of our hands.

Your next remark is in p. 88. where it is said, *that the people, (under the Roman Emperours) who had really an interest to endeavour a change of Government, were so prevented by seeing the Prince, whom they designed to supplant, removed to their hand, that they were*
puzzled

puzled what to do; taking in the mean time great recreation to see those wild beasts hunted down themselves, who had so often prey'd upon their lives and estates, &c.

Trav. Very fine sport indeed for an old Rebel, and I am perswaded, Plato would be highly pleas'd (as old as he is) to follow briskly some such Royal chase. But his blood-hounds are at present a little out of tune, and I hope he will lose his *impious* diversion. But to return to his Historical observation, he tells us, that the people, who had an interest to change the Government, wanted time to destroy their Prince themselves, because it was done so to their hands. And yet the mischief on't is, that under the first change of the Government which is generally the most insupportable, the people had as much time as they could have wish'd. For Augustus liv'd an Emperour about forty years, and dy'd in peace, beloved and lamented.

Tiberius, his Successor, had obtain'd the age of *Seventy eight* before he left his Empire, with the world; a time
long

long enough for such *good Subjects* and *Patriots* of their country as *Plato Redivivus*, to have chang'd the Arbitrary Government to its *ancient popular* constitution.

Claudius also reign'd long enough, and the people wanted not time nor opportunity. And for those succeeding *Cæsars*, as *Nero*, *Galba*, *Otho*, *Vitellius*, they were taken off rather by the *fury* of the *Soldiers*, and private malice and ambition of particular men, than *discontent* of the *Citizens*. Nay, the *people*, as they chiefly defended their Emperours whilst alive, so they were the most considerable *sufferers* by their *deaths*. And notwithstanding the great irregularity in the *Politick principles* of those Emperours, by keeping the Sovereign power, and yet leaving the *property* to the *people*. That Empire (though latterly much divided and dismembred, chiefly by the Emperours themselves, and partly by the Ambition of the *Roman Bishops*) hath subsisted 1700 years, and may for ought we know, continue as many more, and yet no Government more
averse

averse to our great Politicians rule.

But, Sir, if we must answer all the *impertinencies, incongruities, and misapplications* of this *Scribbling Statesman*, there will be no end of our discourse. Pray therefore let us make as short work as we can, and to that purpose we will reduce what is most considerable under some *heads*. And the first thing which occurs, is the account which he gives, p. 97. and 145. of the Government of *France*; In which he tells us, that *France hath no Freemen below the Nobility, that is Yeomen. That the Gentry are very needy and numerous, because the elder brother in most parts of the Kingdom, hath no more share in the division of the paternal estate, than the Cadets, excepting the principal house, &c. which they call, Vol de Chapon.* And from hence he draws several false arguments. To the first, I cannot find, upon the best examination I could make, any considerable difference between the constitution of *France*, and that of *England*, as to the Gentry and Commonalty. For although I do not observe, any such
titular

titular distinction as Yeomen in *France*, which is also antiquated, or almost lost and confounded amongst us. Yet there is a notorious difference between the *Roturiers*, or those whom he calls *Villains*, and the *Freeholders*. The latter are compos'd generally of little *Merchants*, *Tradesmen*, *Shop-keepers*, and such like, and they are distinguish'd by their *Tenures* or *Services*, which they call *Droit de Corvie*, and *Droit de Censive*. The first is properly *Villinage*, as, working for his Lord, either with his *Body*, *Cart*, or *Horses*, or such like. The other, that is to say, *Droit de Censive*, doth not oblige the Free-holder to any manner of *servile* office, but only the payment of some small rent, as Cocks, Hens, or some little part of the profits. They have their *Quint* and *Requint*, which are certain *Fines* upon *Alienations*, as also their *Copyholders*, and lands held in *Gavelkind*; and in a word, I know no greater difference, between the *French* and *English* Subjects, as to the point of *Lands* and *Properties*, than this, That the Lands *ennoble*, or at least
give

give *Titles* in *France*, as *Comte*, *Baron*, *Marquiss*, which priviledges were taken away, I think, from the *English*, under the reign of *Hen. 3.* and which came originally from the *French*, being introduc'd by *William* the Conqueror.

As for the *needy* and *numerous Gentry*, to the last, all the world knows, that *France* is extreme populous, as well in *Commonalty* as *Gentry*. The men being very *Brisk*, and the women, it seems, very *Pregnant*. But for their *wants*, I mean of the *Gentry*, I think it is as publickly known, that they proceed generally from a different cause, from what our Author hath assign'd. That is, from the *Scruple* which they make of undertaking any *Mercantile employment*, which is the greatest support of our *English* families, so that there is no *Cadet* of a house *ennobled*, who had not rather *trail a pike*, than be an *apprentice* to the greatest *Merchant* in *France*.

All these *Cadets*, our Author hath brought to Court, and made them the chief *props* of the present *French* Government and greatness. But he hath forgot,

forgot, That as the young *French Nobility* are very numerous, so the vast number of *Ecclesiastical Preferments, Monasteries* and *Temporal offices*, depending eternally and at all times upon the Crown, do entertain so many of these *young Cadets*, that I am confident, at least *two thirds* of the younger children, are provided for after this manner, without depending immediately upon the King's Purse. As to the division of the Paternal estate, amongst the *Cadets*, except the principal house, which he calls *Vol de chapon*, our Buz-zardly Author of a French Capon, hath made a long-wing'd Hawk. For what he calls *most part of* the Kingdom, is particular to *Paris* only, as with us in *London*, and *Kent* formerly, (I suppose by reason of the Traders) the *Isle of France, Limousin, Xantonge*, and it may be some one Province more, which possibly I have not remembred.

Thus you see, Cousin, how our Author *augments, or diminisheth, changeth or disguiseth* the truth of things, as they make most convenient for his purpose, and what little *credit* ought to be given

to him. We shall therefore take no more notice of *France*. For his premises being demonstrably false, his consequence whatsoever it be, cannot hold good.

Mer. Sir, I never thought all to be Gospel, that hath been preached by our *divine Plato*. But now we come to the *Clergy*, let us see what respect he hath for the *Spiritual Government*, since the *Temporal* doth so much offend him. He tells us then very sincerely and frankly, *that he could wish, there never had been any Clergy amongst us, &c.* For you know the *Northern people* did not bring Christianity into these parts, but found it here.

Trav. Most excellent. You may perceive how happy we are like to be under the New Government of our *infamous Author*, who *rebelling* against God, and *Man* appointed to rule over us by *Gods authority*, hath left nothing that I know of, to set up for, but *Hell and the Devil*. But his argument is very strong, for the *Northern people* did not bring Christianity into these parts.

Indeed

Indeed it is great pity that we have not retain'd the *Gothick*, or *Saxon*, and Northern *Paganism* with the *Gothick Politicks*. But our learned Historian, should have had at least so much respect for *Antiquity* as to have consider'd, that the *Ecclesiastical Government*, or Clergy, was establish'd here according to his own confession, even *before* the barbarous Northern people came here themselves, and I thank God, it still continues in a great measure amongst us, even at this day, and I hope is like to do so, notwithstanding the *Fanatical* and *pernicious* doctrine of *Plato* and his *bellish disciples*. And for the institution of our Ecclesiastical government, and foundation of our Bishopricks, and many of our Monasteries, which our Author ascribes to most *villanous causes*, 'tis certain from the best Histories extant among us, that King *Lucius*, about the year 180. converted no less than *thirty one* of the Temples of the *Heathenish Flamins* and *Arch-flamins* into so many *Christian Bishopricks*, whereof *London*, *York* & *Caerlyon*, now *S. Davids*, were made the *Metropolitans* of the Province.

But our *Pagan Politician*, hating Christianity it self, hates no less the establishment of the Christian Religion, which he vitiates with notorious slanders and falsities. And as for Monasteries, not to give a particular account of all their several beginnings, which were generally from the benevolence of *most pious* men and women, and too many to be numbred, we read that King *Edgar* the peaceable, founded no less for his own share than *forty seven*.

Mer. Sir, I concur with you both in your *History* and your *hopes*, and shall ever add my most hearty *prayers*, and *wishes*. But our Author proceeds, and in the next page, had he had wit enough, he would have turn'd the whole order into *ridicule*. But knowing well that his strongest arguments, and chiefest talent consists in *opprobrious* language, the foul-mouth'd Fanatick is not asham'd to call our Christian Ancestors *barbarous*, and those good men, who at the expence of their *blood* and *lives*, planted and propagated the *Christian Faith* amongst us, *Vipers*.

Trav. He

Trav. He is equally mistaken in both. For not six pages farther, that is in p. 106. he there is pleas'd to give our Ancestors, the title of a *plain-hearted* and *well-meaning* people, who were *barbarous* before in p. 100. But to call a man a *Saint* or a *Devil*, is indifferent to him, and promiscuously us'd, according as either serves best for his purpose.

For the *Ecclesiastical Vipers*, I do not think indeed that his wit has furnish'd him, with a character answerable to the design of his *malice*. For a *Viper* is known to be an Animal, much more *useful* and *valuable*, than our Author himself is like to be. For although that God and Nature have given it a *sting*, or *teeth* if you will, to defend it self from violence, and punish such as offend it, yet we know, that of its body are compos'd the most *Sovereign Cordials*: Such are the excellent *Works* of our *Learned Clergy*, which are found to be the most effectual *Antidotes* against the *poysonous Blasphemies* and *Heresies* of our *Schismatical Dissenters*. Besides, Naturalists assure us, that the

Viper hath such a *care*, and tender *affection* for its *young*, that upon any pressing danger, she receives them again into her own body, and charged with the *load* and *safety* of what her self gave life to, suffers no injury to approach them until first it hath passed through her own body, and she destroyed. But our *unnatural sneaking* and *malicious worm*, and good besides for *nothing*, is barbarous enough to *tear out the bowels* of his *indulgent mother*, (the *Holy Church* I mean) even whilst those very *bowels*, are yearning to see the *sad condition* of her *desperately abandoned Son*, and in the height of his wickedness, opens her tender arms to receive this child of perdition into her *Sacred bosome*. But the *Prodigal* will never return, and so let us leave him, whilst our *Church of England*, wanting as little my defence as, apprehending his reproaches, will still remain firm upon the *rock*, secure, though sadly lamenting those miserable shipwracks, which *storms* of our *own* raising have procured.

Meroh.

Merch. And may the providence of Heaven preserve her, until from *militant* she becomes *triumphant*. In the mean time, I perceive, we are like to have more work about the *civil* Government. For in p. 103, our Author tells us, that the *Sovereign power of England is in King, Lords and Commons.*

Trav. Right, Sir, when there is a Parliament in *being*, and as it is taken for one *intire body*, of which, the King is *Principium, caput & finis*. But there is no *Sovereign power* in the house of Commons, neither is there a *Sovereign power* in the house of Lords, either *conjunctim* or *divisim*, *joyntly* or *separately* without the King, therefore the *Sovereign right* of power can be no where but in the King; right of *council* is in the Lords and Commons in Parliament duly assembled, but right of *command* is in the King. For he both calls the Parliament and dissolves it. One *Sovereign power* cannot dissolve another *Sovereign power* (could they be supposed together) except by *force*. But the Kings of
T 4 England

England have ever called and dissolved Parliaments, not by *force*, but by *right of power* and command, which belongs to them by *inherent birthright*, and *lawful and undoubted Succession*. A *Bill* which shall have regularly past both *Houses*, and brought even to the *Royal assent*, is no *Act*, nor hath it any manner of force, as such, without the *Kings will*. *Le Roy le veut* doth *solely*, and necessarily transform a *Bill* into a *Statute*, and is the *essential constituent* part of it. His *Will* doth alone give *life and being* to that which is no more than a *dead insignificant* letter without it. Nay though a *Bill* should pass both *Houses* with the unanimous consent, and approbation of every *individual Member*, yet the King may *refuse* it; and it is indisputably the right of our Kings so to do, if they shall so think fitting; which prove evidently (amongst other things) that the *Sovereign Power* is *solely* in our *Kings*.

Merch. But, Sir, *Plato Red.* insinuates very strongly, p. 123. that *It is a violation of right, and infringement of the*

the Kings Coronation Oath, to frustrate the counsels of a Parliament by his negative voice, and that in his opinion the King is bound confirmare consuetudines, or pass such laws as the people shall choose.

Trav. The *Delphick Oracle* did never impose Laws more peremptorily to the *Greeks*, than *Plato Red.* would arrogantly obtrude his private opinions upon us ; for notwithstanding all the *Laws* are against him, yet he alone would pretend to devest the King of this his undoubted Prerogative.

But, Sir, there is a difference between *new modelling* a Government, and *maintaining* it according to its *ancient institution*: If *Plato* designs the first, he may as well pretend it is inconvenient that the *Imperial Crown of England* should be *Hereditary*, and *Successive*, and endeavour to make it *Elective*; for the right of a *negative voice* in Parliament, is as certainly the Prerogative of the *Kings of England*, as their right of *Inheritance* or *Succession* is.

But

But having no design to dispute so much at this time, what alteration might be convenient for us, as to maintain, what the Kings *Right* is, and ever hath been, according to the *ancient*, as well as *present* Constitution of the Government, I must, and do averr, That the King, enjoying *hereditarily*, and undeniably this *Negative voice* in Parliament, hath himself the *Supreme power* of England. And this, the *English Gentleman* and his *Doctor* seem to acknowledge, p. 105.

Besides, If the Sovereign power of England were not *solely* in the King, then when there is no Parliament there could be no *Sovereign power* in England, which is *ridiculous* and absurd. For there is no *Free and independent Kingdom*, or *Commonwealth* upon earth, in which there is not at *all times*, a *Sovereign power* in *being*. If the *Sovereign power* ceaseth for a moment, the power which remains becomes *dependent*, and at the same instant a *higher power* must appear. But the Imperial Crown of *England* depends upon *none but God*. *Omnis sub Rege, & ipse sub nullo,*

nullo, nisi tantum Deo, says Bracton, an ancient and a Learned Author: and again, *Rex non habet superiorem nisi Deum*, The King has no Superiour but God. Or as it was express'd under H. 4. The Regality of the Crown of England, is immediately subject to God, and to none other.

Mer. But since the King can neither make any Laws, nor levy any Taxes without the consent of both Houses, it shews sure, that at least some of the Sovereign power resides in them.

Trav. I perceive, Cousin, you have forgot your Grotius, for he tells you, that you must distinguish between the Empire, and the manner of holding the Empire, or the *Jus ab usu Juris*. *Aliud enim est Imperium, aliud habendi modus*. So that although the Kings of England do generally promise, or swear not to alter the Government, nor to make Laws, or levy impositions, but according to the ancient Constitutions of the Kingdom; yet nevertheless this takes not from him his Sovereign right of power, for that he hath in him by Birthright and Inheritance, and according

ing to the *Original Institution* of the Kingdom, and which is *antecedent* and *Superiour* also to any *Oaths* or *Obligations*. I'll give you *Grotius* his own words, as you will find them, *l. 1. c. 3. f. 16. Non desinit summum esse Imperium, etiamsi is qui imperaturus est, promittat aliqua subditis, etiam talia, quæ ad imperandi rationem pertineant.* But he confesseth indeed, that such a *Constitution*, is a little *limitation* to the *Supreme power*. *Fatendum tamen arctius quodammodo reddi Imperium.* But it doth not follow from thence, that there is any authority *Superiour* to his own. *Non inde tamen sequitur ita promittenti Superiorem dari aliquem.* And he gives you the example of the *Persian Monarchs*, who though they were as *absolute* as any *Kings* could be, yet when they enter'd upon the *Government*, they *swore* to observe certain *Laws*, which they could not *alter*. *Apud Persas, Rex summo cum Imperio erat, tamen & jurabat, cum regnum adiret, & leges certa quadam forma latas mutare illi nefas erat.* So also that the *Egyptian Kings* were bound to the ob-
servance

servance of several Customs and Constitutions, *Aegyptiorum Reges, quos tamen ut alios Reges Orientis, summo imperio usos non est dubium, ad multarum rerum observationem obligabantur.*

Mer. Very well, Sir, but pray why may not the Sovereign power remain still in the people, especially if all be true, which our Author boldly affirms, p. 119. viz. *That our Prince hath no authority of his own, but what was first entrusted in him by the Government, of which he is head.*

Trav. Here Plato plays the Villain egregiously, is a Traitor *incognito*, and carries Treason in a dark lanthorn, which he thinks to discover or conceal according to the success of Rebellion which he evidently promotes. But we shall unmask this Republican *Faux*. And first our King, whom he calls Prince, (not understanding, it may be, the difference between *Regnum* and *Principatus*) hath no authority, saith he, *but what was first intrusted by the Government.* Here Government is a word of an amphibious nature, and can as well subsist under a Monarchy, as a
Com-

Commonwealth. For if Rebellion doth not prosper, then *Government* in this place signifies the *Law of the Land*; and indeed, the King's authority over us is establish'd by the *Law*, that is to say, the consent and acknowledgment of the People in due form, That the King hath *inherently, antecedently*, and by *Birth-right*, a *Sovereign authority* over all his people, and this is confirm'd to him, both by *Statute, Common Law and Custom*, according to that of 19. H. 6. 62. *The Law is the inheritance of the King and people, by which they are rul'd, King and people.* But if the Commonwealths men gain their point, if the *Association*, and its *brat, bloody murder*, had taken its damnable effect, then *Government* had most plainly signified the *People*, and that is truly our Authors meaning; for the words which immediately follow are these, *Nor is it to be imagin'd, that they would give him more power, than what was necessary to govern them.* What can be the antecedent to *They* and *Them*, but the word *Subjects*, which precedes in the beginning of the Sentence.

tence. *This is the true Presbyterian or Phanatick way of speaking their most mischievous Treasons, which like a Bizzare, with a little turn of the hand, represents ether the Pope or the Devil.*

But since we are so plainly assured of his meaning, I'll take the liberty for once, to put it plainly into words, and I think it will then run thus: That our King, having neither by birthright, nor by a long undoubted Succession of above six hundred years, any Authority of his own, but only that which the people have intrusted in him, (*for they would give him no more, than what was just necessary to govern them, p. 119.*) the people, in whom the Sovereign power resides, may call this their minister, otherwise called King, to an account for the administration of this his trust; and in case he should not acquit himself, according to their expectation, the Sovereign Subject might punish this their Subject King, turn him out of his office, as all Supreme governours may their subordinate officers, nay and set
up

up any other form of Government whatsoever, without doing any manner of injustice to their King.

This is our Authors doctrine, as appears not only by inevitable consequences, drawn from this *mutated* or *side-commissary* power, which he hath placed in the King, but from the whole context, and course of his *Libel*.

Now though Hell it self could not have invented a proposition more *notoriously* false, though the whole *Association* could not have asserted a more *Traiterous* principle, though the Supreme power or Sovereign right of Government, hath been fixed to the imperial Crown of *England*, ever since the beginning of History or Kings amongst us, or the memorial of any time, though more than twenty Parliaments, which are the *wisdom* and *Representatives* of the whole Nation, have by several explanatory *Acts* and *Statutes*, confessed, declared and affirmed, that this Sovereign Authority, or power of *England* is *solely* in the King, and his *lawful Heirs and Successors*,

cessors, in exclusion to all other mortal power whatsoever. *Rex habet potestatem & jurisdictionem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt*; Nay although all the Power, Priviledges, Liberties, and even the Estates of the people proceeded originally from the meer bounty of our Kings; as both ancient and modern Authors, and Histories have evidently made it appear; And after all, notwithstanding our Author hath not produced one single authority, or one little peice of an Act, Statute or Law, to prove that the Sovereign power is in the people, or that the King held his authority only in trust from them, (as he plainly affirms) or when they entrusted him with it, or had it in themselves to grant; yet by an unparalleled piece of impudence and vanity, he dares to bring his own private opinion, in competition with the wisdom, learning, practice, decrees and justice of the whole Nation, condemn our Ancestors, as betrayers of the peoples rights and priviledges, and by a single, *ipse dixit*, prove himself, the only true Physician, learned

Statesman, and (except some who in most Ages have been *Executed* for their most horrid Treasons) the only *worthy Patriot* of his Countrey and *Defender* of its rights.

Now lest some of our ignorant and infatuated multitude, like the Children of *Hamel*, should dance after our Authors *popular* and *Northern Bagpipe*, until he precipitates them all into inevitable ruin and destruction, I am resolved not to insist at present upon his Majesties *Hereditary* and undoubted *Sovereign* right of power, which he now possesses, not only by *prescription* and a *Succession* of more than *eight hundred* years, but by all the *Laws* of the *Land*, as hath been already declared, and the *universal consent* of all his good Subjects, confirmed by their *Oaths* of *Allegiance*, from which none but *Rebels* and *perjured* men can depart : I will not I say at present urge those arguments, which are sufficient to convince *opiniastrete*, and wilful ignorance in self, but will attack him in his strongest *Gothick Torts*, and the *rational*
part,

part, upon which he seems most to value himself.

And first for these *Goths*, I cannot find in any History, when it was they came over into *England*, nay I am confident that all Learned men will agree, that there is no probable conjecture from any Author, that they ever have been here, or crost our Seas, or came nearer us than *Normandy*; one argument (amongst others) is the flourishing condition of our *Island* above *France* (where the *Goths* and *Vandalls* had made some ravage) in point of Learning and Sciences, in-
somuch that *Alcuinus* an *Englishman*, and Scholar to the Venerable *Bede*, was sent unto *Charles* the Great, to whom he became Doctor or Professor in *Divinity*, *Astronomy* and *Philosophy*, and by his direction erected the University of *Paris*. But to return to our *Goths*, it is certain, that at first they travelled *South-East*, which is very different from *South-West*, such as is our situation from theirs. And yet our *politiak Author* tells us positively, according to his usual method, that

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they

they establish'd their government in these parts after their conquest, p. 93. And endeavouring to prove in p. 46. and 97. that according to their institution, the people had an influence upon the Government, he tells us that the Governments of France, Spain and England by name, and other countries, where these people settled, were fram'd accordingly.

Here we see our Country conquer'd, and an excellent form of Government establish'd by the *Goths*, so good, and admirably just, that we in this age must quit our happy Monarchy, which hath subsisted most gloriously many Hundreds of years, only to run a wool-gathering after these precarious Gothic Princes, and yet no man could ever tell us *when* this conquest happen'd, nor *by whom*, nor *what* became of them, nor indeed any thing more, than what the extravagant fancy of our Author hath imagin'd.

As for the *Romans* who conquer'd us, sure they were neither *Goths*, nor *Northern* people, and so nothing can be pretended from that Conquest, nor are the *Saxons*, who next invaded us,

to be called *Northern* people, by us at least, who lye so much *North* to them our selves.

But forgiving *Plato* all his *absurdities* and *incongruities*, the rather that we may find out the Truth, and confound him with it, we will suppose, that by his *Goths* and *Northern* people, he means the *Saxons*, for the *Danes* were but a very little while, *I think not thirty years*, masters of *England*, and so, what may be gather'd in favour of his popular Government from them, if any thing could, would not be much material.

We will imagine then that our *Saxons* were of the race of the *Goths*, and that (retaining their customs) They introduc'd many of them amongst us, such as might be the division of the lands, into several *Fends*, which they called *Thane* lands, (and were like our *Mannors* or *Lordships*) under certain *Tenures* or *Services*. Many also they might have found amongst the *Britains*, and retain'd them under their own Government : for it is certain the *Britains* held lands by several *Tenures*,

but whether they were originally of their own Institution, or the remains of the *Roman Clientela's*, and *Præda militaria*, I will not determine.

I have already told you, that the *Goths* upon their first Transplantation, and after they were settled in their new possessions, were govern'd by Kings, whose power encreas'd *despotically*, according as the people grew secure and civiliz'd, and so they continued above a thousand years; nor do I find that the people in all this time pretended to any other share in the government, than to meet in *General Councils*, when the affairs of the Kingdom oblig'd their King to assemble them. And truly I ever thought such *National Assemblies*, when well regulated, very conducive to the security, and happy subsistence of all Governments, and such our antient Monarchs have thought fit to make use of, and have transmitted the custom of convoking such Councils, which we now call *Parliaments*, even to our days. But that these Counsellors should have any right of command, is so contrary

to the design of their Institution, that as this must needs be dangerous to the Government it self, so they make their good Institution useless, by rendering themselves suspected to the King, who alone hath the right to assemble them. For what wise Magistrate, would by his own authority raise a power, which he apprehends might *shock* his own.

The *sad* effects of this, we have seen of late days among our selves, when our Commoners in Parliament, who were meer Counsellors, and no more, or *Representatives* with a power to *consent*, have arrogated to themselves a Sovereign authority, and under that pretence, have forceably and violently subverted our antient Government, and destroyed our *Lawful and Natural Governour himself*, and have besides, of late, spent so much time in unnecessary new disputes concerning their own rights and prerogatives, which really do not much concern us, that they have totally neglected those main ends of their meeting, which are the *Security* of our Government, under our *Lawful Sovereign*, and the peace and

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happineſſ of his people, and which are the only blessings and benefits, which we deſire of them.

Nay, they have been ſo far from procuring thoſe advantages for us, to which purpoſes they have been ſolely entrusted by us, that their diſputes concerning the Succeſſion to the Crown of *England*, which is *indisputable*; The *Right* which the King hath to borrow money upon good Security, which was never taken from the pooreſt of his Subjects; ſhewing mercy upon unfortunate offenders, which is his *Nature*, as well as undoubted Prerogative, and ſeveral ſuch other irregular Heats and Animofities, are the moſt apparent cauſes of our preſent horrid *Conſpiracies*, troubles and diſtractions.

But to return to our *Goths*, I have told you, that after their diviſion, thoſe that ſpread toward the Weſt and Southern parts of *Europe*, were in a continual ſtate of war, and ſo their King was but their General, whom ſometimes they did depoſe or continue, according as they found him capable of that great employment, upon whoſe
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conduct, in their dangerous circumstances, their Lives and Fortunes did chiefly depend, and such in some respects was the case of our Saxons under their Heptarchy here in *England*. All the world knows that they invaded us without any pretence of title, being only call'd in as *friends* by *Vortigern*, the British King, to assist him against the *Scots*, and by degrees encroaching upon the *Britains*, they erected several Kingdoms, until at length the Native Inhabitants were totally over-power'd.

But this made very little alteration in their affairs; for wanting a common enemy, they were always quarrelling amongst themselves, usurping upon one another, untill their several little Governments were united under one Sovereign Monarch, who was *Egbert* as some write, or *Alfred* the eighteenth King of the *West-Saxons*.

'Tis true, that during their Heptarchy, they chose one amongst themselves, who was the Supreme head of the rest, and was call'd King of Engle-lond. And it is recorded

Vide Chron.
Sir R. Baker.

corded that eight of the *Mercian* Kings
 in a continued succession, kept the Im-
 perial Crown of the Heptarchy. But
 it was rather a titular honour, than a
 Sovereign right of Government; and
 I do not find, but that every particular
 King in his own Province, did gene-
 rally exercise those two great *Regal-
 ties*, of making *Laws*, and levying *Taxes*,
 by vertue of his own authority. But
 whether they did or not, it is little to
 our purpose, since we have no reason
 to follow the examples of those petty
 Kings and *Usurpers*, especially when
 we consider their circumstances. But
 if we must lay aside the form of Go-
 vernment since the *Norman* conquest,
 from whence our *Æra* begins, and
 concerning which our Histories are
 more certain and Authentick, let us
 then rather consult the Administration
 of those *West-Saxons*, who solely and
 Sovereignly enjoy'd the Crown of
England. And not to be too tedious,
 we will fix upon King *Edward* the Con-
 fessor, the last (except *Harold*) of our
English Saxon Kings. I shall not trouble
 you with much neither concerning
 him,

him, because you may find at large whatever can be said of him, in our own *Englisk* Histories. I shall only therefore make this remark, that we have had no Kings since *William* the Conqueror, nor was he himself, more *absolute*, than King *Edward* the Confessor was.

I remember nothing of his impositions, but rather believe there might have been none during his reign, because I find that he remitted to his people the yearly Tribute of 40000 *l*. that had been gathered by the name of *Danegelt*. But for Laws which now are made by Act of Parliament, I observe no such Parliamentary way of proceedings in his days. It is true, that he called a Council, or *Wittena Gemote* (which some call very improperly a Parliament, especially as it is now understood) in the second year of his Reign, but the Commoners were so far from having any right of power, that their presence was not really necessary. *Minores laici non summoneri debent, sed si eorum presentia necessaria fuerit, &c.* Which shews plainly, that they

they might be omitted. Nay although they were summoned and did not appear, nevertheless the Parliament was taken to be full without them. Which is a sufficient proof, that the Commons, were not so much as an essential part of the Parliament; and it is certain that *Edward* the Confessor took the same course about his Laws, as the *Greeks* and *Romans* formerly had done, the first fetching their institutions from the *Egyptians*, and the latter from the *Greeks*. So King *Edward* having gathered together the Laws of the *Mercians*, *West Saxons*, *Danes*, and *Northumbrians*, he selected the best, and compiled them into one body, which (being approved in Council) by his own authority, he commanded they should be observed, and they were the fountain of those which we call at this day the *Common Law*.

Canutus the *Danish Usurper*, called also a Council or Parliament at *Oxford*, in which he made several good Laws, but I do not find that the Commons pretended any right, in the
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Supreme authority, at that time, any more than afterwards.

But however I cannot believe, that their example is any argument for us, to forsake the present constitution of our *English* Monarchy, to hunt after the *polity* of an *Invader*, who with his Successors enjoyed not the Crown of *England*, the *fiftieth* part so long, as the *Norman* Line hath done.

Now, Cousin, you see what is become of those great expectations which we might have had, from the noise and bustle, which our Author makes of the *Northern* *polities*, and their *exact* rules of Government, but so it falls out, that in our days, *mountains* are no less apt to bring forth *mice*, than formerly. And that when there is a great *cry*, there is not always the more *wooll*. For in this case, contrary to his undeniable Aphorism, though it may *possibly* be true, that the *Saxons* made some division of the Lands amongst the people (for our present division of Lands and Tenures also, were generally made and instituted by the *Normans*) yet they re-
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tained the Sovereign authority themselves.

Merch. Sir, I am obliged to you for remembering me, of what I had read before, but could not apply it so well to our present purpose, as you have done. But believing that you are clearly in the right, I shall not trouble you any farther concerning those *Northern polities*, but desire that you would proceed, and let me know what you mean by the *rational part*.

Trav. By the *rational part*, I mean this, that granting all to be true, which our Author hath affirmed, concerning those *Goths* and *Northern* people, and that in the *original* constitution of our Government, the people had a *share* in the Supreme Authority, and that the prerogative, which our King at present lawfully possesses, hath been by degrees *gained* from the people. (All which is so notoriously false, that on the contrary, the people have *lately encroached* upon the prerogative), yet I say at *this* time, and as our *present* circumstances stand, it is more *rational*, that all *honest* and
sober

sober men, who laying aside *ambition* and *malice*, consider impartially the *just rights* and *liberties* of the people, together with the *preservation* of our Government, and the general happiness of the *Nation*, should rather endeavour by all lawful means, to *increase* the power of his present Majesty, than *diminish* it. And supposing we were at liberty, to *choose* what form of Government we pleased, rather continue it a *Monarchy* as it is, than set up such a *Democratical* form, or *phantastical* model, as our Author, (having stolt in a great measure, from the propositions of the Rebels sent to the late King in the *Isle of Wight*, and the transactions of Forty Eight) hath proposed to us.

Merch. The performance of this, Sir, will be such a full satisfaction to us all, that nothing will remain farther for our consideration, but to contrive a means, how we may better secure our present Government, and by enacting *farther good Laws*, if necessary, with a *strict execution* of them, reduce our *pestilent Republican disturbers*

bers of our peace, unto a due obedience to their Natural and Lawful Prince.

One thing more I must beg of you by the way, which is, to let me know, why you suppose all along, that our Author would set up a Commonwealth, since he tells us plainly, p. 209. *That he abhors the thoughts of wishing a Democracy, much less endeavouring any such thing, during these circumstances we are now in, that is, under Oaths of obedience to a Lawful King.*

Trav. I thank you, Sir, for putting me in mind of it, but indeed I thought, you had by this time sufficiently understood, how to distinguish a Presbyterian, or otherwise Phanatical Commonwealth man's publick declaration, from his more private meaning. I must therefore mind you of this observation by the way, that I never yet met with any of those Authors who was not demonstrably a wilful, malicious Knave in his writings. But truly in this case, I think, our Author is frank and plain enough. I shall therefore mind you of some passages, which I shall leave to your own Interpretation.

tion." He tells us, p. 182. That *our present estate inclines to popularity*, and *do not find*, but that he inclines as much to comply with our estate as they could wish, but let us come to his declaration against it, where he protests that he *hates the thoughts of wishing a Commonwealth*, but yet insinuates, from the story of Themistocles his firing the Grecian ships; That *nothing could be more advantageous and profitable for us*, which surely shews his good inclinations plain enough. But I am fully perswaded that our Governours have taken no less care to secure us against the *literal*, than the *metaphorical* sense of his *fine tale*, and will as well preserve our Navy, as our Government from his Diabolical designs.

But now, he gives us the reason, why he cannot think of a Commonwealth, because (conscientious good man) he is loth to break his *oath of obedience to a Lawful King*.

But for this *Lawful King himself*, it is no matter if he be *perjur'd* to the very bottom of destruction, who having *no less sworn*, and that solemnly too,

to maintain the antient Monarchical Government, as at present by Law confirmed and establish'd, with all the rights and prerogatives belonging to the Imperial Crown of England, may break all, betray his poor Subjects, their rights and liberties, abandon them to the mercy of unmerciful Tyrants, and be damn'd if he pleases. Nay our Author kindly advises him to it, and rather than his cursed project should fail, he perswades him, it is the best thing he can do. Whereas it is plain, That the power of the Kings of England is restrained or limited (as we may say) in nothing more considerable, than this, viz. *That they cannot by their own Grant sever their Prerogatives from the Crown, nor communicate any part thereof to any one, no not to the Princes their eldest Sons, as may be seen more at large in Sir J. Davies, upon Impositions, cap. 29. besides many other good Authors. Nay more, he tells us there, That neither the Kings Acts, nor any Act of Parliament, can give away his Prerogative; and farther, that no Act of Parliament in the Negative,*

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can take away the *Kings Prerogative in the Affirmative*. Yet notwithstanding this, (and ten times more that may be said to this purpose,) our King is *advised and perswaded*, nay, almost *necessitated* (as our Author would have it) not only to quit some One of his Prerogatives, but (to make short work) to release, and give them up all at once.

In the next place, let us consider *Plato's* excellent new model it self, and here (like a wise Politician) he hath made Three co-ordinate powers in *being* at the same time, that is to say, King, Lords, and Commons.

I confess, for the King, he says little of him, and with great reason, for indeed he signifies nothing more than a Cypher, which, as in Arithmetick, is only to make the Commons more valuable.

But to do our Author right, he hath yet a farther use to make, of this his otherwise useless Prince ; that is to say, whilst neither *his own Right*, nor *his Power*, nor *our Laws* can secure himself ; his Name nevertheless is to pre-

serve these *his Masters*. With *that* they hope to prevent all *opposition*, and *civil wars* at home. For should they forceably depose *him*, they justly apprehend, that his *Loyal Subjects* in *England*, would endeavour to *revenge* such an *insupportable wrong*. Nor can they believe that the Kingdoms of *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, would again tamely submit their 'Necks to the servile yoke of a few ambitious, *English* Commons; or that foreign Princes themselves, would even for their own securities sake, *quietly*, and *unconcern'd*, countenance this horrid *injustice*, and *outrage* done to the *sacred dignity* of Kings. But if they can persuade his Majesty *willingly* to *depose* himself, and at the same time *disinherit* his Heirs and Successors, they imagine that none can pretend to *disapprove*, much less blame, or impute to them, the *voluntary* act of a King. For as, *Volenti non fit injuria*, and by consequence no offence in them; so they will certainly reserve to themselves the honour of *punishing* in the King, as their *master-piece*, and last *act of justice*, the *Treason* which

which he shall have committed against himself. To facilitate all this, our Author hath taken from his Majesty, his *Militia*, and his *Revenue*, that is, *men* and *money*, which are the *strength* and *sinews* of Power, and in the *Commoners* he hath plac'd the *Royal authority*, of *Calling*, *Proroguing* and *Dissolving themselves*. And lest the King, in this miserable condition, should have yet *any hopes* left, even of securing his *own Person*, he hath taken from him the power of *making his own Officers*, and bestowing those employments, which have always depended upon the *Regal authority*. Nay, the *Lords themselves* are no more to receive their *Honours* from the Fountain of all *Honour*, but must lick the dust from the shoes, of their once *obsequious vassals*.

So our *poor Master*, having nothing now to give, must lose the hopes, even of a *grateful friend*, who in his extremity, might at least *wish him well*, and speak a *good word* for him to his *insolent Governours*.

Mer. But, Sir, our Author leaves most of these things in the disposition

of the Parliament, by which he tells us, that he ever understood, *the King, Lords and Commons*, so that neither his *Militia* nor *Revenue*, can be said to be so absolutely taken *from himself*, as granted to *the Parliament* in general, of which he is still to be *the head*.

Trav. Ah, Cousin, there is deadly poison in this his varnished treacherous Cup, and you will easily perceive it, when you consider, *Plato* cares not so much, that the *Militia* should be in the *power* of the Commons, as *out* of the King. For whilest the King cannot dispose of it, without the *consent* of his *Lower House*, judge you, whether they will ever agree to the raising any *force*, which they shall not themselves command.

If then any difference arise, upon that, or any other point, (which unavoidably, and designedly will happen) then are the Commoners become immediately *masters* of all. For what can the King do, though joyn'd with the House of Lords, without a *right of command* or *force*, against a *multitude*, and that so unequal too, that (if
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the House of Commons in Parliament, represent the whole Nation, as they pretend they do) then are they at least *ten thousand men* against *one*, though all the *Nobility* be included with the King. The necessary consequence of all this must be, that if on the one hand, the King and Lords, agree with the Commons in *all things*, then the Commons govern more absolutely, than if there were neither the *one* nor the *other*, because there is no *pretence* against them.

On the other hand, if they in any thing *differ* from the Commons, then undoubtedly the disagreeing Lords, as *formerly*, shall be turned out of doors, the King set aside, and the *Votes* made by the House of Commons, *Jan. 4. 1648*, revived and confirmed, which being very short, but plain, I shall here repeat. First, *That the people, under God, are the original of all just power*; Secondly, *That the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by, and representing the people, have the Supreme Authority of this Nation*; Thirdly,

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That

That whatever is enacted, and declared for Law by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, hath the force of a Law; Fourthly, That all the people of this Nation are included thereby, although the consent and concurrence of the King and House of Peers, be not had thereunto.

What think you now, Cousin, of these *four Votes*, even whilst the King and Lords were yet in *being*. Do they not look, as if they designed a Commonwealth, or rather to establish an *arbitrary* Tyrannical power, in the House of Commons, and yet their propositions all along to the King, were the same, which *Plato* hath again offered us, that is, *leaving the Militia, the publick revenue, nomination of officers*, and such like to the Parliament, by which was always meant, *King, Lords and Commons*. This is the politick web, which our Author pretends to have spun out of his own shallow brains, and indeed it is so very wondrous *thin*, that if our present Statesmen could not with half an eye, see through it, I should
be

be apt to agree, with our Author, p. 22. that *they ought in conscience to excuse themselves, from that sublime imployment, and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities, as Shoemakers, Tailors, and such other mechanick professions.*

Merch. Sir, the Sun at noon day is never more clear, than that he designs, at best, a Commonwealth. And indeed where three co-ordinate powers are in being at the same time, it is impossible they should continue long in that state, but some one or two must certainly in time over balance, and get the advantage of the other. I think *Lucan* confirmed this long ago, when he said,

*Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas
Impatiens consortis erit.-----*

And the King having neither power, strength, money nor officers, it is ten thousand to one, as you observe, on the Commons side, who are actually possessed of all. Pray therefore proceed, and let us know, why in reason we

we should not comply, with our Authors Popular Government, since he tells us that our *present state inclines to Popularity*.

Trav. Most willingly. But in the first place, in all changes of Government we must consider, what *inconveniences* we find, under the *present* constitution, and what way we propose to our selves, to have them prevented by an alteration, otherwise we shall never be able to assign any reason for a change at any time. I must therefore desire you to tell me frankly, what fault you find, or *grievances*, according to the *cant* of our Dissenters, in our Monarchy as at present Established.

Merch. Truly, Cousin, I have oftentimes thought seriously with my self, what those *grievances* should be. And though I was once carried a little away with the stream, and cried, *Liberty*, and *Property*, and *Grievances* of the Nation, with some others of the wide mouth'd *pack*, yet to deal plainly with you, I could never be satisfied from them, nor from my
own

own observation, what those *grievances* were in *particular*.

Trav. I believe it indeed, but however since our Author, who is a *knowing man*, assures us, that our *disease* is so *desperate*, that we have no *hopes* but in a *desperate* cure. Pray let us both, though no State Physicians, lay our heads together, and think with our selves, what our sickness may be, especially since the *beginning* of every *cure*, proceeds from the true *knowledge* of the *distemper*. For my part, I do assure you, I will assist you what I can, in finding out the *one*, and for the *other*, we will leave it to our *betters*.

First then I should think, that as all diseases shew themselves by some *Symptoms* upon the natural body, so the distempers of the *body politic*, must be also visible, and will discover themselves, either in our *liberties*, *properties*, or our *Religion*. We will begin with our *Liberties*, and pray, Cousin, think with your self, whether you want any such *civil liberty*, as you could wish for, or know to be
given

given under any other Government upon earth.

Mer. Trouble not your self for that, for except I could have somewhat granted *particularly* to my *own* person, I am so far from wishing our Subjects *more liberty* in general, that I really think we have *too much*.

Trav. What mean you by too much?

Mer. I mean, Sir, amongst other things, that men, especially of late, have taken to themselves the liberty of *reflecting upon*, or *calumniating* the Government, and our Governours, as also to *slander* one another, with so much bitterness and cunning, that we are ready to be destroy'd before we know any thing of the matter. And yet they keep so within the *compass* of the Law, that the *Scrutiny* of a *Jury* can never reach them. Nay, I have heard say, that some are so excellent at it, that they will talk you an hour together, within a *hairs breadth* of *Sedition*, and *Treason*, dance upon the *low rope*, with children ty'd to their feet, and naked swords in their hands, and upon the *high rope*, hanging only by their *toes*, or *nape* of the *neck*.

Trav.

Trav. Right, but I have seen some of them hang, with the rope *round about* their necks, and indeed I never wonder'd at it.

Mer. Yes, men who are only *impudent* bold fellows, and have not the skill to *cut a feather*, very often dance themselves into that *noose*. But to be serious, really, Cousin, methinks, that *calumniating* is a most pernicious *liberty*; for in my opinion, men should either *accuse judicially* or not at all.

In the first case, the accused hath, we suppose, a *fair Trial*, at which he may make his defence, and if he prove innocent, will be freed. But in the latter, a man is condemn'd, and executed too, before he hears of his accusation. It is like killing a man with those *invisible subtle poisons*, which work their effect, even whilst you are reading the complementing Letter, which conveys them; your reputation and good name is gone, your acquaintance gaze upon you, with a different air than formerly; you find a coldness in your friends, neglect in your relations, and disrespect

spect from all. And at length the poison, having crept through those with whom you might have occasion to converse, you find your self generally *condemn'd*, before you know of *what*, or by *whom* you were *accused*; and in truth *Brinvillers* were more tolerable in any Government, than these *pestilent Calumniators*.

Trav. Indeed, Cousin, you have spoke a great deal of reason, and I am perswaded, that the immediate cause of our distractions, proceeds from the *malicious Calumnies* of a few *knaves*, who know they *lye* dispers'd amongst a great many *fools*, who think they *speak truth*.

The Publisher of the divine *Machiavels* Prince, is very just in this particular, telling us, that in all good Governments, Calumniators ought to be restrain'd, and punish'd by the strictest severity: *Qui Rempublicam recte instituere velit, ferri nullo modo debent calumnia, sed puniendi sunt calumniatores. Quodsi hisce rebus in Republica non recte prospectum sit, multa mala patrantur, unde seditiones & turba ortum habent.*

And

And concludes with the story of *Furius---Camillus*, who having gain'd a great deal of honour amongst the *Romans*, for the good service which he had done, in freeing them from the imminent danger of the *Gauls*: *Manlius Capitolinus*, envying above all, his great reputation, endeavour'd by all means to lessen his credit. But finding the Senate and Nobility firm in their good opinion concerning *Camillus*, he then apply'd himself to the Commonalty, who being ever the most susceptible of *false* impressions, were continually plied with the false aspersions of the envious *Manlius*, insinuating amongst other things, that the vast sum of money, which was suppos'd to have been paid the *Gauls*, remained yet in a great measure, in the possession of *Camillus*, and the Senators, who appropriating to their use, what was said to have been paid their enemies, instead of Governours and Protectors, became themselves the greatest enemies the people had, by endeavouring to support their own luxury, at the expence of the peoples misery.

misery. Whereas, if that money were again distributed, (as in justice it ought) amongst the poor Citizens, it would make their present condition much more easie, than otherwise it was like to be in a great many years. Interest is the *great wheel*, that moves all the world, either to *good or evil* actions. The Commonalty thus incens'd by *Manlius*, were now work'd up to that point which he desir'd, and ready either for rebellion, or any other insolence, which their *Incendiary* should suggest. In the mean time the Senate, perceiving this growing mischief, to obviate any farther disturbance, they create a Dictator, on purpose to examine into the whole matter, and punish the offender, wherever he should find the offence. He appoints therefore a day to *Manlius*, who attended with vast multitudes of the *credulous Commons*, is ask'd by the Dictator, where or with whom, that *vast sum of money* was lodg'd. But *Manlius*, unprovided to answer a question, which it seems he did not expect, and hesitating much, without giving any

any satisfactory account of what was demanded, he was cast into chains, and punish'd according to the hainousness of the offence.

Mer. And may all the *Manlii* amongst us be alike confounded. Next, Sir, I cannot approve of the *liberty* men take, of publishing their *private sentiments*, which are generally grounded upon nothing but *conjecture*, and *Enthusiastical* follies.

Trav. Certainly, nothing would conduce more to our quiet, than that the *liberty of the press* should be restrain'd. But since it is not our business, to look into those liberties, which we enjoy, so much as into those, which we *want*, let us leave the consideration of these, and many other such things, to our prudent Governours.

I shall only note this one thing by the way, that since the Act of *Habeas Corpus*, I think I may confidently affirm, that even at *this time*, when there is so much danger of a pretended *slavery*, the Subjects of *England* enjoy a *greater liberty*, than was known to any of our Ancestors before us.

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Pray

Pray therefore proceed to the second consideration, which is our *properties*.

Mer. That is wholly unnecessary, for all the world knows, that whatsoever we possess, is so secured by the Laws of the Land, that the King himself doth not pretend in prejudice of those Laws (which indeed are his own Laws) to touch the least Chattel that belongs to us, nor can any Tax be impos'd, but such as shall be granted by Act of Parliament, which is the *very Government*, that our Author so much approves. And in a word, *Plato* himself has clear'd this point, telling us, p. 127 *That the people by the fundamental Laws, that is, by the constitution of the Government of England, have entire freedom, in their lives, properties, and their persons, neither of which, can in the least suffer, but according to the Laws.*

And to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good Laws, which are our *Birtheright*, all Trials must be by twelve men of our equals: and in the next page, lest the King's Sovereign authority, might be urg'd

urg'd as a stop, to the execution of those Laws, he tells us, *That neither the King, nor any by authority from him, hath any the least power or jurisdiction, over any English man, but what the Law gives him.*

And if any person shall be so wicked, as to do any injustice to the life, liberty, or estate, of any Englishman, by any private command of the Prince, the person aggriev'd, or his next of kin, (if he be Assassinated) shall have the same remedy against the offender, as he ought to have had, by the good Laws of the Land, if there had been no such command given.

Now, dear Cousin, in the name of sense and reason, where can be the fault and distemper of our Government, as it relates to the ease and privilege of the Subject, if this be the constitution of it, as at least our Author himself affirms?

Trav. Faith, Sir, I could never find it out, nor any man else, that ever I could meet withal. And what is still stranger, our great Platonick Physician hath not vouchsafed to give us any one particular instance, in what part

our disease lyes, notwithstanding he alarms us with dismal news of being *dead men*, and that without such a strange turn of Government, as his pregnant Noddle hath found out, we are *ruin'd for ever*.

'Tis true, he tells us, that *the property being in the hand of the Commons, the Government must necessarily be there also*, and for which the *Commoners are tugging and contending very justly, and very honourably, which makes every Parliament seem a present state of war*.

Mer. But, Sir, if it be true, that we enjoy *all* those benefits and blessings before mentioned, & that the *Government it self* secures these properties, inviolably to us, (which we know to be most certain, without the testimony of *Plato* or any man else) what then does this *tugging* concern us, or what relation has it to our *happiness*, which is already as *great*, as we can wish it to be? Must the enjoyment of our *properties*, put us into a *state of war*? Must our *health* become our *disease*, and our *fatness* only make us kick against our *masters*? what can this contention
for

for Government signifie more, than *ambition*? and what could their success produce less than *Tyranny*? Should the House of Commons become our *masters*, what could they bestow upon us, more than we already enjoy, except *danger* and *trouble*? And what can our present Government take from us, except the *fears* of those *fatal consequences*, which such a *popular innovation* would induce? Let then the property be where it will, and if we possess it securely, we are the happier for it.

Trav. Your reasons are too plain, and strong to be resisted, I shall quit therefore this point, and inform you, how our Author seems in many places to insinuate, that the want of *frequent and annual Parliaments*, is the cause of our distemper, and that calling a *Parliament every year*, might prove a *pretty cure*, according to a certain Act in the time of *Edward the first*, and that then, instead of *hopping upon one leg*, we might go *limping on upon three*.

Mer. Faith, Cousin, you are now gotten out of my reach, and you must

answer this your self. I can only proceed according to my former rule, which is, that if we be *as happy as we can be*, a Parliament cannot make us more.

Trav. That answer is, I think, sufficient to satisfy any reasonable man. However we will speak somewhat more particularly concerning this matter, as we find it recorded in History.

Our Author informs us in p. 110. *That by our Constitution the Government was undeniably to be divided, between the King and his Subjects.* (which (by the way) is undeniably and notoriously false: for according to our ancient Constitution as well under the Saxon as our Norman Kings, the Government or the right of Power was originally and solely in our Kings) *And that divers of the great men, speaking with that excellent Prince King Edward the first about it, called a Parliament, and consented to a Declaration, of the Kingdoms right in that point. So there passed a Law in that Parliament, that one should be held every year, and*
oftner

oftner if need be. The same he confirms in p. 159. and in other places.

Now, Sir, if after these fine Speeches by those *great men*, (whom undoubtedly our Author could have named) to this excellent Prince, it should happen at last, that there was *no such Act*, during the Reign of *Edward the first*, what would you think of our Author ?

Merch. In troth, Sir, it would not alter my opinion, for I already believe him to be an *impudent, magisterial Impostor*.

Trav. I fear indeed he will prove so, for except he hath found in his politick search, some *loose paper*, that never yet came into our *Statute books*, we must conclude that he is grossly mistaken. For the *first Act* that is extant of that *kind*, was in the *Fourth of Edward the Third*, and the words of it are these : *It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every year once, and more often if need be.*

Now, Sir, you must observe, that this *Act* was made, whilst the King was but *Nineteen years of age*, and

both himself and Kingdom under the care of *Twelve Governours*. His Mother, *Queen Isabel*, and *Roger Mortimer*, very powerful, the Governours of the Pupil King divided amongst themselves, and many other pressing affairs of the Nation, oblig'd most people to propose that expedient of *frequent Parliaments*, as the most probable means to secure the peace, and prosperity of the Kingdom, at least until the King should come of *riper years*, and thereby many differences be reconciled.

After this, in the *Thirty sixth year* of his Reign, he called a Parliament, and wanting money, (as generally he did,) the Parliament would grant nothing, until an Act passed for maintenance of former Articles and Statutes there expressed, *And that for redress of divers mischiefs and grievances, which daily happen, a Parliament shall be holden every year, as another time was ordained by Statute.*

These are the *two Statutes* intended by our Author, when he tells us that the Statute of *Edward the first*, was
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confirmed by that glorious Prince Edward the third. Whereas in truth they were both made by the same King, and both in a great measure, *revoked* in his own time. Having declared after the making this last Act, *that he yielded to it, only to serve his own turn.*

This Sir, is the *matter of Fact*, upon which our Author builds his great pretensions to the old constitutions of Annual Parliaments. The first Act was made whilst the King was *very young*, the second, when he *wanted money*, and had *Twenty six shillings and eight pence* granted him upon every sack of wool transported for three years. And both first, and second Acts were broken by several intermissions before he died.

Besides, we must make this remark, that a Parliament seldom met, without giving the King some *money*, which might encourage those Kings to assemble them oftner, than lately they have done. But the truth is, *Annual Parliaments* were lookt upon as so great a grievance to the Nation, that

that we find, that about the Tenth year of *Richard* the Second his Successor, it was thought a great Privilege in the King, *that he might call a Parliament once a year.* And both Houses appointed the *Duke of Glocester*, and *Thomas Arundell* Bishop of *Ely*, to acquaint the King, that by an old Statute, *the King once a year might lawfully summon his Court of Parliament, for reformation of corruptions and enormities within the Realm.*

And if we consider with our selves, we shall find, that if yearly Parliaments were imposed upon us, they would become grievances, equally insupportable, as to have *no* Parliaments at all.

For if the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeses be chosen out of the Countrey Gentlemen and Merchants, inhabiting those Countries, where they are elected, (as sure they ought to be) what inconvenience, if not ruin, must it bring upon their affairs, when they shall be forced to run every year, a hundred or two hundred Miles from their particular domestick affairs, to
serve

serve in a *formal* Parliament, in which it may be, the greatest business will be, to make *business* for the next.

Indeed, for *idle persons*, who live about Town, and have nothing to do, but to scribe *knavisb politicks*, to the disturbance of *honest men*, such a constitution might do well enough, if they could get to be chosen members. But we find from experience and History, that in those days, when *Ambition* and *Faction*, were not so much in *vogue* as at present, men were so far from making parties, to get *into* the Parliament, that many *Commoners*, and *Lords* too, have petitioned and been excused their attendance, The King's, Queen's, and Prince's Servants, have stood upon their privilege of *exemption*. So *James Barner* was discharged by the King's command, *Quia erat de retinentia Regis*, 7. R. 2. and the *Lord de Vessy*, in *Edward the Fourth's* time, obtained Licence not to serve in Parliament during his life.. *Rex concessit Henrico Bromslet, Dom. de Vessy, quod ipse, durante vita, sit exoneratus de veniendo*

ad Parl. Besides, the very Writ of Summons shews, that in the *original institution and design* of Parliaments, a frequent meeting could not be *necessary*. For they were only to treat, & *concilium impendere de magnis & arduis negotiis*. Now God help us, if every year should produce, such *magna & ardua negotia*, such *difficult and weighty affairs*, that the King, with his *Judges and Privy Council*, could not determine them, without assembling his *great Council* the Parliament. I confess, in our Authors Chimerical model, I am perswaded our circumstances would be bad enough ; but I thank God, we are not gotten there yet. Thus you see, Sir, that this *grievance*, in not having *annual Parliaments*, is become no *grievance* at all.

Mer. I begin, Cousin, to lose all manner of respect, for this mistaken Mountebank. For I perceive, notwithstanding his great words and pretences, all is but *wind, emptiness and cheat*. Having therefore fully satisfied me, concerning our *liberties, properties, and Parliaments*, pray forget not to say somewhat of our *Religion*. *Trav,*

Trav. Sir, I shall not presume to meddle with the *Doctrinal* part of any Religion, that being none of my *Province*. Nor shall I say much concerning the *Ceremonial* part or discipline of our own, that is to say, the *Church of England*. It is sufficient to mind you, that both the *Doctrine* and *Discipline* in Church Government, have been established and confirm'd by several *Acts* of Parliament, and *Statutes*: Which Parliaments, being the *most* Sovereign power, that our Author himself pretends to, set up amongst us, we ought all to acquiesce in, and be concluded by what they have done, until an *equal* authority shall repeal those *Acts*, or otherwise determine concerning us.

Mer. There is no objection can be made against this answer. But, Sir, since the difference in our *Religion*, seems manifestly to occasion most of our troubles, why may not the King, by his *own* authority, dispence with the *penal* part of these Laws, or grant a *toleration*, especially to *Protestant Dissenters*, or encourage an *Act* of Parliament

liament for *uniting* them into the *Church of England*, or else why might not the same Church release some part of the rigour of the *Discipline* and *Ceremony*, since 'tis agreed on all hands, that the observance or non-observance of them, are not points *necessary*, or absolutely conducing to Salvation.

Trav. Cousin, I shall answer you all these questions as plain as I can. And first, I shall never believe, that *true* and *unfeigned* Religion, especially amongst men, where the *Doctrine* agrees, is ever the real cause of any troubles, disturbance or disobedience to *lawful* authority, such as is *that*, which produces an Act of Parliament, (even in our Authors sence) being so contrary to the Doctrine and Principles of Christian Religion, that I may confidently affirm, where one is, the other cannot be.

Such men therefore, who make use of that *Sacred* name, to countenance any disquiet in the Government, ought, according to the most impartial judgment which we can make of mens opinions by their actions, to be esteemed

as men having *no Religion*, rather than as *true Professors* of the Christian Faith, and that they put the highest *abuse*, and *indignity*, upon Christ and his Apostles, when they make the profession of *their* most *peaceable* doctrine, a pretence, mask or cloak to cover their *Secular interest* or *ambition*.

Mer. But, dear Cousin, we must judge charitably, and not conclude *all* Dissenters such *knaves* and *villains*, as either to have *no Religion*, or to make that which they have, a *blind* to some other worldly design.

Trav. Truly, Sir, for the commoner sort of people, I am inclin'd enough to think (it may be) better of them, than they deserve, knowing well how apt they are to be carried away *with every wind of doctrine*. But those who are their *Ringleaders*, are by so much the more inexcusable, by how much they take advantage of the peoples weakness. Yet this would be only *pernicious* to themselves, and *punishable* in the *world to come*. But their *ungodly* and *malicious Preachers*, and *factions heads*, mingling dexterously *worldly poison*,

poison, with their spiritual food, at length their whole bodies, and mass of blood becomes corrupted, when grown rank, and swell'd (like the heathen Prophetesses,) with the deadly poison, and power of the Devil, they ravingly dispense their Enthusiastical dreams and visions, no less injurious to the Providence of God, than to the government of man. Since then, I say, these their wicked Counsellors do certainly produce these effects, it is equally charitable to think, that they have no Religion, as to say, that they abuse that which they profess, to such damnable ends.

Mer. But they tell you no such thing. On the contrary, no men talk more of God, none inveigh more bitterly against the debaucheries of the age we live in, none pretend greater humility, and in a word (to outward appearance at least) none seem to practise more sincerely the doctrine which they preach.

Trat. *Quid opus est verbis, cum facta videam?* What Poisoner, do you think, would not tell you, that the Ratsbane which

which he offers you is the *purest sugar*? You and I, Cousin, cannot forget, how these very men, (some of which are living at this day) and their disciples, behaved themselves, when in the rebellious sanctified times, they usurp'd the whole power of the land.

Can you forget how they persecuted the Church of *England*? how they *Sequester'd* our Estates? *Imprison'd*, *Proscrib'd* and *murder'd* our Persons? forc'd many to seek out Dens and Caves in Woods and Rocks, to secure their lives, from the insolence and fury of these *humble-minded*, *gospel-preaching*, *holy Wolves*? Are they yet chang'd? are they not pursuing still the same point? Are their *Associations* and *Conspiracies* against the foundation of our *ancient rights*, *priviledges*, *government*, and *life* it self of His present *Sacred Majesty*, evidences of their repentance for the murder of the *late Blessed Martyr*, for those *flouds* of innocent blood, which have corrupted our land ever since, and those violent *extortions* and *impositions* executed upon the Estates of their fellow Subjects, and fellow-labourers

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bourers too, in that Vineyard, which both pretend to cultivate, and with whom they profess to agree in the *Substantial* and *Doctrinal* part of Religion? Are these arguments to convince us of their *sincere* intentions towards us?

Mer. This is indeed notorious matter of fact, and undeniable; but however, they now express a willingness to comply with us, and to be *comprehended*, all under one Church, and Church government. Only they desire that our *Ceremonies* might be *abolish'd*, which being *circumstantial* only, and not absolutely necessary to Salvation, (which is the great end of Religion,) they pray that our Governours in consideration of their *weakness*, would not tye them to *harder meat* than they can digest; but (being *babes*, and to be fed with *milk*,) would have us condescend to their *infirmities*, and not to boast too much of our own strength, for *those who are strong ought to take heed lest they fall*.

Trav. I perceive, Sir, you have been more conversant with this sort of people,

people, than I thought you had, for I find that you have gotten their very *Care*; but you shall have, I hope, a very satisfactory answer. And first for our strength, I confess it behoves us all to *take heed lest we fall*: but if that great care be an argument against us, it is no less against themselves. For if it be so difficult for the *strong* to pass through this *narrow way*, and over these dangerous *precipices*; what circumspection then ought the weak Travellers to use in this their Pilgrimage? Ought they not rather to seek to us for some support, than trust to their own *imbecillity*? And you cannot deny, but that they do truly acknowledge themselves to be *weak*, or that they *abuse* us, when they desire we should condescend to them, both which will equally reflect upon them. And next, Sir, for our *compliance* with them, rather than their *conformity* with us, I think it the most unreasonable request that ever men made. Will a *wise Father* comply with a *froward Son*, or a *Master* with his obstinate *Servant*, or a *Physician* with the de-

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prayed and false appetite of his *Self* pa-
 tient. Sure it would be nothing less,
 than inverting the whole course and
 order of nature.

Now, Sir, I am convinc'd that they
 may and ought to comply with our
 Government, but since your hand is
 in, pray let me have your opinion
 concerning the *Papists Recusants*, and
 whether you do not think that they are
 more to be apprehended in our Go-
 vernment, than the *Dissenters* are, and
 by consequence, that a Parliamentary
 or Parliamentary way of Government
 might not be very conducive to our
 security against them, especially as
 our circumstances stand, and may pro-
 bably continue.

True, I understand you, Sir, and
 shall give you my sense of the thing
 freely as hitherto I have done. And in
 the first place, I answer plainly, that
 I do not think the *Papists* (I mean now
 and always the Secular or Temporal
Papists, or *Laity*) so dangerous to our
 Government, as the *Dissenters* are, but that
 according to the rule of true Policy, the
former are more tolerable than the
 latter.

Mer.

Mr. Have a care, Cousin, that you do not contradict the good account which you gave of your own Religion yesterday. For whosoever stands up for a *Papists toleration* at this time, will be shrewdly suspected to be at least *Papistly inclin'd*, if not a *Papist*.

Now Sir, I again confirm what I said yesterday, nor do I tell you now, that I would have the *Papists tolerated*, it belongs to the Government to look after these matters, but I must affirm, according to my judgment, that if the question be put, which may be the most *safely* tolerated, the *Papists*; or *Dissenters*, I must give it for the *Papists*; and I think I shall produce good reason, and authority for this my opinion.

Mr. Pray, Cousin, use all manner of liberty in your discourse, for I only minded you of your Profession yesterday, not that I question your sincerity, but as being an impartial Judge, neither a *Papist* nor a *Dissenter*, I might oblige you to settle this point equally between them.

Now I do not pretend to be a Judge, but shall endeavour to open the case

faithfully, and leave the rest to your more prudent determination.

First then, we must state the difference between these two parties, as they relate to us — and not to defend to particular points; I shall only say, that the Papists differ from us in the *doctrinal* part of Religion, that is to say, in points which they believe *absolutely necessary* to Salvation. The Dissenters in the *Discipline* only, viz. *Ceremonies* and *Church Government*, which they declare may be — either *used* or *neglected*, without the *necessary* consequence of damnation.

Mer. Right, Sir, and from hence I should conclude, that the Dissenters agreeing more nearly with us than the Papists, ought rather to be tolerated than they, who differ so much, and so materially from us.

Trav. And I for that very reason hold the contrary.

Mer. Pray, Sir, proceed, and unravel this Paradox.

Trav. Next then, we must agree, that the doctrinal parts of the Popish Religion in which they differ from us

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(as *Transubstantiation*, and some others, supposing them right and necessary as they believe they are) consist of such high *speculative* points, as cannot possibly be made demonstrable by humane reason, nor otherwise be seen than by the eyes of faith, but require a *supernatural revelation*, or the special Grace of an invisible omnipotent power, working in our hearts. Hence *Grotius* tells us, that *Doctrina hinc penitus in animum admitti nequeat, nisi sanctis Dei auxiliis accedentibus.* lib. 2. c. 4. no.

This then supposed, I must affirm, that outward force is not a proper means to convince a man's reason of *speculative truths*. For a man cannot always believe just when he says he will, but rather oftentimes, when he pretends he will not, he is then forced to believe, (if proportionate arguments be used) even whether he will or no, and these proportionate arguments are such as force the reason only, and whilst they perstringe the mind do not constrain the body, such as oblige by way of *ratiocination* to consent to

certain propositions, and necessary consequences, which they cannot avoid, arguments which reach the inward man, but leave the outward man untouched. Now how improper means corporal violence is, to obtain such a spiritual end, I leave to your judgment.

If it be then necessary that a mans reason should be convinced of a speculative truth, before he can believe it, it will follow, that those who use violence and force, to oblige a people to embrace an opinion, which they do not, or can not understand, commit either the greatest injustice towards man, or the greatest impiety toward God.

The injustice towards man lies in this, that they either force them to profess, what they do not believe, which is hypocrisie and a lie; or they punish them for not doing that, which is not in their power to do, which is the height of Tyranny. And Gubius tells us, in his *Copie de punis*, that it was provided in the Council of Toledo, That hereafter no man should be forced to believe, for God will have many,

on whom he will have mercy; and whom
 he pleaseth to burden, he burdeneth.
*Præcipit sancta Synodus nemini deinceps
 vim inferri, cui enim vult Deus
 miseretur, et quem vult, indurat.* And
 he addeth, *quod operiniqua faciant*, that
 they do most wickedly, who punish men
 amongst Christians, for not believing or
 entering in some speculative points, which
 they do most unjustly and. St. Augustine
 also, *et Ithacius, Hilarius, and Salvianus*
 are all of the same opinion, as
 may be seen here more at large in the
 same *Cyprianus*, where *Gregorius* for-
 ebbis informs us, that the French
 Bishops were condemned by the Church
 for using violence against the *Protestants*
 in the next place, If it be not in-
 justice towards man, it is impiety to-
 wards God, and must suppose that
 the gift of a holy Spirit is in the
 imitation, which is necessary for the
 understanding these Divine mysteries
 is in the power of mortal man, which
 was the lion of Simon Magus, for to
 show the holy Ghost for women, or to ob-
 tain it by force, is equally injurious;
 and

and dishonourable to a Deity. And
 we find, that although the Sadducees
 differed from the rest of the Jews,
 in so material a point, as that of the
Resurrection, which they totally denied,
 yet they received no manner of punish-
 ment upon that account, nor was
 there any force used to persuade them
 to embrace and believe so necessary
 doctrine, when yet, at the same time,
Sabbath-breakers, because, in relation
 to the discipline and Government of
 the Church, they were punished with
 Death. *Merch.* I thank you, Sir, and do
 assure you, that I was over of this
 opinion. But I do not yet understand
 why you do not apply the same
 reasons for Dissenters and other people,
 as well as the Papists. *Trav.* I thought, Sir, the last in-
 stance would have answered this
 question, which is, that the Dissen-
 ters differ only in point of discipline
 and Government, which according to
 our constitution they agree to com-
 mand nothing damnable, or impossible to
 be understood, or contrary to the
 hopes

hopes of Salvation. And in such cases, outward force is the proper means to reduce obstinate men to their duty, and a compliance with that Government which they ought, and which they confess they may obey. So in some Roman Catholick Countries the Protestant Religion is tolerated, and its professors secured by many Grants and Priviledges, because their difference consists in *speculative points*, whereas those Roman Catholicks themselves who (agreeing in the *Doctrinal* part) shall differ in the *Discipline* or *Church Government*, are punished with the *extremest rigour*. We must distinguish therefore between *Discipline* and *Doctrine*, as also between *faith* and *obedience*.

And in confirmation of this, we may remember another reason, why a toleration is more allowable to *Papists*, than to the *Dissenters*, viz, because it is notoriously known, that the *Papists* have ventured both their *lives* and *fortunes* to support our present Government, as it is by Law established, even against the very *Dissenters*,

Dissenters, who rebelld against it, and by *force of arms*, and *open hostility*, endeavour'd totally to subvert it. And having obtain'd a victory, did actually destroy both our *lawful King and Governour*, as well as government.

Mer. This is too true, and it were impudence to deny any part of it. But it hath been said, that the *Papists* in our late troubles ventur'd their lives, more out of hopes of their *own establishment*, than of the *Government*.

Trav. That, under favour, is a malicious and a *frivolous* objection. For what grounds of hopes had they to alter the Government, against the consent of the *whole Nation*, when joyn'd with so considerable a part, as the *Church of England*, they were both overcome by the *Dissenters*, it was morally impossible. Besides, they had generally taken the Oath of Allegiance, which for ought I can hear, they have not broken, (generally I suppose, for if there be any of them who refuse the Oath of Allegiance, I look upon them as out of the *Kings Protection*, and

and little better, or full as dangerous as open enemies,.) Nor can I imagine, what other Government, they could, or were ever suppos'd to introduce, contrary to that, which was then establish'd, and which they swore to maintain. I am apt enough to believe, that they might hope for some ease or exemption from the rigour of the penal Laws, which neither you, nor I, can blame in them, if they had desir'd.

Men. But though they have taken the Oath of *Allegiance*, yet you see, that they will not be prevail'd upon, to take the Oath of *Supremacy*. And you know, that according to our Law, the King is no less head of the Ecclesiastical than of the Civil Government.

They. True, Sir. But this is as much an argument against the Dissenters, as the Papists. For it is not a greater crime in them, nor prejudice to the State, to tolerate men, who by the principles of their Religion, are taught to submit their Consciences to another Spiritual guide in Spiritual matters, as many Sovereign Princes them-

themselves do at this day; than those who ~~owning~~ the King, to be Supreme head of the Church by their words, ~~down~~ him by their ~~actions~~, that is, in not obeying his Laws, or Rebelling against him as such.

Besides, it is well known, that the general opinion of the *Papists* *Reasants*, (the Laity I mean) concerning the Pope's Supremacy hath no ill influence upon our Civil Government, which is that, which I chiefly intend in this discourse, but that they think themselves indispensably oblig'd, to defend our Lawful Kings, and their Civil Authority, not only against all temporal powers whatsoever, but even against the Pope himself.

Mer. This, Sir, I have heard much controverted, and the contrary opinion affirm'd by some of their own Writers, that is to say, That the Pope may, and doth Excommunicate heretick Kings, as he calls them. By which act, their Subjects are no more bound to pay them their obedience, nay, and can absolve the people from their Oath of Allegiance, and impower them to de-
pose

possess their natural and lawful Prince, and
set up some other in his stead. Now,
Sir, this is such a doctrine, as makes
the *Papists* incapable of ever being
trusted under any *Protestant Govern-*
ment.

Trav. I confess, Sir, I have heard
that some private men have main-
tain'd some such erroneous and pernicious
Principles, and flattering the
Pope, have endeavour'd to raise his
power to a much sublimer pitch, than
ever Christ himself, or any of his Apo-
stles pretended it should arrive. But,
Sir, as Temporal Princes have been
ever usurping upon one another, and
by most unchristian ways, sacrificed
the innocent blood of many thousands
of men, for the promoting their own
greatness, and satisfying their ambi-
tious designs, so these *Spiritual Em-*
perours have follow'd too much the
ill examples of Temporal Princes. And
being, it may be, more solicitous to
extend their power, than encrease the
number of true believers, have per-
verted the good use of St. Peters Keys,
and have rather opened by them the
door

door of dissension, and discord upon
earth, than the gates of the Heavenly
Paradise.

For some years, these holy Fathers
exercised their arms against one ano-
ther, and how much blood and horrid
troubles the dispute between the Bi-
shop of Rome, and Patriarch of Con-
stantinople concerning Primacy, hath
cost Christendom, is sufficiently re-
corded in History. I may add farther,
that this their contention, became at
last the ruine of the Greek Empire;
but hitherto the Temporal Princes en-
joy'd their rights and Privileges un-
disturb'd, until Hildebrand, otherwise
called Gregory the seventh, arrogated
to himself a Sovereign authority over
all Christian Kings and Emperours,
as may be seen at large in the History
of Henry the fourth Emperour of Ger-
many, who was the first unfortunate
example of the Papal usurpation, which
is confirm'd by a learned Roman Ca-
tholick Bishop, and one who lived in
the Reign of Fred. the first, his words
are these: *Lego & religo*, saith he,
Romanorum Regum & Imperatorum
gesta,

gesta, & nunquam invenitur quinquaginta
eorum ante hunc à Romano Pontifice ex-
communicatum vel regno privatum, nisi
forte quis pro Anathemate habendum
ducat, quod Philippus ad breve tempus à
Romano Episcopo inter penitentes colla-
catus, & Theodosius à beato Ambrosio
propter clementiam eadem à liminibus Ec-
clesiæ sequestratus sit. Ottofrising. c. 35.

After this, several encroachments
were made upon other Princes, and the
Popes (making use as well of St. Paul's
Sword, as St. Peter's Keys) reduc'd
most of them under their obedience,
and as the same Author expresses it,
destroy'd them by that very power, which
they had first receiv'd from the benemo-
lence of the Emperours themselves; seem-
ing to imitate therein the Prophet David,
who first overcame the Philistine by the
providence of God, and then cut off his
head with his own Sword. Videntur cul-
pandi Sacerdotes per omnia, qui regnum
suo gladio, quem ipsi à regibus habent gra-
tia ferire conentur, nisi forte David
imitari cogitent, qui Philistinum primo
virtute Dei superavit, postmodum proprio
gladio jugulavit.

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Now,

Now, Sir, after the Popes were in possession of these great Privileges, and had perswaded the people to contribute as well to their own, as their Princes slavery, by granting them this universal right of power, it is no wonder if some of their own Clergy have endeavoured by false arguments, to maintain this usurped authority. But, Cousin, it is well known, that this is now become no more, than an old antiquated title, and gives him no right over Sovereign Princes at this day. It is true, those Princes, who submitted themselves to the confiscations of the Council of Trent, permit the Pope to exercise some Spiritual Jurisdiction in their Kingdoms. But it is universally, and publicly declared, that the Popes have no Civil or Temporal Authority over Sovereign Princes, nor can they by their Spiritual power, or authority deprive any Prince, or depose any King, or dissolve any Subject from their Faith, Obedience, or Oath of Allegiance. Can you give an instance of any such public declaration, made by

any Popish Kings, and consented to by the Roman Clergy.

Ans. Yes, Sir, and that so fully, that there can remain no scruple or difficulty, and it is by the most Christian King of France, and eldest son of the Roman Church, and a severe persecutor of the Protestant Religion. I will give you the words of the Declaration it self, as far as it concerns this particular, that you may the better judge your self of the truth. It is Declared by the Gallick Church, *Præter beato Petro ejusque successoribus, Christi Vicariis ipsique Ecclesie rerum spiritualium, & ad æternam salutem pertinetium, non autem civilium & temporalium à Deo, traditam potestatem, &c. Reges ergo & Principes in temporalibus nulli Ecclesiæ potestati Dei ordinatione subjecti, neque auctoritate clavium Ecclesiæ, directe vel indirecte, deponi, aut illarum subditos eximi, à fide atque obedientia ac præstito fidelitatis Sacramento, sibi posse. Hancque sententiam publicæ tranquillitati necessariam nec minus Ecclesiæ quam Imperio grilem, ut verbo Dei patrum traditioni & Sanctorum ex-*

emplis consonam— omnino retinendam.

Which is thus Englished. It is Declared— First, that the Power of Spiritual things and such as concern eternal Salvation, but not of Civil or Temporal affairs, was delivered by God to the blessed Peter and his Successors Christ's Vicars, and to the Church it self, &c. Kings therefore and Princes in Temporal affairs are not Subjected by the appointment of God to any Ecclesiastical power; nor can they be directly or indirectly depos'd by the authority of the Keys of the Church; nor can their Subjects be freed or absolv'd from their Faith and Obedience, and their Oath of Fidelity. And let this Sentence necessary to the publick tranquillity, nor less profitable for the Church than State, be irrevocable as agreeing with the Word of God, the Tradition of Fathers, and the Examples of the Saints or holy men.

This, Sir, is the first article in the Declaration of the French Clergy, which is asserted, registred, and confirmed by the whole University of Paris, the Sorbone, and Faculties des Droits Civil and Canon, as may be seen fully in the

Edict

Edict du Roy, sur la Declaration faite par le Clergie de France de ces sentimens touchant la puissance Ecclesiastique, and published this present year 1683.

Now Sir, in my opinion, this so solemn and national declaration, together with the concurrence and constant profession of all the English Roman Catholicks, that I have met with, doth sure by much overbalance the writings of any private men or Jesuits whatsoever. And such Principles (although they be most erroneous, and most damnable) yet when we come to examine the case impartially between the very Jesuits, and our Dissenters, even as it relates to these most horrid positions, we shall find these Dissenters have so far outgone the Jesuits themselves in the Doctrine of Deposing Heretick Princes (that is to say Princes who differ from the Church of Rome in Fundamentals, or Speculative Doctrines, which they believe absolutely necessary to Salvation) that they have dared to maintain publicly the Doctrine of Deposing even Protestant Princes, and their own natural and

most lawful Sovereigns, and absolving their Subjects from their Oaths of Allegiance, and this, not for any difference in the Doctrinal part, which is absolutely necessary to Salvation, but for Discipline only and Church Government, which right of Government is so inherent to the Imperial Crown of England, that it makes up, and is one of the constituent parts of it. And that these are the very principles of our Dissenters, I refer you, for ample satisfaction, to their own very words where and when delivered, as they have been Collected and Published by the care and diligence of the most worthy Mr. L'Estrange, in his Dissenters Sayings. Now when our Dissenters shall think fit to make so Solemn and Publick a Declaration as the Papists have done at Paris, against the Doctrine of Deposing Kings, and absolving Subjects (as is before recited) I shall be as ready to do the Dissenters justice in that particular, as I have now done to the Papists.

Merch. Sir, I perceive you are a very good advocate for the Papists, and indeed I must needs confess, that

I am abundantly satisfied, with those arguments, which you have produced in their favour, and do heartily wish, they could as well comply with the Spiritual, as I am perswaded they will live peaceably and quietly under the Civil Government.

And as to the present question of *Toleration* between the *Papists* and the *Dissenters*, I perceive that the force of your argument consists in this, that the *Dissenters*, (besides their more than *Jesuitical* principles, most pernicious to Civil Government, as hath been now declared) that they (I say) agreeing with the Church of England in the *Doctrine*, differ chiefly concerning *Government*, to which in conscience they ought, and confess, they may submit: but the *Papists* disagreeing in the *Doctrine* and *speculative points*, which they believe *absolutely necessary* to *Salvation*, cannot possibly comply with us, without the *apparent* danger of eternal *damnation*. So having a more justifiable pretence, to differ from us in the *Spiritual Government* *only*, than the *Dissenters* in either the

Ecclesiastical or *Temporal*, they ought
 the *rather* of the *two* to be *tolerated*.
 Truly the reason of this is very *obvi-*
ous in the *Oeconomy* of our families.
 For if a Master should command two
 of his *Sons* or *Servants*, to go, for
 example, half a score miles upon ear-
 nest business; and the *one* should ex-
 cuse himself for this reason, that he
 is *certainly* assured, or believes *positive-*
ly and *unfeignedly*, that a company of
Robbers or a *Lion* is in the way,
 (which answers to *Damnation*, in
 the case of the *Papists*) and that he
 shall be *murdered* or *devoured*; that
 the other *Son*, or *Servant*, having *no*
such fears upon him, doth *neverthe-*
less upon some much more slight,
 and *frivolous* pretence *obstinately* re-
 fuse to obey the *Master*, desiring also
 that *hence* forward, the *Master* would
 go upon his own errand himself, (which
 agrees with the *whole* *defension* that the
Dissenters require from the *Govern-*
ment) I think indeed in this case,
 though *both* be guilty of disobedience,
 yet the *former* is much more *excusable*,
 and *tolerable* than the *latter*, and that
 the

the obstinate Servant, is much more unreasonable, and dangerous in the family, than the other. I can say nothing against this, but only wish, that the one had less fear, and the other more duty and respect.

Having then, Sir, given me full satisfaction, concerning these three main points, viz? our Liberties, Properties, and Religion, under our present Government; in which having found no faults negatively, we ought not to desire any change or innovation. Yet nevertheless be pleased to let me know affirmatively why a Commonwealth might not be rationally promoted and set up in this present troublesome conjuncture of our affairs.

True. Let us then agree, that our Author designs a Commonwealth, as I have already prov'd from his own mouth. Besides, the constitution of his mixed Government will inevitably bring it upon us, or return us again to a Monarchy, where we are. For though he doth not tell us plainly, that he designs to abolish the King and Royal family, yet so many inconveniences will happen, that

as (it may be,) in the beginning of the late *Traiterous Association*, all the Traitors might not at first resolve upon the barbarous murder of his Majesty and Royal Highness; yet when they were once engag'd in the one, they found the other so necessary to be effected, that it was morally impossible to succeed in the former, until the latter was actually executed.

It being then most certain, that our Authors intention was to establish a Common wealth, I shall now give you my reasons, why we ought not upon any terms to admit of it.

And first, I shall not insist much upon those vulgar inconveniences, which are visible to all men. As for example, the inevitable consequences of most bloody wars. For can any rational man believe, that all the Royal family, should be so insensible of their right and honour as never to push for three Kingdoms, which would so justly belong to them, or could they be supposed to leave England, under their popular usurpation; what

what reason hath *Scotland* to truckle
 under the Domination of the *Eng-
 lish* Commonalty? What pretence
 hath the *English* Subject, (supposing
 they were to share in the *English* Go-
 vernment,) over the Kingdom of
Scotland? All the world knows that
 that Kingdom, belongs so particular-
 ly to our King, that the late Rebels
 themselves, did not scruple to call
 him *King of the Scots*. Why should
Ireland also become a Province to an
English Parliament? Or should both
 Kingdoms be willing to shake off the
 Government of their *Natural, Law-
 ful* and *antient* Monarchy, why should
 they not set up a Democracy, or an
 Aristocracy, or what else they pleas'd
 amongst themselves? Is there never
 a Statesman in the three Kingdoms
 but *Plato Redivivus*? Can none
 teach them to Rebel but he? No
 rules to maintain an *usurpt* Authority,
 but what we find among his extra-
 vagancies? I am confident you do
 not believe it. Shall these people, no-
 toriously known to have hated one
 another, whilst formerly they were
 under

under different Governours, become the strictest friends, when they shall return unto those circumstances, under which they were the greatest enemies? Will the *French King* take no advantage, (having so good a pretext) of our *Divisions*? Or should we unite against him, under our popular Governours, was it ever known that a *Confederate* army was able to defend themselves long, against an Army of equal strength, commanded by one sole absolute Monarch? Can we foresee any thing, but most desperate wars, and can wars be supported, but by most heavy taxes? Were not our *Thimbles* and *Bodkins* converted in the late times into *Swords* and *Mortar pieces*, and by a prodigious transmutation, never before heard of, were not our *Gold* and *Ear-rings* turn'd into a *brazen Idol*? These consequences, Cousin, and dismal effects of a Commonwealth, besides many other, are so obviouse, that I shall not spend any more time to mind you of them. Supposing then that none of those former horrid inconveniences might

might happen, I must mind you by the way, that one reason why our Author and the *Associators* desire a Commonwealth, proceeds from the fear of a certain *Arbitrary power*, which they pretend the King would introduce, as may be seen, pag. 161. 208. and in several other places.

Now, Though nothing be more extravagant, than such a groundless imagination, our Author having assured us, that his Majesty never did one act of *Arbitrary power*, since his happy restoration. And moreover, pag. 176, That our laws against *Arbitrary power*, are abundantly sufficient. Yet, that we may no more dispute this point, I must produce *Plato's own* authority against himself in these words: That the King fears his power will be so lessened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head, pag. 208. Nay, farther in pag. 214. he shews us, That it is impossible he should ever become an *Arbitrary King*. For his present power, as little as it is, is yet greater, than the condition of property can admit, and in a word, from his beloved *Apology*,
might

rism, and the whole course of his *Libel*, he endeavours to prove, that *Dominion being founded on the property*, and the *property being in the people*, the King can have *no manner of hopes* upon earth, of becoming *absolute*, nor introducing an *Arbitrary Government*, but by some Army of Angels from Heaven, who must procure him an Authority, which he cares not for.

The next, and *main reason*, why our Author would set up a Democracy, at least as far as I can collect, from the whole scope of his discourse, is, because *the State inclines to popularity*.

Now, Sir, for this last time, I must make use of our Author's *own reasons*, against his *own positions*, and do affirm, that for *this very reason*, (were there no other) all sober men, and true Politicians, ought to oppose with their utmost endeavours, a *Popular Government*.

I will not recount to you the many *mischiefs, desolations and destructions*, which a *popular power* hath brought along with it, wherever it got the
better

*better of the antient Eſtabliſhed Govern-
 ment of the place. Somewhat hath
 been already ſaid to this purpoſe in
 our diſcourſe, and much more may
 be read, in the Hiſtories of moſt parts
 of the world, to which I refer you,
 and ſhall only mind you of ſome inevi-
 table conſequences, which will follow
 ſuch an innovation amongſt our ſelves.
 And firſt, if it be true, that the King
 hath no power to make himſelf abſolute,
 then we have no cauſe to apprehend an
 Arbitrary power in him, and by con-
 ſequence, no reaſon to change.*

*But if the Inclination of the people
 be ſuch, that they will take advantage
 of the King's want of power, and intro-
 duce their own Government, what
 moderation may we expect from men,
 towards thoſe, who are to become their
 Subjects, who ſhaking off all ſenſe of
 Juſtice, Law, Religion, and temper, dare
 uſurp the Sovereign authority over their
 natural Governour? Where ſhall we ap-
 peal for mercy, when having cut the
 throat of the moſt merciful King in Eu-
 rope, we expoſe our own to our ambi-
 tious and unmerciful Tyrants? Where
 ſhall*

shall we expect *compassion* towards *Wretches*, when we shall become *Patri-
cides* and *Regicides* to our *father* and our
King? Where shall we seek after *Equi-
ty*, when the *House of Lords*, the *su-
preme Court of Equity*, are most unjustly
turn'd out of doors? And what end of our
miserics can we ever hope for, when our
Tyrants by our *willenots*, *Authors* *confi-
tation*, have not only got all the *Wealth*
and *Militia* into their hands, but have
perpetuated their *usurpation*, by *annual*
Parliaments, never to end? Who being
Judges of their own *priviledges*, p. 244
may regulate elections, as they shall think
fit, p. 249. *Sit*, *Adjourn*, *Prorogue*, and
Dissolve, as they alone shall judge ex-
pedient.

What more barbarous villany was
ever propos'd, and publish'd, under a *beni-
gnant* and *peaceable* Government, besides
our own, upon earth? But suppose our
poor Country thus enslav'd, and our *en-
tinent Kingdom* turn'd into a *Common-
wealth*, what can our new *masters* do for
us more than is already done? Can our
liberties be greater, as to our *persons* and
estates? It is impossible to suppose it.

Will

Will our *proposals* be more *tolerated*?
 will the *Laws* that ever were upon earth,
 under any Government, cannot make
 them more *tolerable*?
 In Nothing then can remain, but *liber-*
ty in Religion, which we call, of *Con-*
science. Shall all Religions, as *Papists*,
Orthodox Protestants, *Presbyterians*, *Inde-*
pendents, and other *Fanatics* and *Secta-*
ries, be *promiscuously* tolerated? If not
 all, then injustice must be done to those
 who are restrained. Who being all e-
 qually *freedom Subjects*, our *grievances*
 will not thereby be heard. If all, can
 any man of sense and sobriety imagine,
 that men of such *different* principles,
 aggravated too by *strong animosities*, and
prejudice, will rejoice, or be satisfied, to
 see the tranquility or propagation of
 those principles which they hate and be-
 lieve most *damnable*? Will should they
 establish one Church, which should be
 the *mother Church*, under whose *disci-*
pline and government, the other *different*
Congregations were to be regulated?
 would it be the *Orthodox Church of Eng-*
land? Ah, Cousin, let us consider, what
 our *Author* declares, *John 8. I will not*,

says he, the little creature the Church of
 England hath among the people, most which
 hath been saved, and which hath been
 kept, as a thing, which is left among
 us, in our Churches, Courts,
 Alms, Crises, Bishops, and other
 Courts, and the whole Hierarchy, besides
 an infinite number of such, as of such
 furious Ceremonies, and the horrible
 viciousness of the Clergy in general, as they
 are with those, that are about them.
 So that there is no hope that Popery can
 be kept out, but by a company of poor people
 call'd Fanatics, who are driven into cor-
 ners as the first Christians were, and who
 only in truth conserve the Purity of Chris-
 tian Religion, as it was planted by Christ
 and his Apostles, and is contrary to the
 world, and all that is contrary to it.
 Now, Sir, can we hope that such im-
 pudent Fanatics, who dare publish all
 this, even whilst our Government is in
 being, will fail to introduce his severe
 discipline, and bring his poor Fanatics
 out of their corners, when he or his
 disciples, shall be once themselves at
 the helm in our Palace, and then
 will he fail, I think you, to see the
 Religion of the Church of Eng-
 land,

Law by Law established, or its pro-
 fessors to enjoy those just rights and
 privileges which they have done ever
 since the first plantation of Christia-
 nity among us? Or shall we not be all
 crowded into those corners, from
 whence he shall have fetcht his poor
 Apostolick Epistles? Will the Papists
 have better measure than the Prote-
 stants, and will this be a settling the
 Nation, and redressing its Grievances?
 Must our gracious King, and his law-
 ful Successors, who alone do and can
 and are willing still to protect us, be de-
 serted, and shall we run headlong into
 the open jaws of those weeping wall-
 ing, cawing, praying, still assembling,
 but ever devouring Crocodiles? Dear
 Cousin, oblige me not to speak more
 upon such a dismal subject, the con-
 sideration of which, must either break
 our hearts, or raise our indignation be-
 yond that temper, which I would wil-
 lingly retain.
 My dear Sir, assure your self, that I
 heartily comply with you in all that
 you have said, and sympathize with you
 no less in your just resentment, than
 in your fears.

fear of their ~~disobedience~~ ^{disobedience} ~~machinations~~
 But we have a God most manifestly
 gracious to us, in his wonderful preservation
 of his Majesties person, and assist-
 ed by our ~~deep~~ ^{deep} and ~~innumerable~~ ^{innumerable} con-
 spiracies against him. We have a King,
 merciful, loving, and tender of us, even
 beyond the ordinary extent of humane
 nature; a Countess wise, Loyal and val-
 eunt, and a people universally detest-
 ing this Traiterous Association, and all
 the consequences of it. And for my
 own particular, let that moment be the
 last of my life, when I comply with
 our ~~false~~ ^{false} Authors detestable propo-
 sitions.

Mrs. S. I am most ~~very~~ ^{very} glad to
 find you so well satisfied, and will
 hope, that the plainness and sincerity,
 which I have used, in obeying your
 commands, will qualify the tediousness,
 and my want of judgment. If there
 yet remains any thing which you
 would have me explain to you, pray
 proceed, for we have yet a little time
 left before Dinner.

Mrs. S. I find one ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~two~~
 turned down, let us see what they
 contain,

contains, and then I have done. In a
 speaking of a certain Act of Parli-
 ament, which it seems he cannot pro-
 duce, concerning answering all peti-
 tions, before the Parliament could be
 dismissed, he tells us, *That if there*
were nothing at all of this, nor any record
entire concerning it, yet he must believe
this is so, by the fundamental Law of
the Government, which must be true, and
imperfect without it. For it is allow'd to
have no Parliaments at all, but when the
King pleases, and to allow a power in him,
to dismiss them when he will, that is, when
they refuse to do what he will. Here you
 see, Sir, he couples granting petitions,
 and a power in the King to dissolve
 Parliaments together. The one he af-
 firms, the other he denies. What have
 you to say to this?
 Answer. Nothing, Sir, only desire
 you to remark, as I suppose you have
 done all along, the prodigious impudence,
 and error of our Author, who dares
 advance his own private opinion in mat-
 ter of Law, against several Statutes de-
 termining absolutely the contrary, the
 universal consent of all Lawyers, and
 com-

have you any thing of
 the Duke of York? Our Author you
 see speaks a great deal concerning
 him. Something look for it
 deliver to him through the
 difficulty, as it looks upon it as ridiculous
 I know No, Sir, the Royal physicians
 and scholars, are as much as our
 sudden disease, as our Author would
 have us believe, and we have but
 therefore to pray, that God would
 please to continue his long blessing to
 these Nations, and that we may be his
 left protected by his Council, than that
 feared by him more than Herodotus
 and pretend to govern
 Merch. Pray give us then your opi-
 nion concerning our share in general
 Where there is no doubt, as
 there can be no doubt, besides, I never
 held it to be the greatest misfortune and
 woe, imaginable, to presume to
 go to the great Council of
 the Nation, and to be absent from
 All for my own part, I have not mind
 nor of pretended success in a business
 Have you any thing more? Confine
 particular?

Merch.

• Merch.

Merch. Sir, I have made some other
few remarks, as the *impertinent* com-
parisons, which *Plaza* hath made of a
Baylis, *Attorney*, or *Referee*, as they
relate to the choosing the Speaker of the
House of Commons, all which is directly
against himself, his magisterial defi-
nition of *Prerogative*, and many other
arrogances and *folies*, all which, I
hope I shall be able to answer my self
without giving you any further
trouble.

True, Sir, I do not in the least doubt
on it, however if any thing hath been
omitted, in which I may be able to give
you farther satisfaction, I shall ever
be ready to obey your Commands.

Caelum ipsum polimur stultitia; neque
Per nostrum parvum factum:
Iraunda, componere stultitia.
Mors. Quia l. r. co. y.

CONTENTS.

DISCOURSE I.

Of the *English* *Government*, *compar'd with* *England*, *Page* 1. *Of* *Plato*, *Lycorgus*, *Sparta*, *and* *Athens*, p. 26. 27. & sequen. *The* *original* *of* *the* *Grecian* *Government*, p. 31. *Of* *Solon*, p. 37. *Of* *Athens*, p. 41. *Of* *Sparta*, p. 47. *The* *Sphero*, p. 48.

DISCOURSE II.

Division of *Government*, p. 59. *Of* *the* *House* *of* *Commons*, p. 63. *Of* *the* *House* *of* *Lords*, p. 66. 67. *Of* *the* *Kings* *prerogative* *in* *Adjourning*, *Proroguing*, *and* *Dis-* *solving* *Parliaments*, p. 73. *The* *be-* *ginning* *of* *Government* *before* *the* *Flood*, p. 76. *After* *the* *Flood*, 78. *Of* *Ogy-* *ges*, *Sithuthrus*, *Denealip* *Noc*, p. 79.

THE FOUNDATION

[illegible]

THE CONTENTS.

ment against the malicious reflections of
 Plato Red. p. 274. 277. Sovereign
 right of power solely in the King, p. 279.
 284. Of the Kings negative voice in
 Parliament, p. 281. The Kings of Eng-
 land depend not upon the people, nor re-
 ceived their right of power from them, p.
 285. & seq. 288. The Goths not in Eng-
 land, p. 291. Of the Saxons and their
 Tenures, p. 293. 297. Of our late Parlia-
 ment, p. 295. Of K. Edward the Confessor,
 p. 298. Plato Red. designs to set up a
 Commonwealth, p. 304. Of the Kings pro-
 negative, p. 306. Of our Liberties, p. 315.
 Of Calumniators, p. 317. Of our Propen-
 sities, p. 322. Of Annual Parl. p. 325. Of
 Religion, p. 333. Of Dissenters, p. 335.
 Of Popish Recusants, 340. Of Toleration,
 342. Of the Popes Supremacy, 350. 355.
 Dissenters Doctrine of Deposing Princes,
 357. A Commonwealth not to be promoted
 in this present conjuncture of affairs, 362.
 367. Of Arbitrary power in the King, 365.
 Of Liberty of Conscience, 369.

ERRATA

In the Preface, line 1. for Inquity, read Inquiry. p. 60.
 p. 117. put out But. p. 120. for parliament, & parliament.
 l. 11. for Abydema, & Abydema. p. 186. l. 1. for Govern-
 ment, & faith. p. 143. l. ult. for Vital heat, & Animal
 spirits. p. 144. l. 1. for Veins, & Nerves. p. 185. 255, 256,
 294 for Præda, & prædia. p. 186. for licentiam, & licentiam.

